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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the relative merits of econometric modeling, statistical and judgmental 
techniques for predicting debt crises and assessing the risk of credit migration. The increased 
reliance on econometric or statistical approaches and credit rating systems in risk management 
has intensified the need for more rigorous analysis of their finite sample properties. A better 
understanding of the available tools has implications for credit risk management, regulation and 
policy decision-making. 
The thesis contributes to the extant sovereign risk literature in three areas. First, it addresses 
the question of whether controlling for unobserved heterogeneity is important for predicting debt 
crises and explores a pervasive inference problem in Early Warning Systems (EWSs). Second, it 
addresses the development of an `optimal' EWS for sovereign debt crises that accommodates the 
decision maker's preferences. Third, it considers the measurement of sovereign credit migration 
matrices using different estimators and explores non Markov effects in the rating dynamics. 
Chapter 2 confronts competing models of sovereign default that differ in how country-, 
region- and time-specific effects are treated. Statistical tests and information criteria over- 
whelmingly favour more complex models with country heterogeneity that possibly changes over 
time. However, simplicity beats complexity in terms of forecasting. Simple pooled logit para- 
meterization, that control either for regional heterogeneity or for time effects produce the most 
accurate forecasts and outperform several naive predictors. 
Chapter 3 investigates the severity of the autocorrelation problem in EWS of sovereign 
default. This stems from seeking to provide crisis warnings over a horizon that is longer than the 
frequency at which the forecasts are updated and from the sluggishness of the typical exogenous 
indicators. Neglecting residual serial autocorrelation in such models is shown to be far from 
innocuous. Inferences are overturned when using a correction. This phenomenon is generally 
clearer for the macroeconomic ratios that are more persistent. 
Chapter 4 combines three fundamentally different classification techniques 
- 
econometric, 
statistical and judgmental- to produce an EWS for sovereign default. The optimal choice of 
crucial EWS elements is shown to depend on the decision-makers' preferences. The forecast 
ranking of classifiers is found to be unstable and overall the classifiers appear to have different 
strengths. Payoffs from forecast combination are documented and the combining scheme is 
shown to depend on the decision-makers' loss function. 
Chapter 5 turns to the estimation of sovereign transition probability matrices and evaluates 
the popular discrete multinomial estimator against two continuous hazard rate methods that 
differ in their treatment of time-heterogeneity. Bootstrap simulations of the rating generating 
process reveal interesting insights. Hazard rate estimators yield more reliable default probabil- 
ities. Efficiency is further enhanced upon relaxing homogeneity. Downgrade momentum and 
duration effects are found to be present in the rating process. 
viii 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview of the Research 
Over the last two decades, several costly lessons have led to a new emphasis on inter- 
national credit risk management. The key impulse for the renewed concern was the 
high-profile debt defaults by sovereigns. In many regions, through a spillover mechanism, 
various countries have experienced at least one serious bout of debt-servicing trouble in 
the recent past. In the early 1990s the Mexican peso crisis led to some debt defaults, 
while in 1997 the Asian `meltdown' evidently spread through Eastern Europe and Latin 
America triggering a chain of unprecedented credit jitters 
- 
in 1998, the plummeting 
of the Russian ruble pushes the Russian government to default on the US dollar de- 
nominated `MinFin' bonds; 1999, Pakistan seeks a restructuring of its foreign bank debt 
obligations with the Paris Club lenders; ' 2000, Ukraine defaults on Eurobonds and US 
dollar denominated bonds; 2000, Ecuador declares the first-ever default on Brady Bonds; 2 
2001, Argentina announces the largest sovereign default in history. In the aftermath of 
the upheaval, financial institutions and regulators became painfully aware of the credit 
exposure to international lending. Multinational banks that had lent heavily in these re- 
gions over the last two decades failed in record numbers. As the Asian markets collapsed 
'The Paris Club is the term used to describe the monthly meetings between 19 creditor and debtor 
nations to negotiate and discuss each country's financial obligations to the others. Frequently, relief 
measures are drawn up for third world and developing countries that cannot meet their liabilities. The 
Paris Club permanent creditor members are governments with large claims on various other governments 
throughout the world (the claims may be held directly by the government or through its appropriate 
institutions). They include European countries, as well as USA, Japan, Australia and Canada. 
213rady bonds are dollar bonds issued by a country to be swapped for outstanding loans. They have 
a much longer maturity than that promised on the original loans and a lower coupon than the interest 
rate on the original loan. The principal is usually collateralized through the holding of U. S. T-bonds. 
Once loans are swapped for bonds by banks and other financial institutions, they can be sold on the 
secondary market. This restructuring program was developed under the authority of the U. S. Treasury's 
1989 Brady Plan and other international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
1 
financial institutions in Japan and Hong-Kong failed and were either forced to merge or 
reconstruct. In 1998, Chase Manhattan, which has been the biggest lender in Latin Amer- 
ica, took off its books $2.6 billion aiming to reduce its credit exposure to the continent. 
As a result, country risk measurement is at the centre of modern risk management and 
international capital allocation. Its importance has been recently emphasised by Kristin 
Forbes (MIT, US Treasury): "What we should care about and what I would like to see 
more work go into is models predicting things such as external financing difficulties and 
financial systems vulnerabilities, just as a few examples". ' 
The objective of this thesis is to explore issues pertaining to modeling, estimation and 
forecasting in the context of sovereign debt and to investigate how such issues can be 
exploited in designing a sovereign risk assessment device. A number of features make the 
current study distinct. First, a systematic analysis of the importance of cross-country, 
regional and timely differences in sovereign repayment performance is carried out. Sec- 
ond, a rigorous forecast evaluation framework for sovereign default is developed, which 
could also be applied in the related contexts of currency and banking crises. Third, we 
delve into a number of empirical issues regarding the optimal design of an Early Warning 
System (EWS). Fourth, we compare the finite sample properties of rival transition matrix 
estimators on which very little is known in the context of sovereigns. The dataset for the 
analysis includes sovereign debt and credit rating data for a broad range of developed, 
emerging and less developed countries (LDC) since the early 1980s. The data span encom- 
passes the major recent sovereign debt crises in Latin America, Asia and Eastern Europe. 
The findings from this study will be useful for practitioners in Central Banks, financial in- 
stitutions and rating agencies interested in the development of EWSs for sovereign default 
and the estimation of sovereign rating migration probabilities. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the concept 
of sovereign risk and its importance. Section 1.3 describes the motivation and objective 
3Panelist in the `2001 Economic Forum' organized by the IMF. 
2 
of this study. Finally, Section 1.4 outlines the layout of the thesis. 
1.2 Importance of Sovereign Risk: The Stakeholders 
1.2.1 The Concepts of Sovereign and Transfer Risks 
A commonly used definition of sovereign risk provided by Claessens and Embrechts (2002) 
is: "The risk of exposure to losses caused by events in a particular country, which may 
be under the control of the government but not under the control of a private enterprise 
or individual". The notion of sovereign risk is very broad and encompasses all forms of 
foreign lending in a country 
- 
to the government, a bank, a private enterprise or an 
individual. It comprises a variety of economic, political, social, cultural or legal factors 
that could render the fulfilment of foreign currency debt obligations uncertain. 
Sovereign risk encapsulates private credit risk. A distressed government may impose 
prohibitive exchange restrictions to private foreign borrowers within its domicile so that 
the latter cannot make any debt repayment despite being in a good credit position. This 
is an example of transfer risk and could be one of the most important drivers of country 
risk. Thus, international lenders to private entities are also concerned with the sovereign 
risk quality of the country in which the private borrower resides. The latter is reflected 
in the risk weights of the New Basel Accord whose implications are described in detail 
below in Section 1.2.4.4 Another feature that differentiates sovereign risk analysis from 
corporate credit risk analysis is the important role of a sovereign's willingness to fulfill 
debt obligations. By contrast, corporate credit risk revolves around the ability for debt 
repayment, which is an easier to quantify concept. As opposed to corporates, sovereigns 
cannot file for bankruptcy. As a result, the characterisation of a sovereign default event 
has been the subject of various controversies. There is no single definition of sovereign 
4Risk weighting for interbank loans includes two options. The first is based on the (rating-based) 
weighting of the sovereign in which the bank is incorporated. The second is based on the assessment of 
the individual bank. 
3 
default, however, the leading rating agencies have set the grounds for a definition that 
is becoming commonly accepted and utilised. According to Moody's (Moody's, 2003), a 
sovereign issuer is in default if one or more of the following conditions are met: 
1. There is a missed or delayed payment of interest and/or principal, even if the delayed 
payment is made within the `grace period', if any. 5 
2. A distressed exchange occurs (rescheduling or restructuring) where: 
" 
The issuer offers lenders a new security or package of securities that amount to 
a diminished financial obligation such as debt instruments with a lower coupon 
or par value and/or longer maturity. 
" 
The exchange had the purpose of aiding the borrower to avoid a stronger event 
of default (such as missed interest or principal payment). 
Such rescheduling agreements are reached after negotiations between the sovereign bor- 
rower and international loan syndicates that comprise major international banks. 6 
1.2.2 Policymakers and the Emerging Markets Case 
The growing degree of interdependence between emerging and developed markets has 
also had implications for country risk assessment. Emerging markets have increased their 
borrowing considerably in order to modernize their economies and improve their com- 
petitiveness in western markets. The degrees of liberalization of convertible-currency 
imports and borrowing in the individual countries differed depending upon internal polit- 
ical choices. Latin American countries, in particular, have had a long history of reliance 
on foreign capital to finance their developments. In fact, the debt crisis of 1982 was born 
5'Grace period' is the period between the rescheduling and when the sovereign starts servicing the 
rescheduled debt obligation. 
6Citigroup, for example, was chosen as the lead bank negotiator in five major loan reschedulings in 
the 1980s, as well as in both the Mexican and South Korean reschedulings in the 1990s. 
4 
there, and a significant amount of outstanding Brady bonds is still associated with Latin 
American borrowers. 
Sovereign default risk plays a prominent role for those countries' economic, social and 
political well-being. Inability to generate the required foreign exchange will lead to balance 
of payments disequilibrium. Restoration of equilibrium implies economic adjustments like 
relative price changes, resource reallocation and income redistribution that are costly for 
a country's growth, unemployment and standards of living. Further, three other costs are 
inflicted by sovereign debt defaults. The first is associated to the cost of losing access 
to international capital markets (Eaton and Gersowitz, 1981). Investors have embraced 
emerging markets in the mid 1990s, however, the recent turmoil in some of them was 
enough to lead the total foreign direct investment flows downsurging by the end of the 
decade. The second refers to the costs due to direct sanctions such as the elimination 
of trade credits or the seizure of assets (Bulow and Rogoff, 1989). The third concerns 
the costs associated with a domestic stock market downhill. Recent anecdotal evidence 
suggests that country default risk has profound implications for a country's stock market 
performance (Clark and Kassimatis, 2004). Between December 1994 and February 1995, 
during the Mexican peso crisis, the Mexican stock market index fell by 38.7%. Asian 
stock markets plunged during the Asian crisis.? In August 1998, the Russia watched 
its stock market plummeting by 41.3% in the first month of the Russian crisis. The 
withdrawal of foreign capital from the domestic market can exacerbate the balance of 
payments disequilibrium and make economic adjustment even more costly. 
Governments of emerging markets today have greater incentives to avoid such penalties 
as their future depends heavily on their credit evaluation record. For emerging markets 
that rely on foreign lending to finance their needs, these are important issues as a troubled 
external financial profile could jeopardise their development. 
7From July 1997 to February 1998, the stock market in Thailand fell by 48.4%, in Indonesia by 81.7%, 
in Malaysia by 58.4%, in Philippines by 49.2% and in Korea by 63.1%. 
5 
1.2.3 Financial Institutions and International Lending 
Among the various risks that multinational banks face in modern financial markets is the 
financial stability of a borrower. Banks are seriously affected, through their loans, by 
worldwide economic changes and energy prices. In recent years, such exposure has caused 
enormous problems for US banks lending to LDC, Latin America and Asia (Saunders and 
Cornett, 2003). The timely fulfillment of debt obligations is not a modern phenomenon 
(Avramovic, 1958). However, over the last two decades, the magnitude of repayment prob- 
lems has reached unprecedented levels and has increasingly involved commercial banks. 
In 1982, when Mexico and Brazil announced their debt moratoria, 80% of the US banks' 
sovereign exposure was concentrated in Latin America. Various banks were later forced 
to increase their loan loss reserves with Citicorp alone setting aside $3 billion. One could 
easily argue that in many cases these loans appear to have been made with little judgment 
regarding the creditworthiness of the sovereign country. 
One lesson from World War II was that economic distress often leads to political 
turmoil, international tensions and military conflict. Factors that trigger sovereign risk 
could be attributed to various and complicated dynamics such as an economic decline, 
social unrest, possibility of war or a change in political ideology. Such uncertainties 
are clearly illustrated by the rapid global changes that followed the collapse of Eastern 
Europe during the last decade. Despite great efforts in assessing and measuring a country's 
risk, financial institutions have been caught off guard by sudden unexpected changes in 
a country's economic climate. The recent financial crises in Mexico (1994-95), Asian 
(1997-99) and Latin American (1999-01) have raised awareness on the importance of 
country risk. Only at this time US financial institutions, armed with the experience of 
the 1980s, limited their exposure to one third of that of their counterparts in Europe and 
Japan. Improved sovereign risk assessment techniques and mechanisms in dealing with 
such exposure did play an important role (Saunders and Cornett, 2003). Nevertheless, 
6 
J. P. Morgan Chase, Bank of America and other major players announced losses from 
emerging markets amounting to millions of dollars in the late 1990s. 
The importance of sovereign risk analysis is thus perceptible in various fronts. First, 
it is necessary to monitor the performance of existing loans and other investments (e. g. 
debt and equity claims). Second, organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank 
would be able to prevent crisis and effectively support countries exhibiting signs of finan- 
cial instability. Third, the effects of a financial crisis are not only felt in emerging markets 
but strong economies might suffer `equally' well by such turmoil. Fourth, sovereign risk 
analysis is not a tool for solely predicting financial crises; it is a vehicle of improving 
the decision-making process regarding capital budgeting and/or financing issues. Fifth, 
serious banking problems (or even failures) in developed economies, due to international 
lending, are presumed to generate serious negative externalities. Finally, due to integra- 
tion of financial markets it is sensible that foreign direct investment in LDC is necessary 
if global markets are to prosper. 
1.2.4 Regulators and the New Basel Capital Accord 
Financial institutions have devoted many resources to developing internal models for 
better quantifying their risks and assigning sovereign risk capital. These efforts have been 
recognized and encouraged by bank regulators. In response to that, in January 2001 the 
proposal for a New Basel Capital Accord (Basel II) launched by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, has reinforced the interest in obtaining loan default probabilities 
and rating transition matrices. 8 Banks are expected to apply the new risk management 
concepts not only to domestic borrowers but also to international lending in the next few 
years. In the light of Basel II, sovereign ratings by rating agencies, as well as internal 
bank ratings are expected to play an important role in the measurement of credit risk. 
8See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001). The Basel Committee is a regulatory body 
under the wings of the Bank of International Settlements. 
7 
One of the most important goals behind Basel II is to modify the actual risk weights 
using a methodology that more clearly identifies the differences in risks of various instru- 
ments. Both practitioners and academics already predict that rating systems and credit 
migration matrices will play a larger role in capturing these differences. Credit migra- 
tion matrices, which characterise the expected changes in credit quality of obligors are 
already cardinal inputs to many risk management applications, including portfolio risk 
management, modeling the term structure of credit spreads and pricing credit derivatives. 
Within the Basel II framework, two approaches are allowed for measuring credit risk: the 
standardized approach and the Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach. The standardised 
approach is a refinement of Basel I and postulates the use of ratings from the rating agen- 
cies for assessing the economic risk capital. ' The IRB method gives flexibility to banks to 
use their internal risk management systems for calculating capital requirements. Specif- 
ically, the Basel Committee advocates statistical models that capture all key variables 
driving credit risk, as well as expert (judgmental) risk ranking as tools for determining 
the overall risk level of credit instruments or portfolios. 10 Basel II leaves ample room for 
a statistical approach to risk. 
1.3 Motivation and Objective of the Thesis 
This study empirically investigates the properties of some of the available tools for assess- 
ing sovereign default risk and provides insights on their relative ability to predict debt 
crisis episodes and quantify the likelihood of sovereign credit rating migration. For this 
9In Basel If, the sovereign creditworthiness risk weights for speculative grade rated debt instruments 
are between 100% and 150%, implying that banks have to set aside capital equal to 8% and 12% of such 
loans respectively. Within Basel II, risk weights are based on credit ratings. By contrast, the 1988 Capital 
Accord (Basel I) provided only three weights for capital requirements based on the OECD/non-OECD 
distinction. Those weights were 0% for OECD sovereign bonds, 20% for all claims on OECD banks 
and short-term claims on non-OECD banks, and 100% for long-term claims on banks, corporates and 
sovereigns of non-OECD countries. These weights correspond to capital requirements of 0%, 1.6% and 
8%, respectively. (cf: Monfort and Mulder, 2000, p. 3 and 5). 
'0Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001; p. 51, paragraph no. 266). 
8 
purpose, it utilizes panel discrete-choice models, non-parametric classification tools, sov- 
ereign credit rating systems as well as migration probability estimators based on survival 
theory. The importance of international credit risk for risk managers and market partic- 
ipants together with the existing gaps in the empirical literature constitute the primary 
motivation of the thesis. 
The empirical literature on sovereign debt and the determinants of default mostly 
rests on panel probit or logit models. Since sovereign defaults on bonds are only recent, 
the extant studies mostly include default events on bank loans, which upsurged between 
the onset of the 1980s Latin American debt crisis and the early 1990s. In this context, 
researchers have to deal with the task of explaining and predicting a relatively rare, but 
persistent event. Moreover, the available emerging and developing country indicators for 
such studies are typically annual series over 10 to 20 years, often with missing observa- 
tions, which make individual country analyses unfeasible. The literature has side-stepped 
this problem by exploiting the cross-sectional variation in country default experiences to 
increase the power of the models. Panel logit and to a lesser extent simple cross-section 
formulations are thus typical in the literature. The majority of panel studies impose 
homogeneity both across countries and over time. 
Restrictive full homogeneity may incur two sources of bias. First, estimates can be 
substantially biased if country-specific behavior is not accounted for. The diversity of the 
countries employed in order to have a reasonable sample size, casts doubt on the country- 
homogeneity assumption. By assuming that the responses to common systematic factors 
in different countries are similar, one ignores any unsystematic country-specific dimen- 
sions of risk attributable to political, social, religious aspects, as well as to the diverse 
economic policies pursued in different countries. Attempts to quantify such subjective 
factors were made by Balkan (1992), Brewer and Rivoli (1997) and Haque et al. (1997) 
by creating variables of political risk, such as level of democracy and political instabil- 
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ity. However, research in this area is scarce. Second, homogeneity over time ignores the 
rapidly changing nature of emerging and developing economies. Both issues have raised 
concern within the academic circles. Despite its obvious importance, there are no studies 
that deal directly with the impact of neglecting heterogeneity, for instance, on predictive 
performance. Motivated by the work of Baltagi and Griffin (1997) and Baltagi et al. 
(2000) in the context of linear panel models we explicitly address the question of whether 
accounting for latent heterogeneity improves sovereign default models. For this purpose, 
we rely both on statistical and forecasting criteria. The analysis seeks to reconcile the em- 
pirical and anecdotal evidence regarding the key role of country, regional or time-specific 
effects, as well as unify and extend the previous literature. 
A number of other important issues in the empirical literature on sovereign default 
warrant further investigation. First, scant attention has been paid to the `optimal' design 
of an EWS for sovereign default tailored to the decision-maker's preferences. It has been 
argued that the decision maker's loss specification can fundamentally determine a number 
of input parameters associated with the development of EWSs (Bussiere and Fratzscher, 
2002). Second, the assessment, comparison and combination of competing forecasting 
models has received superficial attention, if any. Third, besides probit and logit models, 
other statistical classification techniques have been exploited in the literature. In addition, 
external sovereign credit ratings provided by leading rating agencies (Standard and Poor's 
and Moody's) and internal ratings from major international banks (Institutional Investor) 
have also been considered. 
So far no consensus has been reached about the `best' classification method and in- 
formation set for the development of an EWS for sovereign default. There is only very 
limited evidence in this regard and the extant studies are subject to the above criticisms 
regarding forecast evaluation. Our work aims to provide a rigorous assessment of fore- 
casting ability in order to provide insights regarding the relative strengths and weaknesses 
10 
across: a) homogeneous and heterogeneous panel logit models and b) other fundamentally 
different approaches based on non-parametric statistical classification and credit ratings. 
Our framework embodies both statistical and economic criteria, predictive performance 
tests and reasonable naive benchmarks. In the present context, the latter may be hard to 
beat due to the inherent persistence of the external debt repayment behaviour. Further, 
our framework emphasizes the key role of the decision maker's loss function in model 
calibration and in choosing among rival combination schemes. 
Most of the studies that adopt probit or logit models to develop EWSs for sovereign 
debt crises are vulnerable to shortcomings that will invalidate inferences. The EWS 
literature generally seeks to forecast crises over a multiple period horizon (i. e. several 
months or years ahead), which is typically longer than the frequency with which the 
forecasts are updated. The idea is to provide earlier warning signals while, at the same 
time, make use of the most recent data available in updating forecasts. However, this 
comes at the expense of overlapping forecasts that induce moving average prediction 
errors. The problem is compounded if serial correlation is also present in the explanatory 
variables, a stylised fact of macroeconomic and financial ratios. For nonlinear models such 
as logit or probit, this does not invalidate the consistency of the estimators, provided no 
other misspecification is present (Poirier and Ruud, 1988; Gourieroux et al., 1984). The 
standard errors, however, will be biased and tests based on them will have incorrect 
size. Little attention has been paid by the extant literature to this issue. We document 
the magnitude of the autocorrelation problem in the context of sovereign default and 
implement a correction. 
While it is important to investigate the characterisation and prediction of sovereign 
default events for risk assessment and policymaking purposes, the broader sovereign rat- 
ing migration is at least as important and merits particular attention. Reports on rating 
migrations published by rating agencies are used all around the globe by diverse prac- 
11 
titioners, such as sovereign bond investors or analysts and traders working in the fastly 
growing credit derivatives market. Credit migration matrices are intimately linked to 
modern risk management tools such as Value-At-Risk (VaR) analysis and credit portfolio 
models and to the determination of regulatory capital complying with the Basel II rules. 
Their adequate estimation is thus quite important. 
There are some stylised facts in the context of corporate credit migration, but relatively 
little is known in the context of sovereigns. First, corporate credit migration does not 
conform to the Markov behaviour (Bangia et al., 2002; Lando and Skodeberg, 2002; 
Kavvathas, 2001). Under the Markov assumption, the future realization of the rating 
only depends on its previous value. Violation of this implies that the history of the rating 
process carries information about its future, and thus about future transition probabilities. 
The non-Markov properties reported in the literature can be classified in three types. One 
is rating momentum or the influence of the past rating migrations on the current migration 
probability. " The second refers to the dependence of transition probabilities on rating 
durations, that is, on the time spent in each rating. The third concerns the dependence 
between rating migrations and the state of the business cycle. Assuming a homogeneous 
Markov process to develop migration probability measures implies ruling out explicit time 
and state dependence in the migration process, as well as business cycle effects. 
The literature has not investigated these issues in the context of sovereign migrations 
as yet. The bare estimation of sovereign migration matrices has received scant attention. 
The corporate and sovereign migration contexts are different in several respects. First, 
the available samples of sovereign ratings are relatively small, both in terms of time series 
length (rating agencies started rating emerging markets in the early 1990s) and cross- 
sectional dimension. Second, under the definitions of default employed by rating agencies 
there are few default cases on foreign-currency rated bonds. Against this background, it 
is important to analyze the reliability of the transition matrices that have been provided 
"Sometimes Sometimes the term `rating drift' is used alternatively. 
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by rating agencies in the recent years. By exploiting the complete Moody's database from 
1981 to 2004, we contribute to the literature by comparing different sovereign migration 
measures. We examine the extent to which continuous hazard rate estimators have better 
properties than the discrete multinomial estimator (or cohort method). The latter can be 
considered as the industry standard and so it would be interesting to see how it compares 
with more sophisticated survival analysis methods. A second objective is to assess how 
important it is to relax the time homogeneity assumption in the context of sovereign 
transitions. Finally, we test for two non-Markovian effects that in rating transitions. 
1.4 Layout of the Thesis 
The remainder of the thesis consists of four empirical essays regarding the analysis of 
sovereign risk. The thesis can be divided into two parts. Chapters 2,3 and 4 examine 
the characterisation and prediction of sovereign default events within the context of an 
optimal EWS. The second part deals with the estimation of sovereign transition matrices 
and related issues and is presented in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 2 compares rival models of sovereign default that differ in how country-, 
region- and time-specific effects are treated. The analysis is based on a diverse panel of 
countries from Africa, Asia, East Europe, Latin America and the Middle East over twenty 
years. The quality of the models is gauged by means of likelihood ratio and Hausman 
type tests, information criteria and judgements on the plausibility of the estimates. In 
addition, an out-of-sample forecast evaluation based on statistical- and economic-loss 
functions is conducted. Each model is benchmarked against simple forecasts. These 
include the random prediction implicit in the Pesaran-Timmermann test and the most- 
frequent-event prediction. A Diebold-Mariano test is deployed to compare the forecasts. 
Chapter 3 addresses the residual autocirrelation problem of EWSs for financial crises 
that attempt to explain a forward-looking indicator which is persistent by construction. 
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The typical framework is a panel logit/probit regression estimated by maximum likelihood. 
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate that one should not overlook the presence of 
residual serial autocorrelation in such models. To this end, different logit specifications 
for sovereign default are deployed. These range from a baseline pooled model to a random 
coefficients model. We document the extent of the problem and implement a correction 
following the Newey-West approach. 
Chapter 4 utilizes three different classification methods 
- 
K-means clustering a logit 
regression based on macrovariables and a logit based on bankers' credit ratings 
- 
to 
develop an EWS for sovereign default. Specifically, the chapter illustrates how the optimal 
choice of parameters depends on the decision-makers' preferences. Next, it investigates 
the potential benefits of combining econometric, judgmental and non-parametric sovereign 
default forecasts derived from the three classification techniques. Combining forecasts 
of discrete-variables requires different approaches based either on logit regression or on 
voting-type prediction rules. In this context, the benefit from combination is not as 
clearcut, since the expected loss is not directly related to the forecast error variance. 
Chapter 5 addresses the estimation of sovereign credit migration matrices and tests 
for non-Markov effects in the rating migration process. Three estimators are considered: 
discrete-time multinomial and two variants of continuous-time hazard rate 
- 
one impos- 
ing, the other relaxing time homogeneity. The transition matrices are compared on the 
basis of bootstrap simulations reflecting the continuous-time underlying rating migration 
process. The default probabilities associated with the three approaches are examined, 
along with the rating mobility inherent in each transition matrix as depicted by matrix 
norms. Finally, the presence of momentum and duration effects in the rating process is 
investigated through spectral and panel logit analyses. 
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis by providing an overview of our research and a summary 
of the results. Finally, the chapter suggests potential directions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2: Modeling Sovereign Debt Crises Using 
Panels 
2.1 Introduction 
The formulation and estimation of binary-choice models for panel data has been the sub- 
ject of a rapidly growing literature. ' Panels can provide insights which are not available 
in pure cross-section or time-series data (see Baltagi, 2002). The choice of estimator de- 
pends on whether the data are conceptualized as repeated cross-sections or a pool of time 
series. Pure cross-section estimators cannot allow for country heterogeneity. Pooled time 
series estimators can pick up differences in behavior across individuals not captured by the 
included regressors. Default on sovereign debt is not a frequent event for a given country 
and definitely not a short-term situation. As a result, the binary dependent variable repre- 
senting the latter exhibits small variation. In addition, the available emerging/developing 
country indicators for such studies are typically annual (moderate T) series over 10 to 20 
years, often with missing observations. The above two issues combine to make individual 
country analyses unfeasible. Researchers have circumvented this problem by jointly ex- 
ploiting time series on typically 20 to 130 countries (large N panels). Over 80% of these 
studies employ logit models. Simple pooled logit regressions are common, although the 
validity of the implicit full homogeneity assumption has been questioned (McFadden et 
al. 1985, Hajivassiliou, 1987). As Schleifer (2003) puts it: "Sovereign debt markets could 
not be more different". 
The limited number of studies that control for latent country heterogeneity use either 
fixed or random effects logits. One exception is Oral et al. (1992) who allow for fixed 
country effects both in the intercept and slope coefficients of the domestic signals. Some 
evidence in the related scenario of currency crises suggests that the relevant heterogeneity 
'A comprehensive survey can be found in Arellano and Honore (2001). 
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occurs at a broader, regional level (Burkart and Coudert, 2002; Staikouras, 2005). In the 
context of sovereign default, regional differences have been accommodated via regional 
fixed effects (Feder et al., 1981). Some studies find significant time effects using year 
dummies (Aylward and Thorne, 1998) or including global macroeconomic variables such 
as OECD economic growth (Lee, 1991; Detragiache and Spilimbergo, 2001). This stresses 
the importance of exogenous world shocks on default risk. 
The large number of empirical models available have led to at best mixed evidence 
regarding the determinants of sovereign default. The estimates are based on different 
samples (countries and time span) and there is no unanimous default definition. Both of 
these aspects make the model comparison onerous. There is also the non-trivial issue of 
how to carry out the comparison. One can employ statistical hypothesis tests of parameter 
restrictions. Alternatively, the `best' model can be chosen using extant model selection 
criteria. With a small number of degrees of freedom, this approach can lead to quite close 
values for the criteria and hence, to model selection instability. A third common approach 
is to compare the plausibility of the estimates. However, if the ultimate is to design an 
early warning system, it seems more natural to confront the models on the basis of their 
forecast ability. ' Nonetheless, forecasting issues have only received superficial attention. 
Some studies generate in-sample forecasts to compare rival models (Hajivassiliou, 1987; 
Detragiache and Spilimbergo, 2001). A few studies conduct out-of-sample evaluation but 
limited to a 1- or 2-year holdout period and using a fixed estimation window. The typical 
forecast criteria used in these studies are the Type I, Type II error or the overall error 
(Feder et al., 1981; Sommerville and Taffler, 1995; Oka, 2003; Peter, 2002). 3 Recent 
2The issue of whether homogeneous or heterogeneous (linear) models provide better forecasts has been 
examined in the context of US gasoline and cigarette demand (Baltagi and Griffin, 1997; Baltagi et al., 
2000). 
31n this literature, the Type I (Type II) error is the missed defaults aand the Type II error is the 
false alarms. The Type I (T)rpe II) error rate is estimated as the missed defaults (non-defaults) over the 
realized defaults (non-defaults). The overall error is the sum of missed defaults and false alarms over the 
number of sample cases. 
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contributions in the forecasting literature stress that such metrics may not represent well 
the decision-maker's problem (Granger and Pesaran, 2000; Pesaran and Skouras, 2002). 
Futhermore, those studies that provide out-of-sample predictions do not confront them to 
naive benchmarks. This is important due to the persistence of the external debt repayment 
behavior. A specific question we address is whether controlling for country, regional or 
time heterogeneities leads to `better' sovereign default models. ' The literature has not 
yet provided systematic evidence on the importance of heterogeneity in this context. This 
chapter seeks to fill this gap. 
This chapter contributes to the literature in three directions. First, regarding model 
specification we consider a wide range of panel logits, some of them novel in this context, 
that treat regional-, country- and time-specific effects in different ways. The analysis is 
based on data for 96 countries over 1983-2002. The regressor set includes three world 
variables 
- 
macroeconomic uncertainty, monetary policy uncertainty and risk aversion 
- 
that, to our knowledge, have not been considered in the literature. Second, the models 
are compared using various statistical metrics that gauge their ability to describe the data 
generating process (DGP). These include likelihood ratio (LR) or Hausman type tests and 
the AIC and BIC model selection criteria. These metrics overwhelmingly suggest that 
heterogeneity across countries, regions and time should not be overlooked. 
Third, a rigorous forecast analysis is conducted. A 12-year estimation window is rolled 
forward to generate recursive out-of-sample forecasts over a 5-year holdout period. We fo- 
cus on 1-step-ahead point forecasts. Rather than using a fixed ad hoc cut-off probability, 
this parameter is optimally calibrated in-sample over each window for the model and loss 
function at hand. Both statistical and economic loss functions are evaluated over the hold- 
out set and a positive-directional-change subset. The latter allows the emphasis to be on 
'Forecast combining may be particularly fruitful when there is much uncertainty in finding the best 
model (Zou and Yang, 2004). This issue is investigated empirically for sovereign default in Chapter 3 of 
the thesis. 
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anticipating new (rather than perpetuating) debt crises. The equal-predictive-ability test 
of Diebold and Mariano (1995) is deployed to compare the models. Simple naive forecasts 
are also considered. These include random walk predictions and both the random pre- 
diction and the most-frequent-event prediction implicit in Pesaran-Timmermann's (1992) 
and Donkers-Melenberg's (2002) tests, respectively. Models that simply control for fixed 
regional- or time-effects are capable of yielding relatively good forecasts. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 overviews the literature on country 
default risk, heterogeneity in debt repayment and evaluation of event forecasts. Section 
2.3 describes the data and the endogenous default indicator. Section 2.4 outlines the 
models and the inference-based metrics. Section 2.5 discusses the forecast framework and 
Section 2.6 analyses the results. A final section concludes. 
2.2 Literature Review 
2.2.1 Empirical Evidence on Country Default Risk 
A substantial body of literature has emerged, since the beginning of the Latin American 
debt crisis in 1982, on the empirical modelling of external debt crises and the prediction of 
default probabilities. ' The existing can be grouped as follows. First, there are studies that 
take a totally descriptive approach aiming solely at uncovering the risk factors driving 
sovereign default on the basis of two theoretical approaches, the `ability to pay' and the 
`willingness to pay'. The former scheme relates to the idea of credit rationing in which the 
occurrence of default is a demand-supply disequilibrium situation where the international 
credit market does not clear at the interest rate ceiling. 6 The determinants of default are 
5An excellent theoretical discussion on sovereign risk can be found in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), 
Cohen (1991) and Eaton et al. (1986). Comprehensive surveys of the empirical literature are provided 
in Cline (1995), Babbel (1996) and Aylward and Thorne (1998). 
61n this case, the demand for new loans exceeds the maximum supply at the upper-ceiling interest 
rate at which bankers are willing to lend. As long as this demand-supply gap is less than the limit of 
arrears the lenders are willing to tolerate, the country may incur arrears on its debt-service obligations 
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those that shift the demand and supply curves to the right and to the left, respectively. 
For example, Edwards (1984), Callier (1985), Sommerville and Taffler (1995) and Manasse 
et al. (2003) focus on the macro- financial variables, Berg and Sachs (1988) on structural 
variables, Hajivassiliou (1989) on debt overhang. 
According to the second scheme, `willingness to pay' approach, the sovereign default 
event is the outcome of a utility cost-benefit comparison by a sovereign debtor (Eaton et al. 
1986; Lee, 1991). Put differently, the borrower defaults on its external debt if the expected 
value of the discounted utility of consumption with default exceeds the expected value 
of discounted utility of consumption with repayment. The underlying theory postulates 
that even though the borrower possesses the financial resources to service debt, he may 
decide to hold back a debt-service payment that is due, if the benefits of default exceed 
the costs. The selection of explanatory variables for the analysis is based on this theory. 
Therefore, volatility of economic conditions and global financial links play the largest role. 
Solvency and liquidity variables are largely deemed irrelevant. 
The second strand of the literature comprises various studies that produce default 
forecasts but that have mostly assessed their results on an in-sample basis. An indicative, 
but by no means exhaustive list, includes Saini and Bates (1984), Schmidt (1985), Callier 
(1985), Hajivassiliou (1987,1994), Aylward and Thorne (1998), Detragiache and Spilim- 
bergo (2002) and Catao and Sutton (2002). However, good in-sample properties do not 
ensure that the model can predict future debt crises, thus it is important that in sample 
analysis is supplemented by adequate out-of sample evaluation. 
Finally, a small strand of the literature has forecasted default crises and documented 
out-of-sample evaluation of the results (Feder et al., 1981; Sommerville and Taffler, 1995; 
Peter, 2002; Oka 2003). These studies however employ a fixed estimation window, small 
validation samples and report Type I, Type II and overall error criteria for assessing 
to cover the excess demand. If the excess demand rises beyond the arrears limit, a rescheduling of debt 
is perceived as a less costly option than the tolerance of further arrears for either borrowers or lenders. 
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forecast accuracy, which may not be very informative. A reason for the latter is that 
the stylized scoring rules (or loss functions) that may frequently not conform to the fore- 
caster's decision problem. Several empirical studies highlight the marked state dependence 
of sovereign defaults (Aylward and Thorne, 1998; Brewer and Rivoli, 1997; Hajivassiliou, 
1987,1989,1994; McFadden et al., 1985). Therefore, it is important to assess the predic- 
tive value of the model over and above the information implicit in the previous period's 
debt repayment status. To the best of our knowledge the literature does not compare the 
generated forecasts with naive benchmarks. 
2.2.2 Heterogeneity in Debt Repayment 
Earlier empirical work on sovereign default prediction was mostly based on logit or probit 
models that pool information across a variety of developing countries for a long time span. 
The need to allow for heterogeneity in the individual country parameters and over time 
was raised at an early stage by Saini and Bates (1984). The adequacy of this implicit 
homogeneity assumption in the country responses to fundamentals was later questioned 
by Solberg (1988), McFadden et al. (1985) and Hajivassiliou (1987,1994) given the het- 
erogeneity of the countries usually included in sovereign default analyses. Time-invariant 
country heterogeneity may be due differences in colonial history, religious or political 
factors and specific financial conditions, which altogether configure a country's attitude 
toward honouring external debt obligations and hence, lenders' credit decisions toward 
the borrowing country. Some of these country-specific effects are unobservable to the 
researcher and this poses difficulties for sovereign default modeling. For instance, the 
political or cultural environment within a country could be such that a homogeneous 
panel data model permanently underestimates its default probability.? In econometric 
terms, country heterogeneity could bias the parameters and cast doubt on their consis- 
7An interesting example of cultural country-specific unobservables occurred after the price of crude 
oil fell dramatically in 1986. Many Islamic borrowers with significant indebtedness to US banks invoked 
the doctrine of `sharia', which holds that the payment of interest is against the teachings of Koran. 
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tency. Aylward and Thorne (1998) point out that a possible reason why the majority 
of studies of external debt repayment behaviour, do not fully deal with the presence of 
unobserved country effects due to computational difficulties posed by panel logit models. 
Until recently, panel estimators were not available in the typical econometric packages. 
The empirical evidence indirectly highlights the importance of the heterogeneity is- 
sue since very few macroeconomic variables have uniformly been found significant, while 
the significance of other factors varies from one study to another. The various contri- 
butions have restricted themselves to employing fixed or random effects specifications 
to capture time-invariant, country-specific unobservable effects. Within the framework 
of a random effects logit model, McFadden et al. (1985) find that 40 percent of the 
variation in countries' repayment performance is idiosyncratic or country-specific rather 
than attributable to homogeneous responses to the macroeconomic variables included in 
the model. They report statistically significant variability in the country-specific random 
effects term, however no evidence is provided on the possible gains in forecasting from 
a random error components specification. Hajivassiliou (1987) again finds statistically 
significant country-specific random effects and establishes a strong impact of such hetero- 
geneity effects on in-sample crisis probabilities. Nonetheless, neither explicit measures of 
forecast accuracy nor out-of sample evaluations are reported. Subsequently, a few other 
studies including Li (1992) and Detragiache et al (2001) carry out sensitivity tests by em- 
ploying fixed and random effects models to capture country heterogeneity and find that 
some of the variables lose significance with respect to the simple pooled logit. Oral et al. 
(1992) is the only study that allows for heterogeneity in the form of fixed country-specific 
slope parameters and intercept. Feder et al. (1981) and Solberg (1988), among others, 
use regional dummies to control for regional differences in the effects of the explanatory 
variables. 
In the related context of currency crises, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) address the 
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question of regional differences in the leading indicators. They present statistics to show 
that there are significant discrepancies in the volatility of leading indicators before the cri- 
sis in Asia, in Latin America and in other countries. 8 Drawing upon this finding, Burkart 
and Coudert (2002) employ a Principal Component analysis to confirm these regional dif- 
ferences and propose an estimator based on regional discriminant analysis specifications 
for Asia and Latin America, respectively. The authors find that the latter performs better 
than a global model that pools data across regions. They find some variables, such as the 
deviation of real exchange rate from trend, common to both specifications. Furthermore, 
they conclude that the regional contagion indicator which was significant in the global 
model no longer appears significant in the regional models This might indicate homogene- 
ity within each region in terms of common structural problems. The latter are captured 
by the variables that are found to be specific for each region, namely, reserves to imports 
for Latin America and real domestic credit growth rate, openness and short term debt 
to total debt for Asia. In order to produce forecasts they then select for each the model 
(global or regional) that produces the best balance between Type I and Type II errors. As 
expected, this `combined' model performs slightly better than the global model. However, 
they do not establish results on the out-of-sample performance. In general, only a handful 
of papers in the financial crisis literature explicitly consider regional models, the common 
practise being to use regional dummy variables. 
With regards to heterogeneity over time the extant literature has only considered 
time-specific unobservable effects that are common across countries. In the context of a 
one-way fixed effects model for country repayment performance to the IMF and to exter- 
nal creditors in general, Aylward and Thorne (1998) and Solberg (1988) found significant 
8 Empirical research has shown evidence of strong links between currency crises and sovereign defaults, 
although the causal pattern is not clear. Reinhart (2001) find that in emerging makets the probability 
of a currency crisis conditional on having defaulted in 69%, while the probability of a sovereign default 
conditional on having experienced a currency crisis is 46%. Moreover, the literature has pointed out 
similar origins (leading indicators) for the two types of crises. 
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time-specific effects. This highlights the importance of global shocks on a sovereign's cred- 
itworthiness. The latter can also be captured through country invariant global variables 
such as interest rates or economic growth, which given the short time-series dimension 
in this type of studies tend to pick up trends and act as time-dummies. To the best of 
our knowledge, none of the studies in the literature have investigated the performance 
of models that account explicitly for time-heterogeneity (i. e. by allowing for different 
marginal effects of the leading indicators over time). Regarding the issue of whether the 
determinants of financial crises change over time Schnatz (1999) has examined two sam- 
ples 1970-1997 and 1985-1997. He reports no significant difference in the determinants 
for the entire and restricted periods. This result may be a signal that increased global 
integration has not altered the structural factors that drive financial crises. 
Berg and Pattillo (1999) and, more recently, Oka (2003) stress the need of further 
exploring specification issues, namely country heterogeneity and temporal dependence, in 
the context of panel binary-choice for financial crises. Thus, the empirical literature points 
towards the increased importance of heterogeneity in such panels of worldwide emerging 
markets and LDC. Despite the numerous theoretical justifications, a rigorous comparison 
among the homogeneous and the heterogeneous estimators has not been carried out. So 
far, little is known about the value added of heterogeneous estimators in an out-of-sample 
forecasting context. 
2.2.3 Evaluating Event Forecasts 
Forecast accuracy is one of the essential ingredients for discriminating between competing 
models. As stressed by Diebold and Mariano (1995) in their influential study, predic- 
tive performance and model adequacy are inextricably linked - predictive failure implies 
model inadequacy. The assessment of the forecast accuracy of binaxy-choice models de- 
viates to some extent from the conventional forecast evaluation framework. The binary 
nature of the outcomes raises a number of issues that one is not confronted with in the 
23 
case of continuous forecasts. Various measures of forecast performance pertinent to binary 
outcomes are summarized in Cramer (1999), of which the most frequently reported is the 
hit rate of the model. The hit rate is defined as the proportion of observations correctly 
predicted by the model. 
A number of other measures have been used to evaluate probability forecasts associ- 
ated of events that actually occurred, often referred to as scoring rules. The most popular 
is Brier's (1950) quadratic probability score (QPS), which is based on quadratic forecast 
errors, and is a rough analogue to the mean square error as routinely applied to point 
forecasts 
.9 More recently, Diebold and Lopez 
(1996) discuss its application in forecasting 
default probabilities and advocate its use in conjunction with the Diebold-Mariano test. 
However, the QPS may not be appropriate in all contents, for instance if the loss is asym- 
metric. Other specifications include the asymmetric, logarithmic cost-function, applied 
in Diebold and Rudebusch (1989). The latter considers the logarithm of the forecasted 
probabilities and penalizes large errors more heavily. Diebold and Lopez (1996) present 
an excellent survey of forecast evaluation and comparison methods that covers ordinal 
and probability forecasts. 
A crucial question that figures prominently in the recent forecasting literature is 
whether the widely applied forecast accuracy measures can lend themselves to represen- 
tation of the economic loss when the forecasts are put into practice. Leitch and Tanner 
(1991) first argue that forecast evaluation should be based on profits (losses) realized 
upon using the forecasts and not on general, statistical criteria. A similar rationale is put 
forward by Pesaran and Timmermann (1994,1995). Granger and Pesaran (2000a, 2000b) 
formalize the idea by developing a decision-theoretic forecast evaluation framework. In 
this context, the loss-function incorporates parameters to reflect the specific costs to in- 
dividual decision-makers. They demonstrate the approach in a "two state-two action 
9Note that it is not exactly analogous to the mean square error as it compares the forecasted probability 
with whether or not the event actually occurred and not with the actual probability. 
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decision problem", i. e. the binary-choice setup. General evaluation measures are aban- 
doned in favour of one that can be tailored to the risk-preferences of the decision-maker. 
For instance, in the sovereign default context, irrespective of whether the forecaster is 
a policymaker, a financial institution or a multilateral bank her loss function will most 
likely place more weight on mispredicted defaults rather than false alarms or on new 
entries to default rather than defaults that are carrying over from a previous period. Pe- 
saran and Skouras (2000) provide a review of decision-based approaches for evaluating 
and comparing forecasts. Pesaran and Timmermann (1992), Diebold and Mariano (1995) 
and McCracken (2000) elaborate on theoretical results for comparison and evaluation of 
out-of-sample predictions, respectively. 
A good practice in event/probability forecast evaluation is to compare the resulting 
forecasts with `naive' predictors to assess the value added over and above obvious guesses. 
The importance of the latter in a binary framework is further motivated by the misleading 
conclusions that can originate from a high prediction (hit) rate in an empirical scenario 
where the distribution between the two possible outcomes is uneven. For instance, in 
a problem like ours where the default event is rare a high hit rate may result only be- 
cause the model predicts well the non-default states. Notwithstanding the ample room 
for overestimated forecast accuracy in the context of binary-choice models, naive model 
comparisons have received scant attention in the sovereign default literature. 
Various naive predictors have been proposed in the binary-choice literature. `Which 
one is best' is ultimately an empirical question that depends on the relative frequency of 
the two events. For instance, one naive model could forecast 0 or 1 randomly according 
to a certain probability. This naive forecast is implicit in the predictive dependence test 
for directional change developed by Pesaran and Timmermann (1992). Another option 
could be to use as naive predictor one that always forecasts the most frequent outcome. 
Donkers and Melenberg (2002) have derived the limiting distribution of the relevant test 
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statistic for this case. Detailed exposition for these naive predictors follows in Section 2.5. 
2.3 The Dataset 
The analysis is based on World Bank data for 96 emerging markets and LDCs from Africa, 
Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and Middle East over 1983-2002. Information on 
external debt, arrears and rescheduling to official and private creditors is obtained from 
the Global Development Finance database. Macroeconomic and financial time series are 
obtained from the World Development Indicators database (see Appendix 2.1). 
The Early Warning of Default (EWD) indicator 
There is no unanimous definition of sovereign default. The rating agencies definition 
reflects only default on rated sovereign bonds, which is a rare event. Few countries have 
defaulted on rated bond issues, however, many countries defaulted on their bank debt and 
trade credit obligations, especially during the 1980s and the early 1990s. By adopting a 
broader definition that encompasses bank debt and trade obligations we can can base our 
study on a wider set of countries over a longer period of time. 10 We categorize country i as 
being in default in year t (denoted dit = 1) if any of these conditions are met: a) there is 
a large jump in total arrears (interest and principal repayments) relative to total external 
debt AAit/Dit >8 or b) the total amount of debt rescheduled exceeds the decrease, if 
any, in total arrears. " 
1"Moody's and S&P's sovereign default rates are based on a limited number of defaults on rated 
sovereign bonds that occurred between 1998-2003. The leading rating agencies also report corporate 
default rates as proxies for the sovereign default probabilities associated with each sovereign credit- 
rating. Peter (2002) shows that these proxies are too low on average relative to the estimated default 
probabilities from a panel logit model. 
11Some studies rely on reschedulings (Lee, 1991), others focus on arrears (Sommerville and Taffier, 
1995; Aylward and Thorne, 1998) and a third group use both (Detragiache and Spilimbergo, 2001; Peter, 
2002). Credit rating agencies also typically consider both arrears and reschedulings. Following Peter 
(2002), we adopt AA; t/D; t rather than A; t/D; t so that, say, countries with large arrears but which are 
reducing their arrears stock relative to external debt are not classified as default. We set the threshold 5 
for DA: t/D; t at its 1983-2002 mean 3=2.26%. 
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The goal is to predict the probability of a debt crisis over a specific time window longer 
than a year, while updating the forecasts annually. We adopt a 3-year warning window 
and define12 
Yit = f1 if dz, t+k =1 at any k=0,1,2 0 otherwise 
following Peter (2002) and Oka (2003). A unit value for this forward-looking variable, 
called the Early Warning of Default (EWD) state, signifies that country i has defaulted at 
least once over [t, t+ 2]. The default frequency in our sample is about 30% (see Appendix 
2.2). The number of defaults per year is quite close to those identified by S&P (2001) for 
rated/non-rated debt. 
Country-specific and global variables 
A number of macroeconomic variables have been identified as determinants of sovereign 
ratings (Cantor and Packer, 1996), sovereign defaults (Detragiache and Spilimbergo, 2001) 
and sovereign spreads (Kamin and Kleist, 1999). Building on these findings we consider 
25 domestic signals from the World Bank categories: i) external credit exposure, ii) 
external economic activity and financial resources, iii) conditions of real/public/financial 
sector and iv) global financial links. To reduce the degree of skewness and kurtosis in the 
ratios and the number of outliers, these are transformed using sign(x)en(1 + lxj). Any 
remaining outlier in each default/non-default group is reduced by windsorizing the ratios 
as follows. A data point xit is indexed by cE {0,1} according to whether it pertains to a 
tranquil (yit = 0) or default (yit = 1) window. If xit falls outside x° ± 4Q°, it is replaced 
by the appropriate interval limit. 
The 5x1 world regressor vector, zt, includes two typical variables 
- 
the 10-year US 
Treasury Bond yield and OECD GDP growth 
- 
and three global indicators (annual- 
ized) that have not been used in the sovereign default context as yet. One is a proxy for 
12The estimated models thus can be cast as "early warning" devices. Chapter 4 discusses how to 
optimally choose the warning horizon. 
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macroeconomic uncertainty obtained as the conditional variance of the US monthly loga- 
rithmic real GDP. 13 For this purpose, an appropriate AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) model is fitted to 
the detrended (first differenced) real GDP since the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and 
Phillips-Perron (PP) tests indicate the presence of a unit root in the levels. Second, a mea- 
sure of monetary policy uncertainty is analogously derived from the monthly yield spread 
between the 3-month Treasury Bill and the US Federal Funds Target rate. According to 
the ADF and PP tests the spread is stationary and so an appropriate AR(1)-GARCH(2,1) 
is fitted to the levels for this purpose. Arora and Cerisola (2000) find evidence that 
sovereign bond spreads are significantly related to such uncertainty measure. 14 Third, 
the level of global risk aversion is proxied by the Sharpe ratio 
- 
the monthly average 
high-yield spread divided by its standard deviation over the last 12 months 
- 
based on 
the Merryl Lynch 175 US Corporate High-Yield index and the 10-year US T-Bond yield. 
Fitzgerald and Krolzig (2003) find evidence that this ratio captures risk aversion which 
dampens the demand of emerging market assets. The latter, in turn, influences capital 
flows and translates into lower FX reserve levels. 
Large models typically have poor statistical properties. In order to preserve degrees 
of freedom, we deploy a cross-validation (jacknife) approach which assesses the relative 
value of each regressor on the basis of the in-sample Type I error (see Appendix 2.3). 15 
The retained domestic and global signals are denoted by xit and zt, respectively. These 
are discussed in Section 2.6. 
13The quarterly US real GDP was interpolated into monthly frequency on the basis of the monthly 
industrial production (indicator series) using the proportional Denton approach that belongs to a family 
of LS-based benchmarking methods (Baum, 2001). 
14The plot of the monthly spread suggests that there is an upward pattern during 1994 (Mexican 
crisis) and in the second half of 1998 (Asian crisis). The order of the GARCH is selected on the basis of 
a Ljung-Box test on the squared residuals. Details available from the authors upon request. 
"Instead one could base the jacknife on some other criteria (e. g. the overall error rate) which may, of 
course, lead to a different regressor set. For our purpose, however, the relevant aspect is to use the same 
regressor set for all models in order to make the comparison informative with regard to the treatment of 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
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2.4 Models and Estimation 
Let the observed EWD indicator, yit, be influenced by a set of exogenous factors as follows 
yt=a+ x'it, 6 + zi'y + eit, it , iid(0, Q2), i=1, 
..., 
N, t=1, 
..., 
T (2.1) 
where yt is the latent index such that yit =1 for yt>0 and yit =0 otherwise. The noise 
it is assumed independently distributed from the k domestic regressors (xit) and the r 
world regressors (zt). We have pit - Pr(yit = 1) = Pr(y t> 0) and assuming a standard 
logistic distribution for eit it follows that pit = G(Xit, Zt) = exp1+(exp(a+xita+xß, '3+zip+zi ry ) 7) " The response 
probability is thus the logit function evaluated at a linear function of the variables. 16 This 
nonlinear relation between pit and (xit, zt) can be rewritten linearly in terms of the log- 
Pit 
=a+ xiß + zty. Equation (2.1) is referred to as the baseline pooled odds ratio as In 1 pit 
logit model (PLOGIT) which assumes full country and time homogeneity in the response 
yt to (xit, zt). The (1 +k+ r) x1 coefficient vector (a, /3', 7')' can be estimated by 
Maximum Likelihood (ML). 
2.4.1 Country-specific Heterogeneity 
The PLOGIT can be extended to allow for unobserved country-specific effects ai that 
stay constant over time, e. g. some countries are more likely to default than others in 
every period. The fixed effects model (FE) treats ai as fixed and so there is an unknown 
(N+k+r) x1 coefficient vector to be estimated OFE = (a', /3', y')' where a= (al, 
..., 
aN)' 
are country-specific constants. The error components or random effects model (RE) treats 
16Both a standard normal and a standard logistic variable have a zero mean but the latter has a 
variance of 7r2/3. Because the two pdf's are very similar (the logit density has more mass in the tails), 
if one corrects for the difference in scaling, the probit and logit models typically yield similar results in 
applied work. The main competitor to logit for classification is discriminant analysis. The latter assumes 
that the country's characteristics are multivariate normally distributed with a different mean vector (but 
the same variance-covariance matrix) associated to the default and non-default events. Most studies have 
concluded that logit is superior to discriminant analysis mainly because this normality assumption for 
the regressors is unrealistic (see Kennedy, 2003; ch. 15). 
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ai as independent random draws from the same distribution with mean a and variance 
oä. Formally, ai = a+v«vi where vi - iid(0,1) is independent of (xit, zt). Alternatively, 
it can be formalized as Eq. (2.1) with the composite error eit = ai+Cit. The (2+k+r) x1 
parameter vector to be estimated is ORE = (a, a,,; 0', y')'. 
Dependence between ai and (xit, zt) does not render QFE inconsistent. However, the 
FE logit is bedevilled by two problems. One is the incidental parameters problem 
- 
inconsistency of ä; for N 
--º oo and finite T- is transmitted into the slopes. This problem 
does not appear in the linear model because the ai are effectively removed by using data in 
country-mean deviations. To avoid this issue, Chamberlain's (1980) conditional maximum 
likelihood (CML) estimator of the FE logit integrates the ai out of the joint density by 
conditioning on Et yit. But then äi cannot be computed nor, in turn, the forecasts pat. 
The second problem arises from the fact that the FE model (linear or nonlinear) is only 
identified through the `within' dimension of the data. If country i has the same status 
(yit) in every period because, say, it has never experienced default, it is discarded in 
estimation. This may induce sample selection bias. 17 
The random coefficients parameterization (RC) goes one step further by allowing for 
random country heterogeneity both in intercepts and slopes. We consider two variants. 
First, a model (denoted RCß) where the coefficients of the domestic regressors are hetero- 
geneous 
yt= ai 
-{- xitNi + zt7 + Eit, Eit ^ ý iid(0, Q2), i=1, 
..., 
N, y=1, 
..., 
T (2.2) 
so that bi = (ai, ßi)' is a random vector with mean E(8i) = (a, ß')' and diagonal 
covariance matrix E(8; 6; ) = SZ with diag(SZ) = {Q«, ßßl, 
..., 
O'ßk}. Thus we can write 
r vi where 6 is a (k + 1) x1 vector of fixed means, r is a diagonal matrix 
"In this chapter, we do not consider lagged dependent variables (y;, t_1) as regressors. The incidental 
parameters problem becomes more severe in dynamic models. The need to integrate out the a,, in turn, 
prompts the initial conditions problem (see Greene, 2003; Ch. 21). Modeling dynamic effects and initial 
conditions in binary choice models is more complex than in the linear model. 
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such that rr' = Sl, and vi contains (k + 1) unobservable latent random terms which are 
iid(0,1) and independent of (xit, zt). The (2+2k+r) x1 parameter vector to be estimated 
is (a, oa; O's oß,, 
..., 
oßk; 'Y1) 
" 
Second, we consider a RCS' model where the effect of the global signals zti on the 
log-odds ratio is country heterogeneous - equation (2.1) with the random vector 8; = 
(ai, The (2+k+2r) x1 parameter vector to be estimated is (a, Oryl, O 2, cry3). 
Neither the RE nor the RC models (in contrast with FE) rely on large T for consistency. 
The FE logit is estimated by (C)ML whereas the RE, RC' and RC'r are estimated by 
maximum simulated likelihood (MSL). 18 
2.4.2 Region-specific Heterogeneity 
In order to control for region-specific heterogeneity, each country is allocated into one of 
four groups: I) Asia (Ni = 17), II) Latin America (NI, = 26), III) Africa (Nil, = 36), 
IV) East Europe/Middle East/North Africa (NIv = 17). 19 We consider two approaches. 
First, the PLOGIT equation 
it, j = aj + Xit, j, 3j + Eit, j, Eit, j ^' iid(O, Uj IZ=1, ... i Nj, t=1, 
..., 
T (2.3) 
is fitted to regions j=I,..., IV. 20 This regional logit (RLOGIT) with 4(1+k) x1 parameter 
vector (aj,, 3, ) can be seen as treating the regional heterogeneity in intercept and slopes as 
fixed. Second, a regional regressor-specific (RSLOGIT) model with 4+ >j k; parameters 
18There is no closed form for the log-likelihood of the RC model. MSL involves draws from the 
multivariate density of vi. Bhat (1999) suggests R= 1000 draws and shows that a smaller number 
of Halton draws, H= R110, is equally effective and cheaper. Our MSL uses a standard normal and 
H= 500. For the RE model this is asymptotically equivalent to the Hermite quadrature approach for 
approximating the likelihood (for details, see Greene, 2003). 
"There are not enough degrees of freedom for the LOGIT estimation of any of these 3 regions so we 
group them. They share: i) a similar structure of exports given their oil exporting nature, ii) having 
gained access to international bond markets between 1995-98. 
20Alternatively, one could estimate yt= Ej'v! aj D, +x: tß+eit, ct- iid(0, a2) by pooling all countries 
and using regional dummies. This is however a more restrictive version of (2.3) where 6j = ß. 
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is considered where a distinct regressor set, k; < k, is allowed for j=I,..., IV to preserve 
degrees of freedom. 
2.4.3 Time-specific Heterogeneity 
Equation (2.1) controls for common time effects (e. g. oil price shocks) by including the 
global signals zt. We consider also a fixed time effects (FTE) model that uses period 
dummies instead 
y t= at + XitQ 
-}- cite cit ^' ZZ(t(U, Q2), Z= 1ý 
... ý N, t 1ý ... ý T (2.4) 
where the (T + k) x1 vector OFTE = (a', /3')' with a= (a,,..., aT)' is estimated by ML. 
Alternatively, the data can be conceptualized as a sequence of cross-section relations 
Y it = at -f- )eiti0t -I- Eit, cit - iid(0, vt ), i=1, ..., N (2.5) 
over time t=1, 
..., 
T. The elements of the T (1+k) x1 vector (a', f3')' where a= (al, 
..., 
aT)' 
and )3= (01, 
..., 
ßT)' are obtained sequentially by ML. This approach allows for time vari- 
ation in the intercept and slopes. On this basis we define the counterpart of the Pesaran 
and Smith's (1995) mean group estimator. Let Qjt denote the slope estimate of regressor j 
at period t. A mean cross section (MCS) estimator is defined as MCs = (11T) r1 Qjt 
with standard error SE(QýMcs 
0D57(T5-; 
t)ý where SD denotes the sample standard )= 
deviation. 21 
We should note that the mean MCS estimator provides a measure of /3 - E(ot) 
whereas the above pooled time-series estimators measure 3- E(, 13; ). A consensus view 
is that cross-section data estimate long run relations (Pesaran and Smith, 1995; Kennedy, 
2003) 
21If the slopes are random (orthogonal to x; t), 4t Bt , BMCS as N -+ oo and then is consistent as 
T 
-º co. 
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2.4.4 Time-varying Country Heterogeneity 
Next we relax the assumption that the random country effects (in intercepts and/or 
slopes) are time invariant. More specifically, the RCß and RCS models are generalized by 
allowing the coefficients to be time-dependent according to an AR(1) mechanism. Thus 
we have the RCß-AR model 
yt - ait + xitlQit + ZtY + git, cit ^' iid(O, a2) (2.6) 
where ait =a+ Qav t with v it' = pavat_i + eit, eit - iid(0,1) so that E(ait) =a and 
V (ait) 
= 1°2T; likewise 
for Nit. The RCS'-AR is analogously formulated. 
These RC-AR formulations allow for the effects of the regressors on the log-odds ratio 
to vary across countries and over time. The (3 + 3k + r) x1 parameter vector of the 
RCß-AR logit and the (3 +k+ 3r) x1 vector of the RC11-AR counterpart are estimated 
by MSL. 
2.4.5 Inference-based Metrics for Model Selection 
Several metrics are employed to compare the above models. First, we use the BIC and AIC 
which have been shown by Monte Carlo simulation to have good finite-sample properties 
for a range of panel models (Hsiao and Sun, 2000). A ranking is thus obtained based on 
AIC 
= 
-MLL +s and BIC = -MLL + 0.5s ln(NT) where s is the number of unknown 
parameters. 
Statistical tests are also deployed. A Hausman test compares the FE and RE using 
the statistic H= q'{V(q)}-lq a X(e) where 4= (eFE 
- 
9RE), V(4) 
=V (9FE) 
-V (6) 
and s is the dimension of 0. The null is q=0 and a rejection suggests that there are fixed 
effects and so the RE model is inconsistent. This test can confront any two models such 22 
22Unlike in the linear case, the RE estimator is inconsistent (in the presence of fixed effects) even 
if ai is orthogonal to (xit, zt). This is because in discrete-choice models the ML estimator is generally 
inconsistent under misspecification such as in the presence of unmeasured heterogeneity, omitted variables 
(even if they are correlated with the included ones) and any form of heteroskedasticity (Yatchew and 
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that both are consistent under the null but only the less efficient is consistent under the 
alternative. 
The PLOGIT, RE, RC and RC-AR models are nested. For instance, under Ho : oa =0 
the RE collapses to the PLOGIT and thus latent country heterogeneity can be tested 
by a LR statistic (a counterpart of Breusch and Pagan's LM statistic) which is X(1) 
distributed. Likewise, the restrictions oß1 = 
... 
= oßk =0 reduce RCß to the RE. For 
pa = pß1 = 
... 
= pßk, the R06-AR collapses to the RCß. The PLOGIT and FE are also 
nested (Ho : a; = a) and the LR statistic follows a X2 (N-1) for large T and finite N. 
Caution is required with the latter test for large N. 
The significance of the time effects in the FTE model can be tested with a LR statistic 
that has a limit X2 (T-1) distribution under Ho : at = a. We also test for Ho :, at =, a and 
for Ho : at = a, ßt = /3 in the MCS model (which reduce it to the FTE and the PLOGIT 
without globals, respectively) using that MLLMCS = Et MLLcs,. The poolability across 
regions, Ho : a3 = a, ßj =ß for j=I,..., N, can be assessed by means of a LR statistic 
which is X3(k+1) distributed. 
2.5 Forecast Framework 
Although the panel is unbalanced we denote the sample period by [1, T] for expositional 
simplicity. A static model was used in Section 2.4 to simplify the theoretical exposition. 
In our analysis the regressors are lagged one year for forecasting purposes 23 The last 
two years are also lost because of the forward-looking nature of y;, t. Thus, in effect, 
yit is observed over 1984-2000. The models are initially estimated over the first 12-year 
window, denoted [1, T*], and yi, T"+l is forecasted. This window is then rolled forward. 
Out-of-sample predictions are thus constructed over a holdout period [T* + 1, T] that 
spans m=T- T* =5 years (1996-2000) for N= 96 countries. This facilitates a 
Griliches, 1984). 
23This also helps to mitigate endogeneity bias. 
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relatively large Nm validation set. 
The probability forecasts from, say, the PLOGIT model are Pq,, +i such that In p"T; +i = 
y 
r+1 and y, +1 =är+ xý,, r/3, r + zT y. is obtained over [-r - T* + 1, T] recursively for 
T= T*, T* + 1,..., T 
- 
1. To forecast on the basis of the MCS model we recursively 
compute äT = (1/T*) Ei =T-T«+1 at and j.. = (1/T*) Et T_T«+1 Qt and then construct 
y T+1 = ä,. + )ejr T" The probability Pi, T+1 is transformed into an event forecast (yi, T+1 = 
0,1) using a cut-off probability aT which is optimally chosen for each model (see Chapter 
4) 24 
Several forecast metrics are evaluated both over the Nm points in the holdout sample 
and over a subset called positive-directional-change (PDC) sample. 25 The latter excludes 
year t for country i if di, t_1 =1 so as to focus on the models' ability to predict default 
entry. This is important since debt crises, in contrast with currency/banking crises, are 
persistent (see Appendix 2.2). 
We adopt statistical and behavioral loss functions. The latter can tailor more closely 
the forecaster's decision-making problem. 26 Pairwise model comparisons are drawn and 
additionally, each model is confronted to simple benchmarks. One is a RW type event 
model based on the last observed outcome yRW1 = di,,.. Another is a RW type probability 
model, Pi,, +1 = pi, T, where pi,, is the prior probability of default (the unconditional 
frequency of 1s) over the T rolling window, namely, PRT+1 = T« Et T-T«+1 yit. Finally, we 
consider the implicit benchmarks in the Pesaran-Timmermann (1992) and the Donkers- 
Melenberg (2002) tests. 
24Extant studies use A=0.5 or fix it in-sample at the default frequency or at the value that minimizes 
the Type I and II error sum. For each rolling window r, we find the AT that minimizes the chosen loss 
function. 
25 Due to missing data we have a heterogeneus Nt, t=1, 
..., 
m (or equivalently, mi for i=1, 
..., 
N) 
holdout panel set. The ith country forecast loss over the holdout window is computed first, Li _ 
M1 
E "i L(yit, Pit) and then the overall loss L is obtained by averaging the latter over countries. 
68ee Diebold and Lopez (1996) and Diebold and Rudebusch (1989) for comprehensive surveys. 
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2.5.1 Statistical Loss Functions 
The misclassification rate (MR) defines the overall loss as the frequency of incorrect 
predictions 
Nm 
MR 
=N E> yit{1- I (Pit > At)} -f- {1- yit}I (Pit > at), MR E [0,1] (2.7) A, II. 
i=1 t=1 
where I(. ) is an indicator function and At is an optimal cut-off probability. 
Scoring rules do not require At because the probability forecast Pit is directly used. 
One is the quadratic probability score (QPS) or the Brier score which, strictly speaking, 
is not the direct counterpart of the MSE because it does not compare the realized event 
yit with it but with pit 
1Nm 
QPS 2(pit 
- 
yit)2, QPS E [0,2] (2.8) Nm 
i=1 t=1 
Second, the logarithmic probability score (LPS) defines the overall loss as 
Nm 
LPS 
=- Nrri 
EE yit In(Pit) + (1 
- 
yit) ln(1- pit), LPS E [0, oo) (2.9) 
i=1 t=1 
and so it differs from QPS in that large errors are more heavily penalized. 
2.5.2 Economic Loss Functions 
Let the following pay-off matrix summarise the decision-making problem at hand27 
Decision Pit =0 
pit 
=1 
Actual state 
yit 
=0 yit =1 
0t Bt 
tt e 'Pt 
where 0 is the economic loss of a missed default and so forth (O >, j=1,2). We build 
on Granger and Pesaran's (2000) framework but make two simplifying assumptions: a) 
the cost of a correct forecast is zero, ¢° = 0i =0 and b) the cost of an incorrect forecast 
27Granger and Pesaran (2002) define the economic cost of a decision based on the forecast Pit as 
Ctt(Ist) 
= Oiyttl(Ptt > At) +B°(1- y. t)I(fst > At) +Biy; t(1- I(it > fit)) +4 (1- y. c)(1- I(ptt > Ac))" 
36 
is constant over the holdout period, 9t = 91,0° = 00. We define the latter in relative 
ela. terms, i. e. 0 =01+ 
The following economic missclassification rate (EMR) measure 
EMRB 
= ýv-,,, 
ýE Byit{1 
-I (pit > At)} + (1- B){1- yit}I (Pit > At) (2.10) AI IIV 
it 
provides a family of forecast criteria for 0E [0,1], each giving the overall loss associ- 
ated to the model predictions (pit) for a particular decision-making scenario (0). The 
forecast ranking from EMR0,5 amounts to that from (7) since EMRa. 5 = 2MR. The MR 
identically penalises missed defaults and false alarms like the hit rate given by HR=1- 
N 
MR=Nm ým 1> [yit x Pit + (1 - yit) x (1 - Pit)]. In practice, the Type I and Type II i=1 
errors need not be symmetric in their relative importance. For instance, from investors' 
viewpoint misjudging a bad borrower implies a fall in assets (reflected in the balance 
sheet) whereas incorrectly dismissing a loan applicant as a bad risk just entails a missed 
profitable lending opportunity. Hence, the average cost of a Type I error is typically 
higher than that of the Type II error. Nevertheless, we consider 0E {0.8,0.2} in the 
analysis below. 
2.5.3 Forecast Accuracy Tests 
Let eit - L(yat, y) 
-L(yjt, yIt), i=1,2, 
..., 
Nt=1,2, 
..., 
T be the loss differential between 
models A and B. We deploy the Diebold-Mariano (1995) [DM] test statistic 
DM 
=e' N(0,1) 
TIN 
(2.11) 
where e=N Ei eti and j 1N is an estimate of the variance of e that accounts for time 
dependence. 28 This test can readily accommodate non-normality of the forecast errors 
28 We have ei = -n Et eit. The variance estimator is f- V(ei) = _1 Et Veit) + 
m m-1 
Et Ea>t cov(eit, ei, ) where Veit) = Nl l1 Ei(eit - et) for t=1, ..., m and cov(eit, ei, ) _ 
VI--j E1(eit 
-et)(ei3 -e3). We also deployed the test by computing DMt = 9ell N where et =NE1 eit 
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and is applicable to a wide class of loss functions (Diebold and Lopez, 1996) 29 Below we 
deploy (11) also to confront each model with the appropriate RW type naive model, yRW 
or PRW 
, 
depending on the loss function. 
Pesaran and Timmermann (1992) [PT] propose a nonparametric approach to test the 
null that forecasts and realizations are independent. The test is formulated on the basis 
of the HR. The total number of correct out-of-sample predictions (Nm times the model's 
HR), can be treated as a binomial random variable (the number of successes in Nm trials) 
with mean Nmp and variance Nmp(1-p) wherep = Pr(yit = 1, yit = 1)+Pr(yit = 0, yit = 
0). Under the null, p= PP+(i-P)(1-P) where P= Pr(yzt = 1) = Nm EN 1 Et=1 yit and 
P° Pr(yat 
= 
1) 
= 
Nm ýN1 Ec 1 pit are the unconditional probability of observed and 
forecasted EWD states, respectively. Testing for independence amounts to comparing the 
model's HR with that of the implicit benchmark that predicts 1 randomly with probability 
P. Thus we have 
_ 
HR 
- 
HRD' PT 
- (Nm)-1p(1 
- 
P) N N(0,1) 
(2.12) 
where HRD' and a significant PT statistic suggests that the forecasts are dependent 
on the quantities to be predicted. However, as argued by Donkers and Melenberg (2002), 
predictive dependence does not imply that the model outperforms an uninformative naive 
model whose out-of-sample forecast is the in-sample outcome that is most often observed. 
Donkers-Melenberg's (2002) [DoM] test for Ho : HR = HRD°M is based on a naive 
model that predicts 0 in our setting. Thus we have HRD°M = Nm EN 1 EM 1(1- yit). It 
and 9t = V(e; t). If dependence between DMt and DM, is assumed, then DM = in F1i ` _1 DMt - N(0, M). The results from the latter are qualitatively similar to those reported from (2.11) but the statistics 
are slightly higher. Finally, we considered the test variant DM =9 where e=M Et et and 
w 
-V(et) = Ek 
_,,, 
Ck(et) for truncation lag w= m113. Unsurprisingly, this long-run variance is very 
small (Ck, k>0 is computed over just m<5 points) and the resulting DM statistics are very large. 
29The N(0,1) density applies if the models are non-nested (McCracken, 2000). This has been shown by 
simulation to hold for ordinal and probability forecasts (Lopez, 2001). In most of our tests, the models 
are non-nested. 
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follows that 
1" IIY 
-11xv;. NTn L-d L_i, -, .,, -. - ,,.. 
t=1 i=1 
and VI-N-mD follows a limit normal distribution with zero mean and E {(2yzt - 1)2 Xy t} 
variance under Ho. For binary variables, the latter equals E(pit) = Pr(yit = 1). The DoM 
statistic is 
DoM 
= 
HR 
- 
HRD°M e, N(0,1) 
Nm [Nm E1 Et=1 Pit 
and it can be shown that, when a model has positive predictive performance (i. e. it 
outperforms the DoM naive), the quantities to be predicted and the predictions are de- 
pendent while the opposite is not necessarily true. In this regard, the DoM test is more 
challenging than the PT test. 
2.6 Results and Discussion 
The results of the jacknife are reported in Table 2.130 The first column reports the results 
based on the world PLOGIT starting from the initial 30 x1 regressor vector (x0 it, z°)'. The 
retained regressor set contains k= 13 domestic signals xit and r=3 global signals zt (see 
Appendix 2.4 for definitions). A number of regressors between 10 and 15 is the norm in the 
literature (see Peter, 2002). Nearly all the debt (external credit exposure) ratios have good 
predictive power, the exception being the short-term debt/reserves ratio. The remaining 
xtit indicate external economic activity (2 out of 5 variables retained), domestic conditions 
(5/10) and global links (1/4). Interestingly, the retained zt are the US macroeconomic 
uncertainty, monetary policy uncertainty and risk aversion proxies. 
Columns 2-4 report the means per state and a t-statistic to assess whether it has 
good discriminatory power. The regressors retained by the jacknife have a significant 
mean differential, except for the trade balance/GDP, the real exchange rate misalignment 
30The empirical analysis is conducted using LIMDEP 8. 
D- HR 
- 
HRD°M 
=ýl 
.MN 
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(RER) and the three global indicators. In most cases, the sign of the mean differential can 
be explained theoretically, e. g. the debt/GDP during pending crisis episodes (yet = 1) is 
about twice its level during tranquil periods. The exception is the short term/total debt 
ratio (liquidity) which is counterintuitive (see Appendix 2.5). 
Columns 5-8 denote the region-specific regressor sets that are obtained next by ap- 
plying the jacknife to each of the four RLOGIT equations starting from the above 16 x1 
variables. 31 Interestingly, the variables that are dropped in all the regional models are 
those that are unable to discriminate (t-statistic) between the two states, the only excep- 
tion being GDP growth. Eight indicators are retained both in the world model and in at 
least two regional models: five debt burden and liquidity indicators (external debt/GDP, 
official/total debt, short-term debt/total debt, IMF credit/exports), a measure of macro- 
economic control (per capita GNP), a macroeconomic stability signal (volatility of p. c. 
GNP growth) and a measure of openness (total trade/GDP). 
Three domestic indicators are deemed weak in terms of predicting default: trade 
balance/GDP, GDP growth and the HER. The per capita GNP emerges as a strong signal, 
in contrast with GDP growth, perhaps because it reflects wealth. Total trade/GDP, which 
measures the country's degree of trade openness, is identified as a good default predictor 
in contrast with trade balance/GDP which measures the country's competitiveness. The 
latter is reflected in the current account of the balance of payments and is closely linked 
to the HER. This finding supports the `willingness-to-pay' (as opposed to `ability-to-pay') 
theory according to which the opportunity cost of not servicing debt is relatively high for 
integrated economies. 
II One should ideally apply the jacknife to each RLOGIT equation starting from the initial 30 regressors 
but this is unfeasible in terms of degrees of freedom. In order to preserve the latter in the regional models, 
we use a stricter jacknife where a variable is dropped if, in so doing, the Type I error does not increase 
by more than 1%. 
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2.6.1 Inference-based Comparison 
Below we compare rival logit models using several statistical metrics evaluated over 1984- 
2000. 
Model ranking by information criteria 
The AIC can be cast as a discrepancy measure between the true model and a candidate 
whereas the BIC approximates the posterior odds probabilities in a Bayesian framework. 
In the context of nested models the latter can be interpreted as adjusting the size of 
a LR test with the sample size. Table 2.2 reports the MLL, the number of estimated 
parameters and the AIC and BIC statistics. The best model according to the BIC is the 
RCß(ng) that allows for random country-specific effects but no time effects (ng stands for 
`no global variables'). The FE(ng) is generally not favoured (with or without globals) by 
the BIC but is ranked first by the AIC which less heavily penalises for the large number 
of estimated parameters. Nevertheless, the fact that the FE model is estimated over a 
distinct, reduced sample 9= 53 
- 
the countries for which there is no variation in yit are 
thrown out 
- 
calls for caution in comparing its MLL with that of the other models. 
The second BIC-best model is the RCß that allows not only for random country effects 
but also time effects by including global regressors. The AIC ranks the RC'(ng) and RCß 
as second and fourth, respectively. The R06-AR and RCß-AR models where the country- 
heterogeneneous coefficients are allowed to change over time fare better than both PLOGIT 
variants and that FTE. 
At the bottom of the ranking are the models that control for either time effects 
(PLOGIT, FTE, MCS) or regional effects (RLOGIT, RSLOGIT) but not for country 
effects. The RLOGIT is preferred over the PLOGIT vindicating the importance of the 
regional effects. The worst model is the MCS followed by the RSLOGIT. 
Importance of country-specific effects 
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Table 2.3 presents the test results for hypotheses regarding the country-specific effects. 
The LR statistic for Ho : a1 =a using the same reduced IV sample for the unrestricted 
(FE) and restricted (PLOGIT) model is clearly significant. 32 The ML estimates of the FE 
are widely dispersed, &1 ranging from 3.0 to 17.9 with a standard deviation SD(&i) = 3.4. 
We calculate Z(ä; ) = sD(a) where ä is the sample mean of the &;. A coefficient estimate 
is identified as an outlier in the distribution of &; if IZ(&; )I >1 given that SD (&i) is quite 
large. About 34% of the countries are outliers. Similarly, the FE(ng) model suggests 32% 
of outliers. 
Moreover, the LR statistic for the homogeneity null (Ho : as = 0) in the context 
of the RE model is also significant. The estimate &a = 2.35 (t-ratio=22.49) suggests 
a large dispersion. 33 The measure &2ý/(&22 + a2) where o2 = 7r2/3 indicates that 63% 
of the variation in debt-servicing performance that is unexplained by (x=t, zt) is due to 
unobserved (time-constant) country heterogeneity. The RE versus RCß comparison (Ho : 
aß1 = 
... 
= (7ß4 = 0) also suggests country heterogeneity in /3g. Likewise, the RE versus 
RCy test (Aryl = 
... 
= ay3 = 0) indicates that the influence of the global factors on the 
log-odds ratio is country-specific also. 34.35 
Caution is needed in interpreting the latter set of tests because, for instance, under 
Qa =0 the parameter is on the boundary of the maintained hypothesis, aE R+ U {0}. 
In such settings, the usual limit distribution of the test may not apply. For the case of a 
single restriction, an easy correction has been suggested 
- 
to use the X2 critical value for 
percentile 1- 2a instead of 1-a where a is the nominal level (see Kodde-Palm, 1986). 
Most obviously, the corrected test for PLOGIT versus RE remains significant. For joint 
32The brute force test for Ho : a; =a gives LR = 470.8(0.00). This result must be interpreted with 
caution because the MLLFE is obtained from a reduced set (N = 53) whereas the MLLPLOGIT is based 
on all N countries. 
33For the RE(ng) the estimates are similar at öý = 2.37 (t-ratio=23.00). 
34 We also tried a RC formulation which allows for heterogeneity in the 17 x1 parameter vector (a, 
but the MSL estimates and standard errors were massive. Hence, we discard this model as implausible. 
35The &ß and ö. y estimates in the RCß and RCIf models, respectively, suggest large country hetero- 
geneity also. 
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hypotheses (e. g. PLOGIT versus RCß) the correction gets more complicated and is not 
pursued here. Nevertheless, the test statistics are rather large and so the corrected values 
are likely to remain significant. 
Next we compare the PLOGIT model (ML) estimator and the FE model (Chamber- 
lain's CML) estimator using a Hausman statistic. Under Ho : a; =a both are consistent 
(the CML estimator is inefficient because i) it does not use this restriction, ii) it is based 
on a reduced sample) whereas under the alternative the consistent estimator is CML. The 
Hausman statistic at 32.14 strongly rejects. The regressor set without globals gives a 
qualitatively similar result at 34.46(0.001,13) 
. 
36 The Hausman test for FE versus RE is 
clearly insignificant and so the latter is preferred. 37 In the comparison between RCß and 
RE, on the one hand, and between RC7 and RE, on the other, the Hausman test selects 
the RC models. 
Importance of the time-specific and region-specific effects 
Next we focus on the statistical importance of the time effects which are controlled for 
in distinct ways. First, a PLOGIT that includes zt. Second, the FTE that includes 
year-specific dummies. Third, the MCS that allows for time variation in the intercept 
and slopes. Fourth, the RC13-AR (and RO 
-AR) model that extends the RCß (and RC's) 
formulation to allow for time-variation in the random country-specific slopes. Table 2.4 
reports the results. The variables zt are clearly significant (Ho : -r = 0) in the PLOGIT. A 
regression of the FTE estimates &t against zt indicates that about half of the variation in 
the former (R2 
= 
46%) reflects shocks due to global macroeconomic uncertainty, monetary 
policy uncertainty and risk aversion. However, the relatively small Hausman statistic 
for PLOGIT(ng) versus PLOGIT at 4.12 supports the former specification. The joint 
"Likewise, the Hausman test based on the Huber-White estimate of the sampling covariance matrix 
to account for unspecified latent heterogeneity is 31.16(0.01,16). 
37The Hausman test statistic to compare the RE estimate with Chamberlain's FE estimate is very 
similar at 7.75 (0.96,16). Also, the Hausman test to compare the FE(ng) and RE(ng) gives 7.98(0.84,13). 
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restriction Ho : al = 
... 
= aT_1 =a on the year dummies in the FTE model is rejected at 
the 10% level and several of the individual test statistics (Ho : at = a) are significant at 
the 1% level. The Hausman statistic for FTE versus PLOGIT(ng) is clearly insignificant 
supporting the latter specification. 38 
The LR statistic for Ho : Qt =ß (or Ho : at = a, ßt = ß) in the MCS model is 
insignificant. But this outcome may be an artefact of the huge number of restrictions 
being tested (above 200). 39 Indeed, the individual slope estimates suggest that there is 
marked time heterogeneity. For instance, the coefficient on GDP growth and the volatility 
of GNP p. c. growth have ranges [-18.84,18.16], [-29.21,27.89] and standard deviations 
of 10.12 and 13.55, respectively. For each of the j=1, 
..., 
13 regressors, about 30% of 
%3it, t=1, 
..., 
T are identified as outliers using Z(, Q, t). 
The LR test for Ho : pa = pß =0 in the RC-8-AR model is highly significant and the 
individual tests for pß are significant in 11/13 cases. The null Ho : pa = py =0 in the RCy- 
AR model cannot be rejected but 2/3 of the individual tests for py are significant. These 
findings suggest that the influence of the domestic (and possibly the global) indicators xit 
on the log-odds ratio of default varies both across countries and over time. 
We now assess the importance of controlling for heterogeneity at a regional level in the 
intercept and slopes (a1, ß3 )', j=I,..., IV. We use the same 13 regressors, xit, in each region 
and test for parameter stability across regions. The LR test indicates that the regional 
heterogeneity is significant even at the 1% level. This is borne out by the variation across 
the estimates of the four RLOGIT equations. For instance, the coefficient on debt/GDP, 
official/total debt and trade/GDP has a regional range of [5.20,23.03], [4.19,30.23] and 
[-12.60, 
-3.29], respectively. The dispersion of the FE estimates äi within regions is 
38The counterpart Hausman statistics based on the `sandwich estimator' (Huber-White) are 12.19 
(0.51,13) for PLOGIT versus PLOGIT(ng) and 10.84 (0.62,13) for FTE versus PLOGIT(ng). 
39 In these sequential cross-section regressions, the asymptotic distribution of the LR test holds for fixed 
T and N 
-+ oo. As T gets large, the number of restrictions will get large as well and the LR test may 
not be appropriate. 
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SDII 
= 
2.7, SDIII 
= 
2.9 and SDjv = 2.4 (the FE is unfeasible for region I) which is lower 
than within all countries. 40 A Hausman test for homogeneity (ai = a) within regions 
gives smaller statistics than the world panel at 18.67(0.00), 31.89(0.00) and 7.00(0.43) for 
j= II, III, IV, respectively. 
Slope estimates: plausibility of the signs 
The impact of the domestic indicators (on the probability of default) has a clearcut 
theoretical sign in 8 out of 13 cases. 41 This is denoted in parenthesis. Table 2.5 sets out 
the estimation results. 42 Three of the coefficients bear the correct sign and are significant 
in all models: external debt/GDP (+), official/total debt (+) and trade/GDP (-). 43 The 
credit to private sector/GDP is significantly negative in all models thus supporting the 
view that this ratio is a proxy for banking development which is linked with increased 
economic growth (Bekaert et al. 2002) 44 
The significantly negative effect of GNP per capita is correctly picked up by the FE, 
RCI3 and RC1 models. But only the RCS'-AR captures the negative effect of GDP growth. 
40Likewise, the world FE model gives äi with SDI = 1.2, SDII = 3.1, SDIII = 3.1 and SDIV = 1.5. 
41 Eaton and Gersowitz (1981) and Lee (1991) set out a theoretical framework where the default prob- 
ability hinges on the `willingness-to-pay'. The higher the volatility of export growth (and of GNP), the 
more an exclusion from the international capital markets is feared and so the more willing it is to honour 
its debt (-). Peter (2002) advocates the `ability-to pay' theory whereby volatile economies typically have 
large current account deficits (+). A weaker currency (positive RER deviation from trend) favours trade 
competitiveness and hence exports (-) but it means also a high debt burden in home currency and so, if 
debt is serviced mostly using GDP, the likelihood of default is higher (+); an overvalued currency implies 
a high risk of a currency crisis and hence of sovereign default (-). 
42Let y` = x'ß +c, the marginal effect of xj is Op/Ox1 = G(ß'x)[1-G(3'x)]ß,. The sign of Oplöxj is 
that of ß;. 
43An exception is official/total debt in the FE model (t-ratio=0.7). The external debt/GDP signals the 
ability to pay debt. A large total trade/GDP ratio signals openness and hence, the opportunity cost of 
default. Countries experiencing severe balance of payments problems are the most likely borrowers from 
official, multilateral institutions such as the IMF and so their official/total debt ratio is high. 
44The FTE and PLOGIT slopes 4 are very close so the former are not reported to preserve space. The 
t-ratios of the PLOGIT(ng), PLOGIT, R(S)LOGIT based on the asymptotic covariance matrix adjusted 
for unspecified latent heterogeneity (White's robust `sandwich estimator') are qualitatively similar. But 
the t-tests must be interpreted with caution regarding autocorrelation in the residuals (see Fuertes and 
Kalotychou, 2004b). 
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The positive effect of the short-term debt ratio is picked up by the PLOGIT(ng), PLOGIT, 
MCS and RCQ-AR (also in the PLOGIT(ng) for Africa and EastEurope/MidEast/NorthAfrica; 
see Appendix 2.6). For debt service/exports, only the RC# captures the expected pos- 
itive sign although the coefficient is insignificant. For trade balance/GDP, the RCß-AR 
model yields the expected negative signed coefficient although it is insignificant also. The 
AR estimates for RCß-AR and RC11-AR are generally below 0.85 which is suggestive of 
stationary time-series dependence. Regarding the (unreported) coefficients of the global 
regressors, the US macro uncertainty has the expected (+) sign and is significant in all 
models (where included) except for the FE. The US monetary policy uncertainty has the 
correct (+) sign and is significant in the PLOGIT and RE models. The US risk aversion 
proxy has the correct (+) sign in the RCß, RCO-AR and RC1-AR. In contrast to the other 
models, the FE suggests that all three global indicators are insignificant. 45 
Although the individual MCS estimates show massive instability as noted above, their 
average is plausible and comparable in magnitude to the PLOGIT estimates (see Appen- 
dix 2.6). This instability is reflected in large standard errors and six insignificant MCS 
coefficients. Large time series variation is expected in developing economy models due to 
measurement error. The MCS regressions cannot allow for country heterogeneity and this 
provides a rationale for the instability of pt. If the omitted factors (idiosyncratic shocks) 
responsible for the country heterogeneity change over time, this would induce different 
biases in Qt, t=1, 
..., 
T which may, however, cancel out when averaged. 4s 
451n the PLOGIT at least two global signals (macro and monetary policy uncertainty) are significant 
whereas in the RLOGIT equations none is significant. The latter may be an artefact of the smaller 
degrees of freedom. 
46 In a logit, if the true DGP contains xlt and X2t but yst = Olxlt + e; t is specified, then plimß1 = 
5101 +82/32 where S1 and S2 are complicated functions of the unknown parameters. If there are individual 
differences, the CS regression is y, =a+x, ß(3 + e; where ei = (a; - a) + x; (i3, -13) + ei = s, + e, and s. 
represents the factors responsible for the heterogeneous responses whereas e; are true innovations. 
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2.6.2 Out-of-sample Forecast Comparison 
In sum, the information criteria suggest that models that allow for country heterogeneity 
(and possibly time effects also) fare better than models that control for heterogeneity at 
a broader, regional level. The (R)LOGIT and models that exclusively control for time 
effects such as the PLOGIT with globals, FTE and MCS fare relatively worse. The LR 
and Hausman tests tend to suggest that unobserved effects (of time, country and regional 
type) should not be overlooked in modelling the probability of default. However, the 
model comparison on the basis of the coefficient estimates (signs) is mixed. 
We now compare the models' ability to predict outside of the estimation sample. Table 
2.6 presents the overall losses over the entire holdout sample and the PDC subset. The 
model ranking according to the percentage of Type I and Type II errors is similar to that 
on the basis of MR for 0=0.8 and 0=0.2, respectively. For each loss function, the 
minimum-forecast-error (in bold) model is contrasted with all other models using the DM 
test. Asterisks denote a significant loss differential. Interestingly, the RSLOGIT provides 
the best forecasts under the loss functions implicit in the QPS 
, 
LPS and EMR0.8 criteria 
over the holdout sample and it significantly outperforms the RW-type naive benchmarks. 
The DM test suggests that the PLOGIT(ng), PLOGIT, MCS and FTE have similar forecast 
accuracy to the RSLOGIT for these loss functions. Under the MR loss, the R(S)LOGIT, 
MCS, FTE, RE(ng) and RCP' forecast significantly better than any other model but not 
the naive. Under EMR0,2, the PLOGIT (ng), PLOGIT, FTE, RE and RC7 are the best 
models but again the naive generates equally satisfactory forecasts. 
Over the PDC subset, the simple PLOGIT(ng) attains the minimum-loss according 
to the QPS and LPS criteria and it forecasts significantly better than the naive (ßl W). 
Under QPS, the PLOGIT, RSLOGIT and FTE models forecast equally well whereas all 
other models forecast significantly worse. Under LPS, the PLOGIT(ng) and PLOGIT 
forecast significantly better than any other model. The PLOGIT, MCS, RSLOGIT and 
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RE models forecast better than any other model (including the naive Sit ') for the MR 
loss. Under EMR0.2, the best forecasts are obtained from the PLOGIT(ng), PLOGIT, FTE 
and yRW, all other forecasts are significantly worse. Finally, under EMRO. 8 the minimum- 
loss model is the RSLOGIT whereas the FE, RCß, RCO-AR, RC'-AR models and fRW are 
clearly significantly worse even at the 1% level. 
It is worth noting that under the EMR0.2 loss, the best forecasting model cannot 
beat the RW naive. Given that our sample is dominated by Os, the naive predictor yRw 
is expected to perform well because this criteria unrealistically penalises more heavily 
the false alarms than the missed defaults. Nevertheless, the forecast accuracy of the 
PLOGIT(ng), PLOGIT and FTE is equivalent to that of yRw over both the holdout and 
PDC sets. 
We next turn to the predictor dependence (PT) and predictive performance (DoM) 
tests. The PT statistic is significant in all cases at better than the 1% level (except 
for the FE model) suggesting that there is positive dependence between predictions and 
realizations for all models. Unsurprisingly, the DoM test rejects less often since it is 
relatively more demanding. The hit rate of the naive predictor implicit in the DoM test 
(HRD°M 
= 
0.59) is significantly larger than that of the PT test (which varies with the 
model) but smaller than that of the RW naive (HRyRW = 0.80) over the holdout sample. 47 
Among the models which pass the DoM test, the FTE or RSLOGIT produce the largest 
statistics over the holdout sample and the PLOGIT gives the largest statistic over the 
PDC sample. The FE, RCS', RC7-AR, RCß and RC7-AR models do not pass the DoM test. 
In sum, the more general formulations such as FE, RE, RC"(-AR), RCQ (-AR) that allow 
for unobserved (random) heterogeneity across countries and possibly over time too are 
good descriptive models but do not predict well out of sample. In contrast, parsimonious 
47The benchmark predictor implicit in the DoM test coincides with yRW over the PDC set with a hit 
rate HRD°M = 0.66. Also, HRPT = HRYRW = 0.66 over the PDC set whereas for all other models 
HR PT < 0.66. 
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regional logit regressions (RSLOGIT) forecast relatively well and outperform the naive 
benchmarks. The simple PLOGIT, MCS and FTE models that exclusively control for 
time-specific effects also work quite well as early warning devices. 
2.7 Conclusion 
The empirical literature on sovereign default is quite vast but a systematic analysis of the 
importance of controlling for differences in behavior across countries and/or through time 
that are not captured by the included regressors is lacking. This chapter seeks to fill this 
gap. We estimate different panel logit variants ranging from a simple pooled regression 
to a general random coefficients model where each country has its own coefficients that 
are specific to each time period also. The relative quality of the models is gauged on the 
basis of statistical hypotheses tests, model selection criteria, theoretical judgements on 
the plausibility of the estimates and forecast metrics. 
The LR and Hausman type tests point towards the more general formulations. Ac- 
cording to the AIC and BIC, simple models that exclusively control for time or regional 
heterogeneity are ranked last. The comparison is unclear, however, in terms of the plau- 
sibility of the coefficient estimates. Four domestic indicators 
- 
external debt to GDP, 
official to total debt, total trade to GDP and credit to private sector over GDP 
- 
emerge 
as robust default signals together with global macroeconomic uncertainty. 
The loss function affects the forecast ranking. The overall picture is that panel logits 
that exclusively control for either time or regional heterogeneity in a simple manner 
provide more accurate sovereign default estimates than models that allow for random 
(country and time) effects. Moreover, the out-of-sample forecast ability of the selected 
models is superior to the naive benchmarks for most of the loss functions, particularly 
when a heavier penalty is attached to missed defaults (than to false alarms) or when the 
emphasis is in predicting entry into a debt crisis period. Therefore it seems reasonable to 
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conclude that the panel model that best describes the data does not necessarily generate 
accurate sovereign default forecasts. More complexity in the models means, in effect, 
adding extra terms in the forecast error variance. These findings may have implications 
for the appropriate assessment of sovereign default risk, a task which is currently being 
pursued by rating agencies and international investors. 
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TABLE 2.1 
Regressor Set Selected for World and Regional PLOGIT Models 
World panel Regional panels 
mean (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
N=96 y=0 y=1 t-stat N=17 N=26 N=36 N=17 
A) Country-specific indicators 
Total external debt/ GDP 
Official debt / Total debt 
Short term debt / Total debt 
Debt service / Exports 
IMF credit / Exports 
Volatility of export growth 
Trade balance / GDP 
Credit to private sector/ GDP 
GDP growth 
GNP per capita 
Volatil. of GNP p. c. growth 
Real exchange rate 
Trade / GDP 
0.3879 0.7032 23.76* x 
0.5633 0.5933 6.91*  
0.1244 0.1109 2.99* x 
0.1492 0.1843 6.70* xx 
0.0828 0.1529 9.68* x 
0.1072 0.1391 6.14* xxx 
-0.0797 -0.0822 0.40 xxxx 
0.2746 0.1785 13.41* xxx 
0.0398 0.0247 6.26* xxxx 
7.1236 6.4402 13.87* x 
0.0435 0.0529 6.35* xx 
0.1273 0.1110 0.74 xxxx 
0.5427 0.4737 6.93*  
B) Global indicators 
US macroeconomic uncertainty 0.2246 0.2281 0.81 xxxx 
US monetary policy uncertainty 0.2566 0.2572 0.18 xxxx 
US risk aversion 1.0453 1.0458 0.03 xxxx 
The variable selection is conducted over the in-sample [1984,1995] period using the jacknife. 
(I) Asia, (II) Latin America, (III) Africa, (IV) East Europe/Middle East/North Africa. 
t-stat is the statistic for the significance of the absolute mean differential. 
*denotes significant at the 1% level. 
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TABLE 2.2 
Model Comparison on the Basis of Information Criteria 
Model type Controlled effects 
PLOGIT(ng) 
- 
PLOGIT 
MCS 
FTE 
RLOGIT 
RSLOGIT 
RE (ng) 
FE (ng) 
RCß (ng) 
RE 
FE 
RCY 
RClf-AR 
RCß 
RCp-AR 
time 
time 
time 
regional 
regional 
country 
country 
country 
country, time 
country, time 
country, time 
country, time 
country, time 
country, time 
AIC BIC 
MLL s statistic ranking statistic ranking 
-606.3 14 620.3 12 656.5 10 
-601.4 17 618.4 11 662.4 12 
-491.8 238 729.8 15 1007.5 15 
-594.4 30 624.4 13 702.0 13 
-500.1 56 556.1 10 660.0 11 
-646.7 26 676.7 14 735.1 14 
-469.8 15 484.8 8 523.7 3 
-399.0 66 405.0 1 559.4 7 
-399.7 28 427.7 2 500.1 1 
-467.8 18 485.8 9 532.3 4 
-366.0 69 435.0 3 596.4 9 
-457.8 21 478.8 6 533.1 5 
-455.7 25 480.7 7 545.4 6 
-408.6 31 439.6 4 519.8 2 
-425.8 45 470.8 5 587.3 8 
The criteria are AIC = 
-MLL +s and BIC = -MLL + 0.5s ln(NT) where s 
is the number of estimated coefficients and NT(=1307) is the effective sample size. 
AIC 
=-E1 MLLt + Et St and BIC =- Et MLLt + 0.5st Et ln(Nt) 
for the TCS model, where Nt is the no. of available observations per cross-section. 
AIC=-ER 1MLLj+Ejsj and BIC=-EjMLLj+0.5sjEjln(NTj) 
for the R(S)LOGIT, sj are the number of coefficients, NTj the data points per region (R=4). 
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TABLE 2.6 
Out-of-sample Forecast Analysis 
Statistical loss 
Model MR QPS LPS PT DoM 
A: holdout 
naive 
sample 
PLOGIT(ng) 
PLOGIT 
MCS 
FTE 
RLOGIT 
RSLOGIT 
RE(ng) 
RE 
FE 
RCy 
RC"Y-AR 
RCP 
RCP-AR 
0.2014 0.4117* 1.1588** 
0.2700* 0.3275 0.5130 
0.2562* 0.3289 0.5168 
0.2450 0.3435 0.5631 
0.2354 0.3367 0.5353 
0.2314 0.3275 0.5904** 
0.2320 0.3060 0.5043 
0.2434 0.3520* 0.6267* 
0.2514* 0.3530* 0.6335* 
0.3898** 0.5251** 0.8874** 
0.2492 0.3629* 0.6672** 
0.3068** 0.5239** 2.2647** 
0.3220** 0.6231** 3.1384** 
0.3088** 0.5752** 2.6447** 
B: PDC sample 
naive 0.3354** 
PLOGIT(ng) 0.3292** 
PLOGIT 
MCS 
FTE 
RLOGIT 
RSLOGIT 
RE(ng) 
RE 
FE 
RC^/ 
RCy-AR 
RCO 
RCp-AR 
0.4418" 
0.3489 
1.2197* 
0.5469 
0.2400 0.3491 0.5508 
0.2294 0.3713* 0.6153** 
0.3228** 0.3621 0.5788** 
0.2716** 0.3992** 0.7290** 
0.2474 0.3685 0.5935* 
0.2648** 0.3776* 0.6718** 
0.2492 0.3743* 0.6730** 
0.3642** 0.6321** 1.0806** 
0.2788** 0.3916** 0.7158** 
0.3172** 0.5483** 2.1234** 
0.3174** 0.5994** 2.9334** 
0.3096** 0.5774** 2.5995** 
5.00** 3.73** 
4.41** 1.90* 
4.51** 2.20* 
4.67** 2.39** 
4.53** 2.87** 
4.79** 2.72** 
4.68** 2.82* 
4.36** 2.77** 
4.24** 2.59** 
1.72* 0.29 
4.51** 1.37 
3.61** 1.46 
3.06** 1.37 
3.25** 1.61 
0.00 0.00 
3.38** 0.07 
3.79** 2.92** 
3.92** 1.69* 
3.16** 0.16 
3.71** 1.57 
4.26** 1.83* 
2.83** 1.22 
3.76** 2.01* 
0.77 
-1.12 
3.11** 0.84 
2.89** 0.24 
3.12** 0.61 
2.16* 0.30 
Economic loss 
EMRo, 2 EMR0, s 
0.0643 0.1372** 
0.0754 0.0860 
0.0712 0.0927 
0.0973* 0.0776 
0.0703 0.0971* 
0.1004* 0.0835 
0.0960* 0.0760 
0.0938* 0.0948 
0.0897 0.0948 
0.1725** 0.1344 
0.0836 0.0943 
0.1388** 0.1236** 
0.1581** 0.1588** 
0.1456** 0.1594** 
0.0671 0.2683** 
0.0819 0.0970 
0.0776 0.1023 
0.1055** 0.0960 
0.0817 0.1047* 
0.1193** 0.1037 
0.1233** 0.0887 
0.1064** 0.0909 
0.0996* 0.0951 
0.2091** 0.1691** 
0.0900* 0.0947 
0.1523** 0.1280** 
0.1782** 0.1225** 
0.1470** 0.1658** 
Bold denotes the minimum loss. ", * under (E)MR, QPS or LPS indicates that the 
model's forecast ability is significantly worse than that of the minimum-loss model 
according to a Diebold-Mariano test at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. PT is the 
Pesaran-Timmerman test of predictor dependence and DoM is Donkers-Melenberg 
test of predictive performance. The naive prediction is yRW under MR, EMRO. 2 and 
EMRO. s. The naive predictor is PRW under QPS and LPS. 
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CHAPTER 3: Inferences On the Determinants of De- 
fault and the Autocorrelation Problem 
3.1 Introduction 
In the broad financial crisis literature a number of studies have developed EWSs, partic- 
ularly, for currency and banking crises. These studies differ in the domestic indicators 
that they consider and in the model specification, typically some logit/probit variant. 
However, a common denominator across these studies is that they attempt to predict the 
probability of a crisis over a window which is typically longer than the frequency with 
which the forecasts are updated. More specifically, the dependent variable is a binary 
indicator such that a1 value at period t indicates that the country has experienced a 
crisis over the [t, t+ h] window. ' In Chapter 2 we have defined our EWD indicator over 
the [t, t+ 2] time window, which facilitates annual sovereign default forecasts within a 
time window of three years. In a similar spirit, in the currency crisis literature, Berg and 
Patillo (1999) and Kaminsky et al. (1998) adopt a two-year horizon in their monthly 
forecasting models whereas the monthly updated predictions in Bussiere and Ratzscher 
(2002) and Burkart and Coudert (2000) refer to 3-, 12- or 24-month windows. In the 
sovereign default literature, Peter (2002) and Oka (2003) adopt a three-year horizon in 
their EWS for annual data. There is also a parallel macroeconomic literature which seeks 
to forecast recessions over a multiple period horizon 
- 
Bernard and Gerlach (1996) and 
Estrella and Mishkin (1997). The length T of the time series used in these studies is 
typically long enough for autocorrelation issues to become relevant. The fact that the 
dependent variable is a multiple-period outcome (overlapping problem) induces moving 
average prediction errors. On the other hand, the fact that the typical macroeconomic 
and financial ratios employed in these studies are themselves persistent results in autocor- 
'See Abiad (2003) for a comprehensive survey of Early Warning Systems. 
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related prediction errors 
-a sluggish external debt/GDP indicator that predicts a debt 
crisis at t will also predict a debt crisis at t+1 and so on. Hence, the usual logit/probit 
ML standard errors will be biased and tests based on them have incorrect size. 
However, the typical t-statistics reported in these and other studies to analyse the 
determinants of financial crises are based on the conventional ML standard errors. Little 
effort has been made on evaluation of misspecification effects on inference. At most, 
the Huber-White `sandwich' estimator is reported but this is designed to account for 
neglected latent heterogeneity. To the best of our knowledge, Berg and Coke (2004) is 
the only study in the financial crisis literature that directly addresses the autocorrelation 
problem. As Berg and Coke point out, a likely reason why most EWS analyses do not pay 
attention to the presence of autocorrelated errors is that the usual econometric packages 
cannot produce an h. a. c. estimator for panel logit/probit models. They build on the 
autocorrelation-robust estimator for panel binary choice models proposed by Estrella and 
Rodrigues (1998) which is associated with the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
technique. Estrella and Rodrigues (1998) and Berg and Coke (2004) show via simulation 
that the latter produces accurate standard errors whereas the usual probit ML standard 
errors are substantially downward biased. 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate empirically the extent of the above prob- 
lem in the context of sovereign default for different logit specifications. These range from 
a baseline pooled model to a random coefficients model. We conduct tests for serial cor- 
relation in the generalized residuals to preliminary gauge the extent of the problem. Next 
we compute for each specification both the usual QML standard errors and the GMM 
type standard errors following Newey-West (1987). The results suggest that the inferences 
based on the usual QML standard errors are overturned when using the h. a. c. standard 
errors in a number of cases. This phenomenon is generally more clear for the macro- 
economic ratios that are more sluggish as measured by the sum of the AR(p) coefficient 
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estimates. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes data and the conventional 
estimator. Section 3.3 outlines the serial-correlation problem inherent in panel EWS 
models and develops an autocorrelation-adjusted estimator. Section 3.4 presents and 
discusses the empirical results. A final section concludes. 
3.2 Data and Estimation 
The analysis in this chapter is based on annual data for 96 emerging and developing 
countries over 1983-2002. The exogenous variables are the 13 x1 country-specific regressor 
vector, xit 
, 
and the 3x1 vector of global macrovariables, zit 
, 
picked up by the jacknife 
approach applied in Chapter 2. The goal is to predict whether debt-servicing problems 
are likely to arise within a specific time frame. We define the endogenous Early Warning 
Default (EWD) indicator as 
W# = 
f 
(3.1) V .v1/. 
,1. 
1 if d;, t+k =1 at any k=0,1, 
.., 
h 
-1 
0 otherwise u r ise 
using h=3 years. Thus this forward-looking variable takes a value of 1 ('crisis warning') 
if a debt crisis has occurred sometime in a three-year window, i. e. in t, t+1 or t+2. 
Let the observed EWD indicator, yit, be influenced by exogenous factors as follows 
yt 
= Xi, t-1Q -3 +" cit, cit ^' i2d(O, a 2), i=1, 
..., 
N, t=1, 
..., 
Ti (3.2) 
where the (k + 1) x1 vector xi, L_1 includes a constant and yt is the latent index such 
that yit =1 for yt>0 and yit =0 otherwise. The noise eit is assumed independently 
distributed from each of the k macroeconomic ratios included in xi, t_1. We have pit 
Pr(yit 
= 
1) 
= 
Pr(yt > 0) and assuming a logistic density for eit it follows that pit = 
exp(xi 
_10) The response probability is thus the logit function evaluated G(xi, t-t) =t l+exp(x,, t_, O) 
at a linear function of the variables. This nonlinear relation between pit and xit can 
be rewritten linearly in terms of the log-odds ratio as In lPi = x;, t_1ß. The maximum Pit 
59 
likelihood (ML) estimates of f3 facilitate the default probability estimates pit, i=1, 
..., 
N, 
t=1, 
.., 
Ti. 2 
The baseline pooled logit model (PLOGIT), formalized by equation (3.2), assumes full 
homogeneity 
- 
the effect of a change in xi, t_1 on the log-odds ratio is identical across 
countries and time periods, ßit = , 3. Alternative panel logit specifications are considered. 
On the one hand, in order to control for unobserved time-specific heterogeneity we specify 
either a PLOGIT which includes the global macrovariables zt_1 or a 1-way fixed time effects 
regression (FTE). On the other hand, we control for country effects by estimating either 
a fixed effects (FE), a random effects (RE) or a random coefficients (RC) model which 
include the global variables zt_1 to account for country-invariant time effects. The RC 
is a generalization of the RE where the time invariant country-specific heterogeneity is 
captured not only in a random intercept term (ai) but through random slopes also. The 
FE, RE and RC models assume that the presence of the time-invariant country effects 
(e. g. ai) captures all correlation between unobservables in different time periods. That 
is, the idiosyncratic error cit is assumed to be uncorrelated over individuals and time. 
The PLOGIT and F(T)E regressions are estimated by the usual maximum likelihood 
(ML) approach whereas the RE and RC logit variants are estimated by maximum simu- 
lated likelihood (MSL) using 500 Halton draws. The notation ng (no globals) indicates 
that the regressor set is xi, t_1, otherwise is is (xi, t_1, zt_1)', and the slope coefficient vector 
of zt_1 is denoted y. Thus, for instance, RCß denotes a logit that allows for random coef- 
ficients )3i and RC"-AR denotes a logit with random coefficients yit (including a constant) 
which are time-varying according to an AR(1) mechanism and so forth. 
2This is sometimes referred to as quasi-ML (QML) in the logit context because it does not incorpo- 
rate assumptions about the time series model followed by cit. The (Q)ML method uses the likelihood 
corresponding to independent observations, i. e. V(e) = o2I., Q2 =ä 
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3.3 Serial Correlation Problem and Correction 
An EWS with a warning horizon that exceeds the interval between observations, i. e. 
h>1, implies a moving average (MA) process in the prediction errors by construction. 
Moreover, the macroeconomic ratios typically employed as regressors are positively au- 
tocorrelated and this induces further serial dependence in the errors. In the context 
of non-linear logit/probit models, time series dependence in the errors does not hinder 
the consistency of the coefficient estimates, provided that regressors and errors are un- 
correlated (exogeneity). 3 However, the existence of serial auto correlation will invalidate 
conventional t- and F-tests which use the standard ML covariance matrix estimator O. 
The latter yields biased standard errors. 
One way to avoid misleading inferences, without the need to impose specific assump- 
tions on the structure of the covariance matrix of the parameter estimators, SZ, is the use of 
the usual ML logit estimator while adjusting the standard errors for general forms of auto- 
correlation. In this spirit, Gourieroux et al. (1984) and Poirier and Ruud (1988) propose 
autocorrelation robust estimators of the panel probit covariance matrix and demonstrate 
their consistency. However these estimators are computationally cumbersome. 4 
This chapter follows the GMM methodology along the lines of Newey-West (1987) 
proposed by Estrella and Rodrigues (1998) in the probit context. We adapt the latter to 
the logit framework as follows. The log-likelihood function of the logit model is 
NT 
In L=1: E{yit In G(O'xit) + (1- yit)1n[1 
- 
G(, O'xit)]} 
i=1 t=1 
and the first-order (maximization) conditions are: 
ö1nL NT 
a _EEMI 
t+(1-yit) 
I 
]Xit=0 
i=1 t=1 it 
(1 it) 
3Wooldridge (1994) demonstrates the consistency of the probit/logit ML estimator under general 
conditions. 
4For instance, they require numerically solving single and double integrals of the gaussian pdf. 
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where Git = G(A'Xit) = Pr(yit = 1) and git = g()3x t) = dG. ) d( 
.= (i+ tja 
ö1nL N T( 
T- =E ý(yit - Git)Xit =0 
i=1 t=1 
= 
Git(1-Git) 
and (yet 
- 
Git) = Est is referred to as the generalized residual. ' The ML estimator of the 
asymptotic variance-covariance matrix is 
SZ 
= -H-1 
where H denotes the Hessian matrix 
021n LNT H= 
aßap, =- 
[Git(1- Git)]xitxit 
i=1 t=1 
This estimator is inconsistent in the presence of serial correlation. The heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation consistent (h. a. c. ) estimator associated with GMM techniques is as 
follows, 
n hac 
= 
H-1S*H-1 
where 
(3.3) 
NLT 
s* 
= 
SO + wjEJit-j (XitXit-j + Xit-jxit) 
i=1 j=1t=j+1 
and So = Ei, t EitXitXit. The above expression provides a family of GMM type robust 
estimators for the asymptotic covariance matrix of the logit parameter estimator. For in- 
stance, one can use wj =1 in the spirit of Hansen's (1982) approach or alternatively, the 
Barlett window wj =1- 1+ following Newey-West (1987) so that higher-order autocor- 
relations are given less importance; L represents the maximum plausible autocorrelation 
5Note that the first derivative of the log-likelihood with respect to the constant term yields Ec Ft(ytit- 
Git) = 0. This implication bears some similarity to the LS normal equations and so yit - G: t is viewed 
as a residual. 
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lag. Estrella and Rodrigues (1998) demonstrate that the O"° estimator in the probit case 
(i. e. where Zit are the ML generalized residuals of probit) has the same asymptotic prop- 
erties as the estimators derived by Poirier and Ruud (1988) and Gourieroux et al. (1984). 
In particular, as long as L increases with the time series length T, the S2'`"° estimator 
for the variance-covariance matrixis consistent. One advantage of (3.3) over the former 
estimators is that is easy to compute. Both Estrella and Rodrigues (1998) and Berg and 
Coke (2004) demonstrate by Monte Carlo simulation, although on the basis of different 
data generating processes, the satisfactory performance of SO'`ac for small samples. 
In our application, we adopt L=3, given that h=3 in our dependent variable 
definition above, and follow the Newey-West approach. ' Our preliminary analysis of the 
data includes two residual autocorrelation tests 
- 
the Baltagi and Li (1995; BL) LM 
type test and the Bhargava, Franzini and Narendranathan (1982; BFN) Durbin-Watson 
type test. The alternative hypothesis is that there is first-order autocorrelation in the 
idiosyncratic error term sit. Random or fixed individual effects are allowed. However, like 
most existing panel autocorrelation tests, the BFN and BL tests have as pitfall that they 
assume homogeneity in serial correlation across individuals. The BFN statistic 
BFN 
= 
EN i ET`_2Rit - 
Ei, 
t-1)2 
ENT; 2 
i=1 
ýt=1 ýit 
converges to 2 under Ho, i. e. it suggests first-order (positive) autocorrelation if BFN < 2. 
The BL test statistic 
BL 
= 
NT2 FN i Ei `_2 ýitýt, t-i 
2 
ýN (ý T; 2 T-1 jýi=1 Lt=1 ýct 
where T=N 'T", suggests first-order autocorrelation if BL exceeds the usual 5th or 
10th quantile of the Xý1) distribution. In our context, eit denotes generalized residuals.? 
6A longer lag implies estimating the second term of S. on the basis of a shorter sample (T 
- 
L). 
Experimenting with L=4 produced qualitatively similar results. 
7The theoretical properties of the BFN and BL statistics (bounds and sampling distribution, respec- 
tively) have been derived under balanced panels, i. e. Ti =T=T. Hence, the test results for our 
unbalanced panel should be taken as indicative only. 
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To provide a measure of the degree of persistence in each macroeconomic ratio, the 
pooled series are used to estimate an AR(p) model with sufficiently long lag p so as to 
absorb the underlying time dependence. The autoregression includes country dummies 
to control for autocorrelation arising from unobserved time-invariant country effects, i. e. 
xit = ai + plxi, t_t + 
... 
+ ppxi, t_p + cit. The model estimates facilitate the persistence 
measure r=j 
_1 p7's 
3.4 Results and Discussion 
Table 3.1 sets out the coefficient estimates for each logit model and the usual t-statistics. 9 
In parenthesis we denote for each coefficient the expected theoretical sign. We use (+/-) to 
indicate that contradicting theories can be considered. The t-ratios for the PLOGIT and 
FTE models (that do not control for country-specific heterogeneity) using Huber-White's 
robust `sandwich' estimator that adjusts for unspecified latent heterogeneity are reported 
in square brackets. 1° Although the t-ratios change, the results are qualitatively similar. 
However, all t-tests in Table 3.1 must be interpreted with caution because of residual 
autocorrelation. To gauge the extent of the latter we applied the Bhargava, Franzini and 
Narendranathan's DW test and Baltagi and Li's LM test to the generalized residuals of 
each model. 
The BL and BFN test statistics are strongly significant in all models. The former 
ranges from a minimum of 472.09 (RCß-AR residuals) to a maximum of 867.86 (RCa) and 
similarly, the strongest rejection with the BFN test occurs for the RCß model at 0.292 
8 Observations t=1,2,..., 5 are lost for all i=1, 
..., 
N. Note also that since N= 96 whereas T= 17 
(or smaller Ti due to missing data for some countries) there may be a downward bias in the fixed effects 
AR(p) estimates (Nickel, 1981). Nevertheless, in our context the persistence measure E pj is not analysed 
in absolute terms for each variable but instead compared across them. 
9The Hausman test statistic to compare the slope estimates in the FE and RE models gives a p-value 
of 0.96 which clearly supports the efficient RE estimates. Given the latter and the fact that the FE is 
based on a different sample from all other models (countries for which there is no time variation in yit 
do not enter the log-likelihood function) the FE estimates are not reported to preserve space. 
'0The Huber-White covariance matrix can be seen as formula (3.3) for wj = 0, 
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whereas the highest statistic is that for the RCß-AR model at 0.700. For comparative 
purposes, we deployed the tests also for the same models where the dependent variable yit 
is defined as in (3.1) with h=1, i. e. the forecast horizon matches the annual frequency 
of the data. The BL and BFN statistics are now notably smaller but still significant, as 
expected, due to the persistence in the macroeconomic ratios and in the default indicator 
di, t itself. For instance, the BL statistic falls from 628.81 (h = 3) to 149.05 (h = 1) for 
the PLOGIT and from 635.01 to 152.30 for the PLOGIT(ng). Likewise, the BFN statistic 
increases from 0.490 to 1.185 for LOGIT and from 0.491 to 1.170 for PLOGIT(ng). These 
figures illustrate that even if there is no overlapping problem, the sluggishness of the 
macroeconomic ratios is an important source of serial dependence in the logit prediction 
errors. l i 
Table 3.2 reports the t-statistics based on the Newey-West type standard errors and 
the AR(p) persistence measure for each regressor. For the latter, a maximum lag order 
p=5 years seems to absorb most of the serial dependence in the errors. 12 The h. a. c. 
standard errors are larger than the usual QML (or Huber-White adjusted) standard errors 
by a factor that ranges between 1.5 and 18 times. The coefficients lose significance or 
become marginally significant in a number of models and so one should be cautious about 
the inferences from earlier sovereign default studies. For instance, the coefficients of 
GNP per capita and IMF credit/exports lose significance in five and three specifications, 
respectively, when the h. a. c. standard errors are used. Not surprisingly, the degree of 
persistence of these variables is relatively large as compared with the remaining ratios. 
"We also compared the usual QML t-statistics and the h. a. c. t-statistics in the counterpart models for 
yit defined using h=1 (no overlapping problem). Although the latter are smaller than the former, the 
difference is now smaller. This is in line with the fact that the serial dependence in prediction errors stems 
now from the sluggish regressors and the persistence inherent in dit itself. For instance, for GNP p. c. in 
the LOGIT (ng) the usual t-ratio is 3.87 whereas the h. a. c. t-ratio is 3.01, for debt service/exports the 
usual t-ratio is 
-3.96 and the h. a. c. t-ratio is -3.39 and so forth. 
12For instance, for the three most sluggish variables 
- 
GNP per capita, credit to private sector over 
GDP and IMF credit to exports 
- 
the estimated autocorrelation in the residuals is negligible at 
-0.004, 
-0.039 and -0.027, respectively. 
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The more marked changes occur in the RC logits where several variables lose significance. 
3.5 Conclusion 
Autocorrelatedness in the prediction errors is a pervasive feature in an early warning 
system (EWS) of sovereign default, or of a broader financial crisis, for two reasons. One 
is that the macroeconomic and financial ratios typically employed are persistent and this 
results in serially dependent prediction errors. Another is that, by definition, the goal of 
an EWS is to estimate the probability of a debt crisis over a period (window) that exceeds 
the frequency with which the forecasts are updated. This overlapping problem induces 
a moving average process in the prediction errors. A large number of studies use panel 
logit/probit classifiers estimated by maximum likelihood to investigate the determinants 
of default. To the best of our knowledge, none of them raises the issue of autocorrelated 
errors and their impact on the inferences. This chapter is a step towards filling this gap. 
We estimate different panel logit variants ranging from a simple pooled regression to a 
random coefficients model where each country has its own coefficients that are specific to 
each time period. We utilize Estrella and R. odrigues's (1998) Newey-West type covariance 
matrix estimator which is associated with GMM techniques. Using two conventional serial 
correlation tests, the logit prediction errors are shown to be significantly autocorrelated 
even when the forecast horizon matches the frequency of the data so that there is no over- 
lapping problem. The overall picture that emerges from this analysis is that the adjusted 
standard errors are substantially higher than the conventional ML logit standard errors 
particularly for the most sluggish macrovariables. As a result some of the variables lose 
significance or become marginally significant. Our results are in line with the simulations 
in Berg and Coke (2004) for a panel probit calibrated using a currency crisis dataset. 
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CHAPTER 4: Towards the Optimal Design of an Early 
Warning System for Debt Crises 
4.1 Introduction 
The financial turmoil in emerging and developing markets during the last decade has 
stressed the need for accurate country risk assessment. A number of studies have focused 
on the so-called twin crises, namely, banking and currency crises (Frankel and Rose, 1996; 
Berg and Pattillo, 1999; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Kumar et al., 2003). ' As more 
countries are moving toward flexible exchange rates the latter are becoming less frequent 
events. But sovereign debt crises remain a matter of concern for international financial 
markets and economic policymakers. 
The sovereign default literature is very prolific. Most studies have focused on identify- 
ing the main determinants of default among fundamentals of the domestic economy and 
indicators of the international business-cycle and market sentiment. For this purpose, dif- 
ferent classification techniques have been used. However, scant attention has been paid to 
forecasting issues and to the optimal design of an Early Warning System (EWS) tailored 
to the decision-maker's preferences. 
Various classification techniques have been attempted mostly based on macrovariables. 
Several studies have applied linear discriminant analysis which assumes multivariate nor- 
mal regressors with equal covariance matrices in the default and non-default states (Frank 
and Cline, 1977; Taffler and Abassi, 1984). These assumptions have been shown to be 
rather strong. The most recent research is based on nonlinear panel logit/probit models 
(Peter, 2002). Non-parametric classification techniques such as clustering and recursive 
tree analysis, albeit popular in other areas, have received little attention in this litera- 
ture. One exception is Manasse et al. (2003) who apply both a logit and a recursive tree 
'See Abiad (2003) for a comprehensive survey of the EWS literature. 
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analysis. Moreover, most of the models thus developed are based on arbitrary choices for 
the cut-off probability and warning horizon or crisis window. These ad hoc choices may 
not necessarily be optimal for the problem at hand. For instance, a low cut-off rate and 
a long warning horizon may be better choices for a highly risk averse (towards default) 
decision maker since they lead to more default signals and vice versa. 
The credit ratings provided by leading agencies and bankers have also been found 
to contain predictive power regarding sovereign debt crises and to Granger-cause the 
spreads of sovereign bonds (Reinhart, 2002; Rojas-Suärez, 2001; Larrain et al., 1997). 
Moreover, the New Basel Accord allows banks to use internal ratings for calculating 
capital requirements. The Institutional Investor ratings can be regarded as consensus 
internal ratings from major international banks. The upshot is that it is unclear which 
method and information set one should adopt to develop an EWS of sovereign default. 
This indirectly stresses the potential importance of forecast combining, an issue that has 
received scant attention in this literature. 
The contribution of this chapter is twofold. First, it provides a framework for the 
optimal design of an EWS for sovereign default. For this purpose, it implements three 
forecasting tools: i) logit based on macrovariables, ii) K-means clustering of macrovari- 
ables and iii) logit based on Institutional Investors' credit ratings (LOGIT-R). Thesecond 
classifier has not been utilized in the present context as yet. The sample pertains to 75 
emerging and developing economies over 1983-2000. We show how the loss function and 
degree of risk aversion of the decision-maker can be accounted for in order to optimally 
choose key elements of an EWS such as the logit cut-off rate and the number of clusters. 
The calibration of the classifiers is conducted in-sample recursively over a 12-year rolling 
window. The assessment of their forecast ability over a 5-year holdout period focuses on 
the anticipation of default entry events. 
Second, the chapter delves into several forecast combining issues. It assesses the 
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relative strengths of the classifiers for different decision-makers and the stability of the 
ranking over the holdout years. In order to adequately gauge the gains from forecast 
combining, it is shown that the choice of weighting scheme should also be tailored to the 
loss function and degree of risk aversion. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 outlines the back- 
ground literature. Section 4.3 describes the methodology and Section 4.4 introduces the 
data. Sections 4.5 then illustrates empirical issues regarding the optimal calibration of 
classifiers while our forecast combining analysis is presented in Section 4.6 before con- 
cluding. 
4.2 Elements in the Design of an Optimal EWS 
The goal of an EWS is to issue signals of pending debt repayment difficulties. Hence, the 
variable of interest takes a value of one at year t if a default occurs any time within a 
[t, t+ h] window 
1 if dit+k=1 at anyk=0,1,..., h-1 
Yit =0 
otherwise 
(4.1) 
and the classification problem at hand is formalized as yit =f (xi, t_1) where xi, t_1 repre- 
sents the available predictors at t-1. The forward-looking variable yit is called the Early 
Warning Default (EWD) indicator. 
4.2.1 Warning Horizon for a Crisis Signal 
It is reasonable to expect that signs of economic deterioration will emerge some years 
before a debt crisis occurs. The warning horizon is the time interval within which the 
EWS should anticipate the occurrence of a crisis. If the warning horizon chosen is, say, 
h=3 years then the forecast i i, t+i =1 indicates that a debt crisis will occur sometime 
during [t + 1, t+ 3]. Choosing h requires a trade-off. The longer h is the less missed 
defaults but the more false alarms and vice versa. 
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Currency crises studies typically set h= 24 months (Berg and Pattillo 1999; Kumar 
et al., 2003). Bussiere and Fratzscher (2002) find empirically the optimal currency-crisis 
warning horizon according to a specific loss function. Burkart and Coudert (2002) carry 
out a sensitivity analysis of the Type I and II error rates associated to currency-crisis 
warning horizons from 1 to 4 quarters and find worse performance at shorter horizons 
(higher Type I error rate). However, the choice of warning horizon has received scant 
attention in the sovereign default literature. Most studies arbitrarily set h=1 year. 
Sommerville and Taffler (1995) argue that this may be too short for bankers' purposes. 
Peter (2002) and Oka (2003) arbitrarily set h=3 years in modeling default on external 
creditors and arrears to the IMF, respectively. 
4.2.2 Cut-off Probability Rate 
In order to assess the adequacy of an EWS, the probability forecasts are usually trans- 
formed into event forecasts and compared with the EWS indicator yit. For this purpose, 
the decision-maker has to adopt a cut-off or threshold probability A. Mascarenhas and 
Sand (1989) show that the overall error rate of a sovereign default predictor based on 
discriminant analysis varies with A. 
In the financial crises literature, A is most often arbitrarily set at 0.5,0.25 or 0.10 
(Kumar et al., 2003; Peter, 2002; Berg and Pattillo, 1999; Frankel and Rose, 1996), fixed 
at the in-sample frequency of crises (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1999; Detragiache 
and Spilimbergo, 2001; Manasse et al., 2003) or at the level that balances the Type I and 
II errors (Burkart and Coudert, 2002). Only three sovereign default studies account for 
the loss function in choosing this parameter (Taffler and Abassi, 1984; Sommerville and 
Taffler, 1995; Oka, 2003). 
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4.2.3 Decision-maker's Loss Function 
The loss function facilitates the expected cost of mispredicting. On this basis, the fore- 
caster can optimally calibrate several parameters of an EWS such as the cut-off rate and 
the warning horizon. The literature typically treats the Type II error (false alarms) as 
less worrisome than the Type I error (missed crises), mainly for two reasons. First, the 
costs of missing investment opportunities or those of taking pre-emptive policy measures 
in the case of a false warning are often less severe than the losses, reflected in the lender's 
balance sheet, or the welfare cost of an unanticipated default. Second, false alarms are not 
always `errors' as such in that they may not stem from predictive failure of the model but 
simply reflect that, although economic vulnerabilities might have been severe, appropriate 
policy actions were taken and a debt crisis was avoided. 
Suppose that an EWS is developed using the warning horizon h and the cut-off A. 
On the basis of its forecasts, different error measures can be computed. Let Eo(A, h) 
and El (A, h) denote the number of false warnings (yet = 1, yet = 0) and missed defaults 
(yet 
= 
0, yit = 1), respectively. Let Co(h) and C1(h) denote the total number of tranquil 
(yet 
= 
0) and debt crisis (yet = 1) cases, respectively. The available sample has C= 
Co + Cl = NT cases where T denotes time periods and N denotes countries. The 
Type I error probability (PI hereafter) is estimated by the percentage of missed defaults, 
El(A, h)IC, (h). The Type II error probability (P11) gives the likelihood of a false alarm 
and it can be estimated as Eo(A, h)/Co(h). Finally, let 0 denote the degree of risk aversion 
(toward missing a crisis) of the decision-maker. Below we outline three loss functions that 
have been widely used in the broad financial crisis literature. 
Kaminsky et al. (1998) introduce the noise-to-signal loss (NS) for currency crisis 
forecasts 
NS(A, h) 
=1 
PI 
I(A, h), NS E [0,1] (4.2) 
defined as the ratio of the probability of a false alarm over the probability of a correct crisis 
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warning. Other currency crises studies adopt this loss function (Berg and Pattillo, 1999; 
Burkart and Coudert, 2002). But it has not yet been used in the sovereign default litera- 
ture. It can be estimated by NS(A, h) = c(h) x cl(h) E 
(X, h (a 
h) where c(h) = C1(h)/Co(h). 
Hence, optimizing A according to (4.2) amounts to minimizing the ratio of false alarms 
to correct alarms. 
Another typical loss function, that we call investor's loss (IL), is defined as 
IL(6, a, h) 
= 6P1(a, h) + (1- e)P11(, \, h), IL E [0,1] (4.3) 
it can be estimated by IL(0, A, h) =Bc a'h + (1 - 0)_ C , \'h . The cost attached to a i(h) o(h) 
missed default relative to that of a false alarm is captured by the risk-aversion parameter 
0, e. g. 0=0.8 reflects that the cost ratio for the decision-maker is 4 to 1. Equation 
(4.3) represents a family of loss functions parameterized by 0. Oka (2003) and Burkart 
and Coudert (2002) adopt it for 0>0.5. 
Other studies have employed what we call the policymaker's loss (PL) function defined 
as 
PL(8, A, h) 
= 
BPI(a, h) + (1- B)Pyy, PL E [0,1] (4.4) 
which is a weighted sum of the probability of missing a default and the probability of 
issuing an early warning. One implicit assumption is that the latter triggers some policy 
action or structural reform (e. g. a reduction in public-sector pay and employment) that 
maybe costly for policymakers in terms, for instance, of social unrest and not being 
reelected and for the country itself in terms of reduction in output, economic instability 
and so forth. Thus an optimal EWS for policymakers should not trigger too many warning 
signals. 2 In contrast, the loss function (4.3) presumes that correct alarms have negligible 
costs and so it is thought to be more representative of investors. 3 
2The cost of a false alarm is simply the cost of the preventive policy action (1 
- 
0). Strictly speaking, 
the cost of a correct alarm is the cost of the preventive action minus the benefit from preventing the 
default (1- 6) 
- 
C. 
3A correct default warning entails transaction costs for investors. Nevertheless, labelling (4.3) as IL 
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Note that Pw 
- 
Pr(y 
= 
1) 
= 
Pr(y 
= 
in y= 0) + Pr(y =in y= 1) so that 
Pw=Pr(y=1ly=0)Pr(y=0)-}-Pr(y=lly=1)Pr(y=1) 
which can be estimated by Pw =cc+ (1- Cl) C. Thus we have 
PL(6, a, h) 
_ 
(1- B)p j I(1 
Be)p 
- 
lI Pi(, \, h) + 
(1 
p 
p) Pir(a, h) +1I (4.5) 
which reveals that PL is also a linear function of PI and PI, but, in contrast with IL, 
the weights reflect not only the risk aversion 0 but also the prior probability of default 
or in-sample default frequency P=c. The lower p the heavier the penalty for the Type 
II error ceteris paribus. The PL metric is adopted by Bussiere and Fratzscher (2002) 
and Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1999). The former show how the optimal (A, h) 
depends on 0 whereas the latter focus on A in the contexts of currency and banking crises, 
respectively. 
4.2.4 Forecast Combining Schemes 
Bates and Granger's (1969) seminal paper sets out the concept of forecast combination. It 
urges that, when alternative forecasts are available, it may pay to combine this information 
rather than to opt for one of the alternatives. Combination permits the blend of forecasts 
from a range of sources. Combination has been shown to be effective not only when 
the forecasts are obtained from widely heterogenous methods but more generally also 
(Montgomery et al., 1998; Winkler and Makridakis, 1983; Clemen et al. 1995). Instability 
in the ranking of forecasts provides another rationale for combination (Stock and Watson, 
2001; Aiolfi and Timmermann, 2003). 
Bates and Granger (1969)'s framework advocates that the gains from quantitative fore- 
cast combining are akin to the diversification gains in a portfolio of assets and hence, the 
optimal weights depend on the covariance matrix of individual forecasts. This approach 
and (4.4) as PL is mainly for ease of exposition. This terminology does not imply loss of generality in 
the ensuing analysis. 
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amounts to minimising the combined forecast error variance. Granger and Ramanathan 
(1984) show that the latter boils down to an OLS regression of the actual series on the 
individual forecasts with the constraints of a zero intercept and slopes adding to one. 
They propose unconstrained OLS as a means of allowing for the possibility of biased 
forecasts. Weighted least squares has been suggested for large samples to allow for the 
possibility of time-varying weights and structural change (Diebold and Pauly, 1987). A 
Bayesian approach to forecast combining is introduced by Bunn (1975). In this spirit, 
Clemen and Winkler (1986) advocate shrinking the OLS weights toward some prior mean. 
Gupta and Wilton's (1988) Bayesian odds-matrix approach has proven quite successful 
for small samples. Several studies discussed in Clemen (1989) show that the simple equal- 
weighting approach does at least as well as the above parametric methods based on past 
performance. Non-parametric combination schemes - weights based on rankings of past 
performance - have been shown to outperform the equal-weights combination out of 
sample (Aiolfi and Timmermann, 2003). 
The combination of forecasts for discrete variables raises distinct issues and this lit- 
erature is comparatively smaller. Bayesian methods (Gupta and Wilton, 1988; Clemen 
et al., 1995) have been suggested to combine probability forecasts. In Gupta-Wilton's 
odds-matrix method, forecast performance is measured by the distance between the fore- 
casted probability and the realized event. For event forecasts, Feather and Kaylen (1989) 
suggest an approach based on grouping them into mutually exclusive classes (method A 
forecasts success and method B failure, both forecast success and so forth) and conditional 
upon the class, the success and failure probabilities are assumed to follow a joint Dirich- 
let distribution. This approach has been shown to be nested in Kamstra and Kennedy's 
(1998) [KK] logit method. The latter is simpler to apply and it can combine probability 
forecasts, event forecasts and a mix. Moreover, it can be extended to polychotomous and 
ordered classification problems on the basis of multinomial- or ordered-logit regressions, 
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respectively. Monte Carlo simulations in Kamstra and Kennedy (1998) and an empirical 
application in Kamstra et al. (2001) suggest that KK-logit can beat the simple average 
for large samples. 
The extensive and continued interest in forecast combination is in large part explained 
by the wealth of evidence from empirical studies on its merits (see Newbold and Harvey, 
2004). Surprisingly, this concept has received scant attention in the sovereign default lit- 
erature. Sommerville and Taffler (1995) compare judgmental forecasts (bankers' ratings) 
and parametric forecasts (logit and linear discriminant analysis) based on macrodata but 
do not assess the merits of combined forecasts. Mascarenhas and Sand (1989) investigate 
the accuracy of discriminant analysis based on three information sets 
- 
credit ratings, 
macrovariables or both. They find that combining credit rating and macroeconomic fore- 
casts using Gupta and Wilton's (1988) Bayesian odds-matrix method outperforms the 
individual forecasts. But they do not explore alternative weighting schemes in order to 
find the `optimal' combination for the problem at hand. Manasse et al. (2003) com- 
pare the forecasts from a logit regression and a non-parametric recursive tree based on 
macrovariables and find that the latter yields less missed defaults but more false alarms. 
Using two distinct event weightings (dummies in the logit that incorporate information 
from the tree nodes and the unanimity principle) it is shown that forecast combining 
improves accuracy. 
4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Competing Classifiers 
Three forecast methods are considered. First, a pooled logit model for macrovariables 
(LOGIT-M) 
log 
[_Pit 
11=a+ 
p'Xt, t-i ,i=1, ..., N, t=1, ..., T (4.6) 
-PztJ 
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that implies the nonlinear relation, pit = '"+A x;, t-1 where p (y 1) and xi 171-77" t1e it = 
Prit 
= 
, t_1 
is an sx1 vector. The coefficient, Qj, j=1, 
..., 
s estimated by maximum likelihood 
] 
represents the marginal effect of the macrovariable xitj on the log-odds ratio log [Pit 
ceteris paribus. 4 
Second, the analysis relies also on sovereign credit ratings (zit hereafter) that reflect 
consensus bankers' judgment. Several studies have found these internal ratings to be cor- 
related with default signals such as GDP per capita, inflation, external debt, economic 
development and the actual default history (Lee, 1993; Cantor and Packer, 1996). Futher- 
more, these credit ratings incorporate important qualitative information on default risk 
such as the effects of social, political and cultural conditions. A univariate logit transfor- 
mation log 
[Pit ]= 
a+Qzi, t_1 is used to generate default forecasts based on the bankers' 1 pit 
ratings. We refer to the latter as LOGIT-R forecasts. 5 
As discussed in Section 4.2.1, a warning horizon h is embedded in the definition of 
yit. In a logit framework, a cut-off probability is required to transform the probability 
estimates into EWS signals, i. e. it =1 if Pit >A and bit =0 if pit < A. Hence, optimal 
logit calibration implies finding the (A, h) combination that is `best' according to the 
decision-maker's preferences, namely, her loss function and degree of risk-aversion 0. The 
following two-step optimization approach is proposed: 
1) For each (0, h) pair, compute the loss associated with the A candidates so that Ah 
min L(9, A, h) gives the optimal cut-off rate. This facilitates a set of optimal cut-off rates 
denoted {Ah}. 
2) For each 0, calculate the loss associated with h= {1,2, 
..., 
hm} so that 
he 
= min[L(9, Aeh, h)] h (4.7) 
4The forecasts from the pooled logit model are shown to outperform those from more sophisticated 
specifications such as random coefficients logit under several loss functions (see Chapter 2). 
5The finite-sample properties of different estimation approaches to generate rating migration probabil- 
ities from the external ratings provided by Moody's are explored in Chapter 5 by Monte Carlo simulation. 
78 
is the optimal warning horizon. This facilitates an optimal horizon and cut-off pair 
(he, A h) for each 0. The latter is denoted (h*, A*) for simplicity. 
The third classification technique we employ is K-means clustering. ' The inputs or 
cases are the NT observation vectors, xit = (xit, l, xit, 2, 
..., 
xit, 3), where s is the number of 
macrovariables. These are allocated in clusters so as to maximise within-cluster similarity 
and between-cluster discrepancy. The outputs are K clusters labelled as either default 
(y 
= 
1) or non-default (y = 0) according to an assignment rule. An unseen or out-of- 
sample case xit is classified as default/non-default depending on the cluster whose centroid 
is closer. (See Appendix 4.1). The choice of K does not follow from the algorithm and is 
often made subjectively. Hence, optimal clustering calibration requires finding the `best' 
assignment rule and K according to the decision-maker's preferences.? We propose below 
an approach which is discussed without loss of generality for the IL function. 
For a given K, the assignment rule can be optimized as follows. ' Let nc(1) be the 
number of default cases (vectors xi, t_1 such that yit = 1) in cluster c. Likewise for nc(0). 
Let C1 (and Co) denote the total number of default (non-default) cases. The loss implied 
by labelling cluster c as non-default is Lo,, (0) =0x PI where PI = "ýl is the estimated 
probability that a default case falls in cluster c. Likewise, L1, c(0) = (1 - 0) x PII = 
(1 
- 
B) "C0 
. 
The optimal rule for cluster c is 
yý = axgmin Ly (B) (4.8) 
yE{0,1} 
K 
(0). The minimal loss for the overall clustering is L(0, K) 
_ 
Lc* (0). 9 with loss Lc* 
C-i 
Large-K clustering characterizes the sample rather well, but not necessarily the pop- 
ulation and so it may produce poor out-of-sample forecasts. The optimal K can be found 
'K-means clustering was chosen over hierarchical clustering techniques, such as nearest neighbour or 
average linkage, because for large datasets these are computationally and storagewise rather expensive. 
7The proposed approach can be applied to different warning horizons to optimize h also. 
8This is akin to finding the optimal cut-off rate A* in the logit framework. 
9For the PL function, Lo(c) = (1 - B) x Pw where Pay - Pr(y = 1) is estimated as the number of 
cases in the cluster over all sample cases, "(1)+"(0). Likewise, we have L1(c) =0x P1. 
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by a method introduced by Altman et al. (1985) to correct for overfitting bias in recur- 
sive partitioning. Consider KE 12,..., Km} and define L(9, K, S) = L(9, K) +SxK 
where L(O, K) is the minimal loss for a given K defined as above and S>0 is an over- 
fitting penalty. For each SE {Sl,, 
.., 
S,, } we find Ka = argmin L(6, K, S). This yields a 
x 
set 
{Kal, 
..., 
Ks } from where K* is found using a cross-validation. The sample {xit} 
is randomly partitioned into V equally-sized groups. For say Sl, we leave out one group 
and cluster the remaining cases using the above k51 that was selected using the whole 
sample. The group cases left out are then assigned to the existing clusters. The procedure 
is iterated by leaving out a different group each time. The cross-validated loss associated 
to Kal is the average loss over the V iterations CV[L(O, Kal)] 
_ 
Ej 1 L(O, k81); where 
j denotes the group left out in iteration j. The optimal K* minimizes the cross-validated 
loss 
K* 
= argmin CV [L(O, k6)], j=1,2, 
..., 
n. 
K61 
In this chapter, we set Kmax = 10,5 E {0.001,0.002,... 0.01} and V=5.10 
The main advantage of clustering over logit is its non-parametric nature, namely, it 
does not require the forecaster to formalize the relation between the exogenous macrovari- 
ables and the default event. But clustering has some pitfalls. First, it does not provide a 
continuous scoring scale such as the posterior probability of default and so the countries 
cannot be ranked in terms of default risk, which is important for international investors. 
Second, the main aspects of the default clusters (e. g. low trade/GDP) are often not clear- 
cut particularly when many variables are used and so one cannot identify the determinants 
of default, which is important for policymakers. 
10 Simulations have shown that V=5 works well to calibrate the number of nodes in classification trees 
(Breiman et al., 1984). The change in IL or PL for successive K is of order 10-2. The latter drives our 
choice of range for 8. 
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4.3.2 Combining the forecasts from LOGIT-M, LOGIT-R and 
K-clustering 
Let {y 
+1}, M 1 denote M rival forecasts formed at period t and y t+1 = R(y= t+,,..., y+; +1) 
the combined forecast where R is a mapping or transformation. We consider two map- 
pings: a) logit for mixed probability and event forecasts and b) voting rules for event 
forecasts. 
Kamstra and Kennedy's (1998) [KK] logit regression method is simple to apply and 
it permits the combination of probability, event forecasts or a mix. It can be extended to 
polychotomous and ordered classification problems using multinomial or ordered logits, 
respectively. It has been shown that KK-logit can beat the equal-weights approach in 
large samples (Kamstra et al., 2001). 
According to the KK-logit approach, we fit by OLS a regression of the EWS indicator 
(yet) on a constant, the log-odds ratio forecasts (logj-) from LOGIT-M and LOGIT-R 
and the event forecasts (yzt) from K-clustering. The coefficient estimates are the combining 
weights. To allow for time-variation, this approach is recursively applied in-sample over 
a 12-year rolling window. Thus we have weights w, - (w4, wT, wT) for each set of out-of- 
sample forecasts, "r = 1996, 
..., 
2000. 
A nice property of KK-logit is that it enables forecast encompassing tests (Fair and 
Schiller, 1990). We conduct a LR test for Ho : wm =0 for each m=1,2,3 and the 
mth forecast for year r is discarded if the statistic is insignificant. The out-of-sample 
combined forecasts, PF, are transformed into event forecasts by means of a cut-off rate 
)\T. The latter is chosen optimally for each r= 1996, 
..., 
2000 as described in Section 4.3.1 
according to the decision maker's preferences. 
Event type forecasts can be combined using voting rules such as: 
m 
y t+1 =1 
if F, m=1 wt+iym :, t+1 ?R (4.9) 
0 otherwise 
where R is the voting parameter. There is a large literature on the properties of such 
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combining schemes, mostly in the context of recursive trees and neural networks. The 
results depends on the choice of wt+1 
- 
weighting equally or according to cross-validated 
past performance 
- 
and the empirical evidence is inconclusive (Alpaydin, 1998; Ali and 
Pazzani, 1995). A key role is also played by R. The most frequent choices are R= 1/2 
and R=1 which, alongside the constraints Em 1 wt+1 =1 and wtt+l =1, yield the 
Majority Rule (MR) and Unanimous Rule (UR), respectively. The combined forecast is 
thus the event predicted by the majority of the classifiers or by all of them, respectively. 
The empirical evidence on the relative performance of these schemes is conflicting. Battiti 
and Colla (1994) support the MR whereas Albanis and Batchelor (1999) support the UR. 
We consider both schemes. 
4.4 The Dataset 
The analysis is based on N= 75 emerging and developing countries over 1983-2000.11 
Since the predictors (explanatory variables) are lagged 1 year, the effective sample for 
yit spans the 1984-2000 period: 1984-1995 is the initial 12-year rolling window and 1996- 
2000 is the holdout period. 12 The endogenous default indicator {dit}i°_°984 is constructed 
in the same spirit as in the previous chapters. The default events that follow from our 
definition correspond closely to those in Standard and Poor's (2001). See Appendix 4.2. 
The reduced set of transformed macroeconomic and financial ratios that resulted from an 
in-sample jacknife procedure is considered. 13 The thirteen variables thus retained are the 
"See Appendix 4.2. The regions (number of countries parenthesis) are East Europe (7), Asia (12), 
Latin America (22), Middle East/North Africa (9), Africa (25). The countries are those in Chapter 2 
excluding the ones for which no II credit ratings were available: Belize, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central 
African Rep., Chad, Eq. Guinea, Gambia, Guyana, Maldives, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome- 
Principe, Solomon Islands, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, Vanuatu, Yemen. 
12LIMDEP 8 and SPSS 10 are used in the subsequent empirical analysis. 
13The jacknife is based on a logit regression over 1984-1995. A variable is dropped if, in doing so, the 
cross-validated loss (a conservative IL or PL with 0=1, A=0.5 and h= 3) does not increase. For details, 
see Chapter 2, Appendix 2.3. The variable selection could be cast as another element in the optimal design 
of an EWS, namely, one could select the set that is `best' according to the decision-maker's preferences. 
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predictor set, xit - (xit, l, xit, 2) 
..., 
xit, 13)', for the LOGIT-M and K-clustering classifiers. 14 
The LOGIT-M estimates using the thirteen variables retained are outlined in Appendix 
4.3. 
Country credit ratings are obtained from the Institutional Investors database. These 
are available for 67 countries in 1984 rising to a maximum of 83 by 2000.15 They seek to 
capture the perception of worldwide bankers regarding a country's ability and willingness 
to service its financial obligations. In particular, our ratings series (zit) is an index based 
on the weighted scores assigned to the countries by the 100 largest international commer- 
cial banks. The latter closely monitor the observance of standards 
- 
whether a country 
has published an IMF Article IV or ROSC and met the SDDS specifications. '6 It varies 
in a 1-100 scale with 100 representing low default-risk countries. The bankers' ratings are 
updated semi-annually and our LOGIT-R classifier is based on end-of-year data. To avoid 
sample selection bias in comparing the classifiers 
- 
LOGIT-M, LOGIT-R and K-clustering 
- 
the country-period cases used in the analysis are those for which both xit and zit are 
available. This leads to 45 countries in t= 1984 and 69 in t= 2000. 
We should stress that sovereign debt crisis typically last longer than one year in con- 
trast with banking and currency crises. About 30% of all country-period cases over 
1984-2000 are defaults (dit = 1) whereas about 10% are default entries (Odic = 1). The 
average length of a debt crisis is axound 3 yeaxs. The real challenge for an EWS of sov- 
ereign default is to predict a new default entry (turning point) rather than a perpetuating 
default. In order to develop a powerful EWS in the above sense, the loss functions will be 
14The same information set is used for both classifiers to make the comparison more informative. There 
is also the rationale that the determinants of default shoult not depend on the model employed. 
15In contrast, external credit ratings from Moody's and S&P's are unavailable for many countries in 
our sample. 
16The Special Data Dissemination Standards (SDDS) was designed for countries with, or seeking access 
to, international capital markets. It sets macro data definitions, in particular, reserves. It also sets 
minimum timeliness and frequency standards for data releases. The Reports on the Observance of 
Standards (ROSC) are voluntary and refer to transparency, financial market regulation and corporate 
governance issues. (See Glennerster, 2004). 
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evaluated over an entry set defined as follows. Year t is excluded for country i if it was 
in default at year t-1, i. e. dit =1 is excluded if di, t_1 = 1.17 
4.5 Optimal Calibration of Forecasting Tools 
This section discusses the in-sample calibration of the classifiers over the first 12-year 
window 1984-1995. Unless otherwise noted, yet is based on h=1 and the risk aversion 
parameter is set at 0=0.5. Asterisks denote optimal values. 
4.5.1 Balancing the missed defaults and the false alarms 
As noted earlier, the cut-off rate (A) and warning horizon (h) parameters of an EWS are 
often chosen subjectively. An objective choice requires a trade-off between Type I and 
Type II errors. Figure 4.1, Panel A, illustrates the latter for the LOGIT-M classifier. 18 We 
consider cut-off rates AE (0,1) and warning horizons h= {1,2, 
..., 
hmax} with hmax = 3. 
A higher A or a lower h yield fewer false alarms at the expense of more missed defaults. 
From the perspective of creditors or investors, the latter means realised losses (balance 
sheet), reserve holdings will need to rise and cash flows and asset values will also be 
adversely affected. From the perspective of policymakers, the experience of the 1990s has 
suggested that output contractions, rising unemployment and poverty rates are some of 
the repercussions of sovereign debt crises. 
17Some studies use `exclusion windows' whereby consecutive default years within a certain time window 
are excluded from the empirical analysis; the length of the window is arbitrary and studies have used 
about 1-3 years (Detragiache and Spilimbergo, 2001; Frankel and Rose, 1996). However, in using this 
reduced sample for the model specification and estimation one may discard important information. In 
this paper, the entry set is used to assess the models' out-of-sample forecast accuracy. The estimation 
and clustering are based on all the in-sample cases. 
"The LOGIT-R calibration raises similar issues to that of the LOGIT-M so we focus on the lat- 
ter. Clustering methods have been shown to work better when the variables are mapped to the 
[0,1] interval. Hence, for K-clustering the N points for each year, {xit}j 1, are transformed using 
xit = (xit - min{xit})/(max{xit} - min{xit}). The same 13 regressors are used for both the LOGIT-M 
and K-clustering classifiers to make the comparison more informative. Another rationale is that the 
determinants of default should not depend on the model employed. 
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Lowering A or raising h will induce the opposite trade-off, namely, less missed crises 
at the expense of more false alarms. The latter means foregone profit opportunities for 
investors and unnecessary policy actions which may be costly, for instance, in terms of 
social unrest. Forecasters should use the (A, h) combination that are `best' according to 
the decision-maker's preferences. 
4.5.2 Well-behaved Loss Functions 
Figure 4.1, Panel B, shows the interaction between the losses and the cut-off AE (0,1). 
The NS loss function monotonically falls as A increases. The minimum NS is achieved 
at a relatively high A* > 0.724. The total number of default signals, Eo + (Cl 
- 
El) at 
this A* is rather small and the model misses most of the defaults (PI = El/Cl = 85%). 
The intuition is that, as A increases, both the rate of false alarms, Eo/Co, and the rate 
of correct default warnings, (C1 
- 
El)/C1, fall but the former does so faster because 
Co > Cl is This suggests that the NS loss function may be unsuitable in this context 
because it leads to a debt-crisis EWS with a very high probability of missed defaults. 
The main pitfall of NS is that it only accounts for the Type I and II error rates 
in relative terms. For instance, NS = 1/9 could stem from PI, = CO = 10% and 
PI 
== 
10% or from P11 = 1% and PI = 91%. Oka (2003) and Mulder et al. (2002) 
pose a similar criticism for the NS in the context of arrears to the IMF and currency 
crises, respectively. Moreover, the NS loss function, in contrast to IL and PL, does not 
allow the forecaster to control for the decision-maker's degree of risk aversion (0) in the 
design of an EWS. Hence, we shall focus on IL and PL hereafter. 
4.5.3 Optimal Cut-off and Warning Horizon Combination 
Which are the optimal warning horizon and cut-off for an EWS of sovereign default? 
To answer this question, we deploy the optimization approach suggested in Section 4.3.1 
19Over the 1984-1995 period, the probability of default entry is p= Ci/(Ci + Co) = 71/423 =17%. 
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for hE {1,2,3} and AE [0.17,1). 20 Figure 4.2 illustrates the in-sample calibration of 
LOGIT-M for representative risk-affine (0 = 0.2), risk-neutral (0 = 0.5) and risk-averse 
(0 
= 
0.8) decision-makers under the IL or PL loss function. Table 4.1 sets out the results. 
The entries are the optimal values. For the IL function, a risk-neutral decision maker 
(0 
= 
0.5) would need A* = 0.641 and h* = 3. The best design for a highly risk-averse 
user (0 = 0.8) corresponds to A* = 0.205 and h* =2 whereas for the risk-affine user 
(0 
= 
0.2) the optimal choice is A* = 0.727 and h* = 3. Regarding the PL function, for the 
risk-neutral user (0 = 0.5) the best parameters are A* = 0.270 and h* =1 whereas for the 
risky user (0 = 0.2) we have A* = 0.724 and h* = 1. These findings illustrate that: 
Result 1. The optimal cut-off and warning horizon parameters of a logit EWS depend 
on the decision-maker's preferences (loss function, risk aversion). 
Figure 4.3, Panel A, shows the optimal cut-off for different risk aversion (towards 
default) levels. For a given horizon h, a higher 0 needs a lower A* to achieve the best 
balance between the two errors. Hence, more risk-averse decision-makers would need 
lower cut-off rates. Thus we have: 
Result 2. For a given warning horizon, the optimal cut-off rate decreases with the 
decision-maker's degree of risk-aversion towards missing defaults. 
Figure 4.3(A) reveals also that for a given 0, a longer h implies a higher A' and vice 
versa. The intuition is that the longer the warning horizon h ceteris paribus, the more 
alarms are issued. The latter implies more Type II errors (E0 T) but less Type I errors 
(El . 1. ) with the former increasing at a faster rate and so a higher cut-off is needed to 
achieve the desired balance. Thus we have: 
Result 3. For a given risk aversion level, the optimal cut-off increases with the warning 
horizon. 
20The LOGIT-M for h= {2,3} and A<0.17 predicts 1 nearly all the time. The step size for A is 10-4. 
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The relation between the risk aversion level and the warning horizon is shown in Figure 
4.3, Panel B. For any given 0<0.7, the IL function yields h* = 3. For 0>0.7, it results 
in h* 
= 
{2,3}. Intuitively, the benefit for institutional investors from using a relatively 
long horizon stems from missing less defaults (PI J, ) which outweighs the opportunity cost 
of more false alarms (Plr T). 
Result 4. The optimal warning horizon is relatively long for international investors. 
According to the PL function, for risk aversion 0<0.7 the logit EWS should be based 
on h* = 1, for 0.75 <0<0.85 the best choice is h* =2 whereas for 0>0.9 it is h* = 3. 
Thus we have: 
Result 5. The optimal warning horizon increases with the degree of risk-aversion for 
policymakers. 
In sum, the optimal horizon depends on the decision-maker's preferences. The contrast 
between Result 4 and 5 can be rationalized as follows. Since policymakers assign a cost to 
default alarms (whether correct or false), a longer horizon would only be optimal for those 
policymakers with high risk-aversion so that the benefit of missing less defaults outweighs 
the cost of too many alarms. 
4.5.4 Optimal Number of Clusters 
We now turn to the K-means clustering classifier. We consider KE {2,3, 
..., 
Km. } with 
Kmax 
= 
10. The optimal number of clusters under both the IL and PL functions with 
risk aversion 0E {0.3,0.5,0.8} are set out in Table 4.1.21 The optimization results are 
very similar under both loss functions. Figure 4.4(A) illustrates the calibration under 
the IL function with 0=0.5. For the low risk aversion level 0=0.3, the optimal 
21 We adopt 9=0.3 as low risk aversion level here because under 0=0.2 all clusters are labelled as 
non-default. 
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number of clusters is K* =8 whereas for 0=0.5 and 0=0.8 we have K* =7 and 
K* 
= 
6, respectively. Figure 4.4(B) also shows the relation between the optimal number 
of clusters and degree of risk aversion which, interestingly, is roughly V-shaped. A similar 
relation is found under the PL function. The main finding is 
Result 6. The optimal number of clusters depends on the decision-maker's degree of 
risk-aversion. 
The calibration of the warning horizon in K-clustering raises similar issues as in the logit. 
For instance, a higher 0 leads to a longer optimal h in both classifiers. 22 The choice 
of assignment rule for the final clusters into default/non-default is akin to the choice of 
cut-off in the logit. For a high 0, the preferred assignment rule assigns relatively more 
clusters to the default state. 
4.6 Optimal Forecast Combination 
The above results suggest that the decision-maker's preferences should be accounted for in 
the design of an EWS, namely, in choosing parameters such as the warning horizon, cut-off 
rate (logit) and number of clusters (K-clustering). Another potential way to improve the 
performance of an EWS is by combining the strengths of different classifiers. Since many 
weighting schemes are possible, we suggest to choose among them optimally according 
to the decision-maker's preferences. To simplify the exposition, we take yit as defined in 
(4.1) for h=1 as the event to be forecasted and focus primarily on the IL function. 23 
The results for the PL function are outlined at the end of this section. 
221n contrast with the logit estimation, changing h (or the definition of yit) does not change the 
clustering of the xti, t_1 cases. However, changing h will affect the optimal K and assignment rule for a 
given loss function. 
23The same warning horizon has to be adopted in all classifiers because, otherwise we would be com- 
bining forecasts for different dependent variables (y; t). The calibration of h for the combined classifier 
can be carried out as in Section 5, namely, by choosing hE {1,2,..., hm.. } so as to minimize the overall 
loss of the combined forecasts. 
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We start by comparing the out-of-sample predictive ability of the classifiers. First, 
the classifiers are calibrated 
- 
the cut-off for LOGIT-M and LOGIT-R and the number 
of clusters and assignment rule for clustering 
- 
over the 1984-1995 window. The logit 
estimates and final clusters thus obtained are used to generate out-of-sample forecasts 
for 1996. This calibration and estimation/clustering is reconducted over 1985-1996 to 
generate out-of-sample forecasts for 1997 and so on. A country-mean loss is obtained for 
each out-of-sample year and then averaged over years. 
Table 4.2 sets out the comparison across individual classifiers over the holdout sample. 
The entries are the Type I and II error rates and the overall loss (IL) for several risk 
aversion levels 0. The Type I error rate from LOGIT-R is lower than that from LOGIT- 
M virtually for all 0. The exceptions are 0=0.2 and marginally 0=0.6. So LOGIT-R 
outperforms LOGIT-M regarding missed default entries whereas the opposite holds for 
false alarms. This indirectly suggests that the bankers' judgments implicit in the ratings 
are relatively pessimistic about country creditworthiness. 
The Type I error rate of K-clustering is essentially higher than that of LOGIT-R or 
LOGIT-M for low to moderate risk aversion levels 0<0.55. For higher 0, clustering gives 
few missed defaults (2-6%) albeit at the expense of many false alarms (69-88%). LOGIT- 
M classifies the non-defaults relatively well, that is, it dominates the other classifiers in 
terms of the Type II error rate. 24 
The ranking of the classifiers, in terms of the overall loss (IL), follows from their 
different relative strengths in terms of Type I and Type II errors. For instance, at the low 
level 9=0.3 the minimal loss is that of the LOGIT-M because of its relatively small Type 
II error rate despite having a large Type I error rate. However, as the risk aversion (Type 
I error penalty) increases, the LOGIT-R beats the LOGIT-M. 25 The overall loss of the 
24The exceptions are 0= {0.2,0.6} for which the credit ratings (LOGIT-R) yield the smallest Type II 
error rate. 
25The only exceptions occur at 0.65 <0<0.7. 
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non-parametric (clustering) classifier is relatively large except for very high risk aversion 
levels 0>0.85. These considerations prompt the thought that there may be gains from 
combining the forecasts of the three classifiers. 
We now assess the stability of the out-of-sample forecast ranking. Table 4.3 indicates 
year-by-year the best classifier and the associated minimal loss for several risk-aversion 
levels. The forecast ranking changes over time which further motivates the forecast com- 
bination. For instance, LOGIT-R stands out over 1996,1998 and 2000 whereas LOGIT-M 
essentially excels over 1997. The forecast instability pattern can be explained in terms 
of the relative strengths (Type I and Type II errors) of the classifiers. In particular, 
LOGIT-R is relatively `pessimistic' toward country creditworthiness and so it does quite 
well in 1996 and 1998 where a relatively large number of defaults occurred. Interestingly, 
relatively few default entries occurred in 1997. 
To combine the forecasts we use the (parametric) KK-logit regression and the two 
non-parametric schemes 
- 
the majority rule (MR) and unanimous rule (UR). In contrast 
to the latter, KK-logit accounts for the historical (in-sample) forecast performance of the 
rival forecasts. Table 4.4 reports the KK-logit weights of the out-of-sample forecasts for 
year 1996. These combining weights are obtained via a logit regression of the indicator 
yet }t1=995 on the rival forecasts from LOGIT-M, LOGIT-R and K-clustering. The latter { 1984 
change with the optimal number of clusters and assignment rule which, in turn, depend 
on the decision-maker's risk aversion 0 as the foregoing analysis has shown. Thus a new 
set of K-clustering forecasts is obtained as 0 varies and so the forecast combining weights 
vary also. The cut-off rates (for the LOGITs) play no role in this combining exercise 
because Pit is directly used. 
The properties of the combined forecasts are set out in Table 4.5. Regarding false 
alarms, the best results stem from the UR for nearly all risk aversion levels. This is 
expected given that, in order to signal a default, the UR requires all individual classifiers 
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to predict a default. In terms of missed defaults, KK-logit excels for low risk-aversion 
levels 9<0.45 whereas MR leads the race for 0>0.5.26 The UR scheme performs rather 
poorly relative to individual or rival combined forecasts in terms of missed defaults. 
Regarding the overall loss (IL), the best combined forecasts stem either from KK-logit 
for risk-aversion 0<0.75 or from MR for 0>0.75. We conduct a Diebold-Mariano 
(1999) [DM] test to compare the best combined forecaster and the best individual fore- 
caster. 27 For several risk aversion levels, it pays to combine the classifiers. For instance, 
for 0E {0.2,0.25,0.55,0.65,0.7,0.75} the minimal loss from KK-logit combining is signifi- 
cantly smaller than the losses from either of the individual classifiers. For 0E {0.55,0.85} 
the gains from MR combining are significant. Figure 4.5, Panel A, illustrates the compar- 
ison graphically. It shows that either the individual LOGIT-R forecasts or the combined 
forecasts using KK-logit or MR produce the best out-of-sample forecast performance 28 
The forecasts should also be compared with naive predictions. Our uninformative, 
naive model predicts 1 for highly risk-averse decision-makers, 0>0.5,0 for 0<0.5 and 
the most frequently observed event in-sample (here 0) for 0=0.5. Table 4.6 reports the 
ratio of the overall loss for each classifier (IL) relative to that of the naive predictor (IL"). 
A DM test is conducted to compare the minimal loss among the classifiers, individual or 
combined, with that of the naive predictor. It turns out that for all risk-aversion levels 
the best forecasting model significantly outperforms the naive predictor. The highest 
gains relative to the naive come from LOGIT-R for 0=0.5 with the smallest ratio ii^ 
_ 
0.453, followed by the KK-logit or MR combined forecasts for 0=0.55 with a ratio of 
26The Type I and Type II error rates for the KK-logit forecasts essentially stabilize for 0>0.6. 
27We compute DMt, t=1, 
..., 
in, where DMt a N(0,1). Under independence between the test statis- 
tics, it follows that DM =Z1 DA - N(0, m). 28For the baseline overall error rate reported in many studies 
- 
errors over sample cases (Eo+E1)/C 
- 
the UR forecasts essentially beat all other forecasts despite their relatively high Type I error rate (E1/C1). 
This is because this metric does not account for E1/C1. Due to the small number of is in the sample, C 
is much larger than C1 and so E1 /C and Eo/C appear small relative to E1 /C1. Hence, like the NS ratio 
this metric can be misleading. 
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0.462. Interestingly, the gains of the best-performing model relative to the naive (1- i^ ) 
monotonically increase with 0 up to 0=0.5 and then decrease thereafter. 
Next we reconduct the above steps in the optimal EWS design (calibration, estima- 
tion/clustering, forecast combination and evaluation) on the basis of the PL function. 
The comparison of individual and combined forecasts over the holdout sample is set out 
in Figure 4.5, Panel B. The results suggest that forecast combining brings gains for a 
wide range of risk-aversion levels albeit not for all. More specifically, the KK-logit com- 
bined forecasts achieve the minimal loss for 0<0.7 whereas the LOGIT-M and LOGIT-R 
forecasts are ranked best for 0.7 <0<0.8. Clustering significantly outperforms all other 
individual and combined methods for 0>0.8. 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter highlights the importance of and illustrates how to optimally design an EWS 
for sovereign default according to the decision-maker's preferences. Debt crisis forecasts 
are obtained from two different methods based on the same macrovariables 
-a logit 
regression (LOGIT-M) and clustering 
- 
and a logit regression based on bank-internal 
ratings (LOGIT-R). The data pertains to 75 emerging and developing economies over 
1983-2000. 
First, the study shows how to recursively calibrate in-sample these classifiers according 
to the decision-maker's preferences. The latter are formalized by means of a loss function 
and risk aversion parameter. Second, we discuss forecast combining issues. For this 
purpose, we consider a regression framework that exploits information on the classifiers' 
past forecast ability and two non-parametric voting rules based on equal weights. 
The results suggest that the decision-maker's preferences influence the optimal warning 
horizon, cut-off probability, assignment rule and number of clusters. These key parameters 
have mostly been chosen in an ad hoc manner in the literature. The optimally calibrated 
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classifiers show different strengths in terms of missed defaults and false alarms. In partic- 
ular, the LOGIT-M classifier outperforms the non-parametric (clustering) and judgmental 
(LOGIT-R) classifiers in terms of false alarms. On the other hand, judgmental and non- 
parametric classifiers dominate LOGIT-M in terms of missed defaults. Moreover, there 
is instability in the out-of-sample forecast ranking. Overall these findings vindicate a 
forecast combining exercise. The latter reveals that the best combining scheme depends 
on the decision-maker's preferences. In most cases, the combined forecasts significantly 
outperform the individual forecasts and uninformative naive forecasts. 
The findings in this chapter should have strong implications in applied work on credit 
risk prediction. In practice, many EWS for sovereign default are based on ad hoc para- 
meter choices. The optimal recursive in-sample calibration of the forecasting tools that 
underlie such EWS, including the forecast-combining weigthing scheme, is strongly rec- 
ommended. 
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TABLE 4.1 
Optimal Calibration of Classifiers over Estimation Window 
LOGIT-M K-clustering 
Risk-aversion IL PL IL PL 
9 (A*, h* L* (X*, h" L* K* L* K* L* 
0.2 (0.727,3) 0.129 (0.724,1) 0.195 8 0.193 8 0.288 
0.5 (0.641,3) 0.227 (0.270,1) 0.301 7 0.343 7 0.369 
0.8 (0.205,2) 0.139 (0.205,2) 0.161 6 0.189 6 0.196 
Investors' loss (IL) or policymakers' loss (PL) with risk-aversion parameter 0. 
The optimal cut-off and warning horizon (a`, h`) or number of clusters (K') give 
the minimal loss L` over 1984-1995. K-clustering results based on the optimal 
assignment rule of final K clusters into 1 or 0 for yit(h=1). 
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Figure 4.1: The Type I and Type II errors and the Cut-off Rate 
Panel A: The Trade-off Between the Probability of Type I and Type II Errors (LOGIT-M) 
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Figure 4.2: The Overall Loss for Different Cut-off Rate and Warning Horizon Combinations 
(LOGIT-M) 
Panel A: Investors Loss function 
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Figure 43: The Cut-off Rate and the Warning Horizon 
Panel A: Optimal Cut-off Rate for Different Warning Horizons (LOGIT-M) 
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Figure 4.5: Overall Loss for Individual and Combined Forecasts 
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CHAPTER 5: A Comparative Analysis of Sovereign 
Credit Migration Estimators 
5.1 Introduction 
The development of credit risk management over the past few years has brought rating 
migration modeling to the forefront of attention. A chain of major sovereign defaults on 
foreign-currency denominated debts has been the main impetus for the growing interest 
- 
the 1994-1995 Mexican-peso crisis, the 1997 Asian currency crisis, the 1998 Russian 
ruble devaluation and, more recently, the 2001 credit failure in Argentina. These events 
increased the financial institutions concerns about their risk exposure to emerging market 
borrowers and their quest for better risk management procedures. 
The fate of emerging markets with regard to international capital market access is in- 
extricably linked to their external credit rating which plays a major role in modern credit 
risk management, valuation and international capital allocation. Financial institutions 
use credit ratings to feed their Value-at-Risk (VaR) analyses, to price credit risky loans, 
bonds and credit derivatives and to determine concentration limits. The Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision, a regulatory body under the Bank of International Settlements, 
has proposed the New Basel Accord (Basel II, 2001) which permits banks to use internal 
credit rating systems to determine the regulatory capital against their credit exposure. 
Credit migration matrices are central inputs to industrial risk management tools such as 
J. P. Morgan's Credit Metrics, McKinsey's Credit Portfolio View and, more generally, VaR 
models for simulating the loss distribution of credit portfolios under extreme scenarios. 
For instance, the future value of a risky bank loan or bond is linked to its credit qual- 
ity and thus, to the probability that it experiences an upgrade, downgrade or default. ' 
I The price of, say, a Baa bond has been found to increase by about 1-2% upon upgrade and to decrease 
by 30-50% upon default (Saunders and Allen, 2002, ch. 6; Marrison, 2002, ch. 18). 
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Furthermore, the need to insure against default losses has led to an ongoing expansion of 
credit derivative instruments. Prominent models for the term structure of credit-spreads 
(Jarrow et al., 1997) and the pricing of credit derivatives (Kijima and Komoribayashi, 
1998) also build upon rating transition probabilities. 
Risk management and capital allocation require a mapping of credit ratings into de- 
fault probabilities and intra-rating transition (or migration) probabilities. A number of 
statistical issues undermine the reliability of conventional probability estimates in this 
context. One such problem is the relatively small sample of rating transitions available 
which becomes more pronounced when the focus is on specific categories of obligors such 
as financial institutions, European industrials or sovereigns. 
The defaulted amount of sovereign debt and the subsequent scale of losses suffered in 
the last two and a half decades exceed by far those of corporate defaults. Nonetheless, most 
extant empirical studies mainly focus the latter. The application of existing corporate 
rating migration and credit risk management methods to sovereign credit ratings has 
received scant attention. Sovereign migration modeling is fraught with difficulties, mainly 
because of data limitations 
- 
sovereign rating histories (T) are relatively short and the 
cross-sectional dimension (N) is also small. The problem becomes even more acute for 
low credit-quality (emerging market) issuers because until very recently the ratings were 
mainly produced for industrialized sovereigns. 2 Rating transitions, particularly distant 
ones and defaults on sovereign bonds, are thus rare events. 
The usual framework for modeling rating migration is a discrete Markov process which 
is time-homogenous. Hereafter we refer to the latter as just `homogeneity' to simplify the 
exposition. Homogeneity means that the migration probabilities are constant over time. 
This assumption simplifies the estimation but its plausibility is questionable. In fact, 
2In 1993 Moody's foreign currency bond ratings pertained to 24 sovereigns of which only 8 were non- 
industrialized countries. The number of rated sovereigns has increased substantially over the last decade 
(e. g. 72 in 2004) with a higher proportion of emerging economies (76% in 2004). 
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heterogeneity is a stylized fact in the context of corporate rating migrations. 3 
The first empirical analysis of rating migrations in a continuous Markov framework 
was conducted recently by Lando and Skodeberg (2002). Since then other studies have 
also applied continuous approaches, albeit exclusively in the area of corporate ratings. 
Discrete modeling entails loss of information regarding the exact timing of rating changes 
and the duration in each rating. 
To our knowledge, only two studies focus on the estimation of sovereign transition 
matrices in the literature. Wei (2003) proposes a discrete multi-factor Markov chain 
model that accommodates heterogeneity while Hu et al. (2002) exploit bond ratings and 
sovereign default data in a discrete, homogeneous ordered probit framework. Very little is 
known on the finite-sample properties of credit migration matrix estimators particularly 
in the context of sovereigns. There are two comparative studies available (Jafry and 
Schuermann, 2004; Christensen et al., 2004) but they focus on corporate debt. 
The purpose of this chapter is to compare different approaches to the estimation of 
rating transition probability matrices for sovereigns. Hereafter we often refer to the latter 
as just `transition matrices' for expositional simplicity. In particular, we assess the bias 
and the sampling variability of rival estimators. The estimation methods we consider differ 
with respect to their assumptions 
-a discrete multinomial (also called cohort) method 
and two continuous hazard rate (also called duration) methods. The hazard methods 
differ in that one imposes the assumption of homogeneity in the underlying Markov process 
whereas the other relaxes it. A matrix-norm statistic based on the spectral decomposition 
is used to gauge the dynamics or overall mobility implied by the transition matrix. 4 In 
order to statistically compare the finite-sample properties of these rival estimators we 
deploy a bootstrap method that facilitates the empirical distribution of the transition 
3The literature typically assumes also that the underlying Markov process is identical across issuers. 
4Less dynamics means overall smaller probability mass at off-diagonal positions or equivalently, a 
smaller likelihood of transitions. 
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probabilities and of the mobility metric. We explore two conjectures. One is that there 
are efficiency gains from continuous (versus discrete) estimation methods in small samples 
of transitions. The other is that there is heterogeneity in the sovereign rating migration 
process which, if neglected, may lead to biased and inefficient estimates. 
The literature on debt ratings is very extensive in the context of corporates but rel- 
atively limited for sovereigns. There is extensive evidence that sovereign and corporate 
credit ratings behave differently. This prompts the thought that competing estimation 
methods may have different properties in these two worlds. This provides a motivation 
for the present chapter in two directions. First, the properties of the underlying Markov 
process for corporates and sovereigns may be different. For instance, there is consensus 
that corporate rating transition probabilities are time-varying and therefore hazard rate 
methods that allow for this heterogeneity are superior. However, it is unclear whether 
this also applies to sovereigns. Second, given that sovereign ratings are remarkably more 
stable than corporate ratings, it is expected that continuous methods will bring gains 
relative to simple discrete ones in this context. 
The contribution of this study to the sovereign credit risk literature is threefold. First, 
it investigates the potential value added of continuous estimators that incorporate full in- 
formation on the exact timing of rating transitions and on rating duration. Second, it fills 
another gap by formally assessing for the first time whether imposing the assumption of 
homogeneity results in sovereign transition matrix estimators that exhibit more bias and 
sampling variability than heterogeneous estimators. Third, it provides the first tests for 
the plausibility of the homogeneous Markovian migration process for sovereigns. For in- 
stance, the presence of momentum and duration effects will invalidate it. For this purpose, 
we employ spectral analysis and panel logit models. We find that the continuous (homo- 
geneous) hazard rate estimator produces more reliable default probability estimates than 
the discrete multinomial estimator. The efficiency of the former is further enhanced upon 
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relaxing the homogeneity assumption. Relatively higher sovereign default probabilities 
are generally obtained from the homogenous estimator. There are significant downgrade 
momentum and duration effects, consistent with the extant evidence on corporate ratings. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 outlines the back- 
ground literature. Section 5.3 introduces the Markov chain framework and discusses the 
three estimators under study. Section 5.4 introduces the dataset. Section 5.5 outlines 
the bootstrap simulation experiments. Section 5.6 discusses the results of the tests for 
non-Markov effects. A final section concludes. 
5.2 Literature Review 
The broad credit risk literature can be grouped in three strands. First, studies that model 
the rating migration process in order to derive transition matrix estimates include among 
others Altman and Kao (1992), Lucas and Lonski (1992), Carty and Fons (1993), Belkin 
et al. (1998), Duffee (1998), Helwege and Kleiman (1997), Bahar and Nagpal (2000) and 
Nickell et al. (2000). Second, studies that estimate risk-neutral credit migration matrices 
as inputs for pricing bonds and credit derivatives (Jarrow et al., 1997; Kijima and Ko- 
moribayashi, 1998; Bielecki and Rutkowski, 2000; Lando, 2000). The third strand focuses 
on the analysis of credit portfolio models, such as the CreditMetricsTM (JP Morgan), the 
Credit Portfolio View (McKinsey) and the CreditRisk+ (CSFB), to simulate the distribu- 
tion of credit assets and evaluate expected losses. 5 Our discussion below focuses primarily 
on those studies that directly investigate the characterisation of the rating migration with 
a few references to relevant work in the other two strands. 
5For comprehensive surveys of credit portfolio models see Koyluoglu and Hickman (1998), Crouchy et 
al. (2000), Gordy (2000) and Saunders and Allen (2002). 
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5.2.1 Caveats in Rating Migration Analysis 
The entry pij in a transition or migration matrix P gives the probability of being in the 
credit state j at time t+1, conditional upon being in state i at time t. Jarrow et al. 
(1997) introduce a distinction between implicit and explicit approaches to the estimation 
of migration matrices in the literature. The implicit approaches are based on market 
data (i. e. prices of risky zero-coupon bonds and assumptions on recovery rates) whereas 
the explicit approaches draw upon the rating and default history of obligors. Another 
distinction between the available estimators follows from their assumptions regarding the 
dynamics of the rating migration process. Regarding the explicit estimation, which is our 
focus in this study, different methods have been proposed ranging from simple discrete 
estimators to continuous ones that build on survival theory. 
The transition matrix for Moody's seven broad ratings (Aaa, Aaa,..., C) plus the de- 
fault state involves estimating 56 parameters if default is treated as an absorbing state. 
Accurate estimation presumes not only a sufficient number of observations but also enough 
cases in each rating as well as enough transitions. The use of a finer rating scale in order 
to increase the number of observed transitions has the shortcoming that more parame- 
ters need to be estimated and there are less issuers (transitions) per rating. ' Insufficient 
data is a pervasive problem particulary for sovereign rating migrations. As in the case 
of corporates, defaults at the upper range of the rating spectrum are inexistent. Dis- 
tant transitions are rare because migrations typically occur between neighboring ratings. 
Observations are also scarce at the lower end of the rating spectrum because the leading 
rating agencies have primarily focused on investment grade issuers.? Lastly, the number of 
sovereigns with rated bonds is relatively small (N) and the rating histories are short (T). 
All these issues raise concerns about the reliability of estimation and statistical inferences 
'In 1982 Moody's expanded each coarse rating category into three sub-categories identified by three 
numbers, e. g. Aal, Aa2, Aa3. The counterpart S&P sub-categorisation is AA+, AA, AA-. 
7Issuers with no rating worse than Baa3 in the Moody's and BBB- in the S&P's systems, respectively. 
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on sovereign transition matrices. 
The growing area of risk management has spurred interest on developing accurate 
sovereign credit migration estimators. One approach is to use samples of corporate bond 
ratings which have a much longer history going back to 1970.8 However, this presumes 
that the sovereign migration process resembles that of corporates. But the empirical 
evidence reveals significant discrepancies. Jackson and Perraudin (2000) find that, on 
average, sovereign credit spreads are substantially lower than those of similarly rated cor- 
porates. Cantor and Packer (1996) find that sovereign ratings exhibit more discrepancies 
than corporate ratings across agencies. Nickell et al. (2000) show that the transition 
probabilities of US industrials differ significantly from those of similarly rated sovereigns. 
Hu et al. (2002) seek to overcome the small-sample problem by augmenting the 
sovereign ratings available with default data on non-rated sovereigns from the UK Export 
Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD). As the latter incorporates defaults on commercial 
debt and trade credit obligations, a frequent event in the 1980s through to the early 
1990s, this increases the sample size both in terms of countries and time span. The 
above information for rated and non-rated sovereigns is pooled and explained, through a 
(discrete) ordered probit model, in terms of macrovariables that proxy liquidity, solvency 
and economic conditions. The fitted rating histories are then used to estimate transition 
matrices which, they argue, can be combined with those from S&P's to increase accuracy. 
By construction, the discrete multinomial approach typically adopted by leading rating 
agencies (Carty and Fons, 1993; Carty, 1997) and in most of the academic literature 
(Bangia et al., 2002) produces zero probability estimates for unobserved transitions. For 
corporate ratings, Lando and Skodeberg (2002) illustrate how continuous hazard rate 
methods can facilitate probability estimates of transitions (e. g. from Aa to default) that 
are not observed in the sample. Being able to estimate these probabilities is important 
because such transitions can actually occur given a large enough sample. This argument 
8Moody's corporate ratings database contains about 60,000 annual observations from 1970 to today. 
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is implicitly supported by Basel II which establishes a minimum probability of 0.03% for 
such (unobserved) rare events. Further, a positive risk weight is assigned for sovereigns 
rated Aa to Baa which implies that Basel II recognizes the risk of default from these 
ratings. 
5.2.2 Accuracy of the Transition Probability Estimates 
Regarding the sampling variability or noise-to-signal of discrete migration probability ma- 
trix estimates, Bangia et al. (2002) find that the diagonal elements are quite accurate 
whereas the reliability of the off-diagonal entries falls as one moves away from the diag- 
onal (i. e. transition between distant ratings). This result can be explained in terms of 
the persistence in credit ratings and the low frequency of distant transitions. Nickell et 
al. (2000) estimate standard errors for discrete transition probability estimates using a 
binomial distribution. 9 High standard errors are reported for low credit ratings because 
of the fewer observations per rating available (number of observations) and the greater 
volatility (probability of rating change) of rating transitions. Both studies provide bi- 
nomial confidence sets for their probability estimates and conduct t-tests to assess the 
element-by-element differences between `unconditional' and `conditional' transition ma- 
trices. The latter condition on the rating history and/or the business cycle. The small 
sample alongside the discrete multinomial estimators used result in (meaningless) very 
wide confidence intervals for rare events. Using bootstrap confidence sets, Christensen et 
al. (2004) show that continuous transition matrix estimators are more accurate than the 
(industry standard) discrete multinomial estimators particularly for rare transitions from 
high ratings to default. 
Lando and Skodeberg (2002) and Jafry and Schuermann (2004) deploy a continuous 
9 Each entry pi j is cast as a binomial random variable - from rating i there will be a transition 
over a given horizon (e. g. one year) either to j or to k=1,.., K-1, k#j with probabilities p; j and 
(1 
- 
p;,, ), respectively. Assuming transition independence, the standard error for p; j is the binomial 
standard deviation/j3(1 
- 
p; 3) /N;, where Ni is the number of sovereigns rated i at year-beginning. 
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heterogeneous hazard rate estimator for corporate ratings and find that it markedly differs 
from the discrete multinomial estimator but not so much from the homogeneous hazard 
rate estimator. However, they arbitrarily adopt a 1-year horizon in the analysis and 
acknowledge that over longer horizons the (time) heterogeneity will become more apparent 
and so their findings may not hold. This conjecture has not been explored as yet. 
An interesting hypothesis is whether rival migration matrix estimators yield different 
portfolio loss distributions and hence, different VaR measures. To this end, Jafry and 
Schuermann (2004) test for the statistical and economic significance in the context of US 
corporate migration matrices. They corroborate that there are significant differences in 
the implied portfolio VaR capital from the discrete multinomial and the continuous hazard 
estimators. However, allowing for heterogeneity within the year appears less important, 
both statistically and economically, notwithstanding the evidence of heterogeneity in the 
rating evolution. 
5.2.3 Non-Markov Effects and Time Variation in the Migration 
Process 
Another issue that has spurred a considerable amount of research is the Markovian be- 
haviour and time homogeneity of the migration process. In the celebrated Jarrow et al. 
(1997) framework, the dynamics of rating migration is modeled via a discrete, homoge- 
neous Markov chain. The homogeneity assumption is critical as it rules out dependence 
on business cycles and non-Markov effects such as rating drift or momentum. Some at- 
tempts have been made recently at testing for non-Markov effects but only in the context 
of corporate ratings. 
Momentum Effects 
Several studies address the hypothesis of rating drift or momentum which implies that 
a previous upgrade/downgrade increases the probability of a future upgrade/downgrade. 
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Put differently, prior rating changes carry predictive power for the direction of future 
changes and so the current state does not fully determine the future transition iprobabil- 
ities. Downgrade and, to a very small extent, upgrade momentum in corporate ratings is 
supported by Lucas and Lonski (1992), Altman and Kao (1992), Carty and Fons (1993), 
Altman (1998), Kavvathas (2001) and Bangia et al. (2002) and Lando and Skodeberg 
(2002). The latter study utilizes a semiparametric exponential hazard rate model that 
allows for the momentum effect to vary across ratings. To have enough transition data 
for reliable inference they focus only on transitions to neighboring ratings. 
All the above studies provide evidence of downgrade momentum. This is often at- 
tributed to the rating agencies' common practice of gradually downgrading an issuer 
(corporate or sovereign) rather than drastically reducing its rating. 10 Christensen et al. 
(2004) propose a continuous hazard rate model that accommodates downgrade momen- 
tum. They find that the default probability estimates for high credit ratings increase 
when accounting for momentum effects. 
Duration Effects 
The duration effect, another non-Markov property, is the relationship between the time 
spent in a given rating and the transition probability. This issue has been recently ex- 
amined by Lando and Skodeberg (2002) and Kavvathas (2001) and both confirm the 
earlier findings by Carty and Fons (1993) that uncover duration effects in corporate rat- 
ings, although the evidence on the direction of the relationship is conflicting. Lando and 
Skodeberg (2002) find negative duration dependence which means that the longer an is- 
suer stays in a rating the lower is the probability of a rating transition. The duration 
effect is documented for all ratings and both for upgrades and downgrades. Kavvathas 
(2001) finds evidence of positive duration dependence instead. One explanation for this 
'°This is linked to morel hazard (Sy, 2002) because of the the client-provider relationship between 
issuers and rating agencies (Altman and Saunders, 1998). The latter receive considerable fees from the 
issuers for rating them. A severe downgrade will leave the customers unhappy. 
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conflicting evidence is that, although both studies use continuous hazard rate methods, 
the distributions (exponential and Weibull, respectively) they assume for the hazard rate 
can only capture monotonic duration effects. Du (2003) argues that the duration depen- 
dence in corporate rating migrations is not monotonic but A- and U-shaped for upgrades 
and downgrades, respectively. In particular, he empirically shows that the upgrade prob- 
ability initially increases with duration, peaking after about two years and then decreases. 
The opposite pattern is observed for the downgrade probability. 
A rationale for the decline in downgrade probability with duration is again the ten- 
dency of rating agencies to downgrade an obligor notch by notch until their `target' rating 
is reached. Thus one observes (sample) low ratings with very short durations but high 
downgrade risk and vice versa for high ratings. " On the other hand, upgrades are pos- 
itively linked to duration because agencies are more willing to drastically upgrade an 
obligor once it has spent a considerable amount of time at the current rating. 
Business Cycle Effects 
A few studies address the issue of business cycle time-heterogeneity in corporate rating 
migrations. Lucas and Lonski (1992) were the first to provide empirical evidence of these 
cyclical effects which are particularly present in non-investment grade (or speculative) 
bonds. Subsequently, this has been corroborated by Helwege and Kleimen (1997) by 
documenting significant correlation between corporate default probabilities and the state 
of the economy. Belkin et al. (1998), Nickell et al. (2000), Bangia et al. (2002) and 
Kavvathas (2001) explicitly model this cyclical heterogeneity using dummies for the state 
of the business cycle and exogenous macrovariables such as interest rates, stock return 
volatility and stock returns. Nickell et al. (2000) document that the impact of business 
cycles on the transition probabilities differs between banks, industrials and other types 
11 Du (2003) provides evidence that the duration effect in downgrades loses significance when momentum 
is controlled for. 
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of borrowers (e. g. financials, insurance or sovereigns) as well as across US and non-US 
investment grade issuers. Overall there is evidence that business cycle variations have a 
strong impact on transition probabilities and especially on default probabilities of non- 
investment grade issuers. In this light, Lando (2000) and others allow for business cycle 
effects in bond pricing. On the other hand, Blume et al. (1998) and Du (2003) show that 
the declining trend in ratings over the recent decade is linked to more stringent standards 
(rating agencies) rather than to the business cycle. 
Kim (1999) and Nickell et al. (2000) propose an ordered probit model for rating mi- 
grations. In this context, given an initial rating the probability that an issuer migrates to 
another rating is linked to specific latent factors via the cumulative normal distribution. 
Nickell et al. (2000) attempt to disentangle the effects of borrower characteristics (in- 
dustry and country) and business cycle fluctuations on the rating transition probabilities 
through the use of dummy variables. They then assume that business cycle evolution is 
driven by a stochastic three state (peak, trough and normal) Markov process. Between- 
rating variation is analysed by running different ordered probit models for sub-samples of 
issuer years starting with the same rating. 
Wei (2003) proposes a multi-factor Markov chain model for rating migrations. The 
model facilitates the estimation of transition matrices which vary over time according 
to rating-specific latent variables that may reflect business or credit cycle fundamentals. 
A key aspect of the model is that it allows the transition probabilities for each rating 
to respond differently to external factors. While Wei advocates the application of this 
(highly parametrised) model for both corporate and sovereign debts, he recognizes the 
limitations in the later case due to the small samples available. 
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5.3 Methodology 
This section discusses three distinct credit migration estimation methods. We start by 
outlining the homogeneous Markov chain model which is the assumed baseline data gen- 
erating process (DGP) for credit ratings. 
5.3.1 The Time-homogeneous Continuous Markov Chain Model 
The literature on migration matrix estimation essentially rests on two assumptions. First, 
the future rating is independent of the rating history (first-order Markov property). Sec- 
ond, the transition probabilities remain constant over time (homogeneity). 
Let S denote the transition space and i=1,2, 
..., 
K the available credit ratings. 
Moody's bond rating system has seven coarse states (Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B, C), twenty 
three finer states (Aaal, Aaa2, Aaa3, Aal,..., Ca) plus the default (D) state. This study 
adopts the broad credit rating scale so i=1 is the highest (Aaa) rating and i=K=8 
denotes default. Let P(s, t) denote the KxK transition probability matrix generated by 
a continuous Markov chain 77 so that 
pij (S, t) = Pr (77t =j I77s = i) 
,s<t 
ý5.1) 
is the probability that a sovereign rated i at time s migrates to rating j at time t. At this 
point it is important to recall the first-order Markov property formally, 
Pr(77c=j 1770 
=io, 77i=il, 772=i2i..., 773 =i)=Pr(77t=. 717is=i) 0<1<< 
.. 
<s 
which further implies that 
P(s, t) = P(s, u)P(u, t), s<u<t (5.2) 
If the Markov chain is homogeneous, then the transition matrix only depends on the 
transition horizon (At =t-s> 0) but not explicitly on time 
P(t 
- 
s) = P(t 
- 
u)P(u 
- 
s), s< u< t (5.3) 
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and thus we have a family of transition matrices, Pot, indexed by At. Equation (5.3) 
further implies that the transition matrix for horizon nLt is simply Pot. '2 Hereafter, P 
denotes the transition matrix over a one-period (i. e. At = 1) horizon 
P= 
Pll P12 P13 
... 
Plx 
P21 P22 P23 
""" 
P2K 
(5.4) 
PK-1,1 PK-1,2 PK-1,3 PK-1, K 
000... 1 
where pij >0Vi, j, Ejlý1 pig =1Vi and default is treated as an absorbing state. 
5.3.2 Discrete Multinomial (DM) Estimator 
The conventional transition matrix estimator is a discrete multinomial (DM) approach 
based on annual migration frequencies. Transitions away from a given state i=1,2,..., K 
over a one-year horizon are assumed to follow a multinomial distribution with K-1 
outcomes and associated probabilities p2j, j=1, 
.., 
K, i; j. Let Ni(t) denote the number 
of sovereigns that start year t in state i and Nij (t, t+ 1) the number of sovereigns that 
migrate to j by the start of year t+1. The migration frequency over [t, t+ 1] is N'Nt, t1-1 i(t 
Let us assume homogeneous Markov chain dynamics for the rating process (time in- 
dependence) and independence between the multinomial experiments for different issuers 
(cross-section independence). Accordingly, the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) of 
the one-year transition probability based on the pooled ratings is defined as 
T Nt; (t, t+1) 
_ 
ET 
iN+i(t, t+1) Pij wt(t) Ni(t) Et 
t=i 1 Ni(t) 
(5.5) 
where T is the number of sample years and w; (t) = """*L is the weight for the year ýt=1 Ni(t) 
t migration frequency. Many studies use instead the sample average of the year-on-year 
migration frequencies psi =T Et N'N"(t)1 as estimator (Bangia et al., 2002; Hu et al., 
2002). However, this coincides with (5.5) only in the special case where the number of 
12See Norris (1997) for a depth-in discussion of continuous Markov chains. 
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sovereigns rated i remains constant over the sample period, Ni (t) = Ni, t=1,2, 
..., 
T. 
This implies that the annual inflow is equal to the outflow which is implausible. 
Israel et al. (2001) argue that transition probability matrices obtained from the dis- 
crete estimator (5.5) are typically not consistent with a continuous Markov chain process 
mostly because of the concentration of probability mass around the main diagonal. More- 
over, the one-year discrete estimator (5.5) neglects information about within-year rating 
transitions and about rating duration or the time spent by an issuer in each rating. In 
the context of sovereigns, where the available rating histories are short (T) and over small 
cross-sections (N), it is crucial to account for as much additional information as possible. 
This motivates the following estimators. 
5.3.3 Continuous Hazard Rate Estimators 
We outline below the relevant survival theory concepts in a general framework where the 
transition probabilities are time-dependent or heterogeneous. Next we discuss a hazard 
rate estimator that assumes homogeneity and a more general heterogeneous estimator. 
Background on Survival Analysis 
Let the random variable Ti denote the duration of a sovereign in rating i or `survival' 
time. Let At be the heterogenous Markov chain generator or intensity matrix 
A ii A12 A13 
""" 
A1K 
A21 A22 A23 
""" 
A2K 
At = 
AK-1,1 AK-1,2 AK-1,3 AK-1, K 
000... 0 
where the ofd diagonal transition intensity 
Ai. 
7 
(t) 
= Qý1 
0+ 
p'+. 7 (t C T{ ý Qt At I T{ i t) JU (ý 5.6 
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is defined as the instantaneous rate of transition from rating i to j at r=t conditional 
upon being in state i ('survival') up to time t. The diagonal element 
x 
Aii (t) 
= 
Ai (t) 
=-> 
Aij (t), i 34 j (5.7) 
j=1J#i 
is the hazard rate function or the instantaneous rate of transition from i at time t con- 
ditional upon being in state i up to time t.. The probability of leaving rating i over any 
time horizon At can be approximated by Ai(t)At. 
The behavior of Ti can be characterized through the hazard rate function, the survivor 
function or the probability density function. The survivor function is defined as 
Fi(t) 
= 
Pr(Ti > t) 
= 
Pr(r7u 
=i `d uE (s, t] 1? 79 = i) 
,0<t< oo (5.8) 
and it represents the probability that the process does not leave state i before time t. 13 
The probability density function (pdf) 
Pr(t < Ti <t+ At) fi(t) 
= 
lim 
At-o+ At 
(5.9) 
gives the instantaneous rate of transition from state i at time t. Combining equations 
(5.6)-(5.9) it follows that the three specifications are interrelated via 
ýi (t) 
- 
f; (t) 
_ 
-d log F; (t) Ti (-t) dt 
so that by integration and with the initial condition F(O) =1 we have 
(5.10) 
rt 
F; (t) 
= exp(- J \i(u)du) (5.11) 0
Using equation (5.10) the pdf of T{ can be written as 
j f(t) 
= a(t) exp(- ai(u)du) (5.12) 
13This probability is different from pt; (s, t) in (5.1). The latter gives the probability of being in state 
i both at times s and t but the process could have been in any other state after s and before t. 
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Exponential and Weibull densities are often employed (for the hazard rate function 
)%) to characterize failure time. 14 The former assumes a constant hazard rate, that is, 
the instantaneous migration rate from i is homogeneous or Ai(t) = Ai. The exponential 
survivor and density functions are 
Fi(t) 
= exp(-Ait) and 
, 
fi(t) 
= 
Ai exp(-Ait), 
respectively. The two-parameter Weibull distribution has the hazard rate function 
Ai(t) 
= 
Aiß(Ait)ß-1, Ai, 0>0 (5.13) 
which allows for explicit heterogeneity (time-dependence) through a power function spec- 
ification. The shape parameter Q dictates the type of time-dependence, i. e. whether 
failure intensity increases or decreases with the duration of the current state. The hazard 
function is monotonically increasing for /3 >1 (positive duration dependence), decreasing 
for 
,Q<1 (negative duration dependence) and equal to the constant hazard for /3 =1 (no 
duration dependence). The Weibull survivor and density functions are thus 
Fi(t) 
= exp{-(i\it)ß} and fi(t) = Aiß(Ait)ß-i exp{-(Ait)ß}, 
respectively. The explicit heterogeneity imposed in this formulation breaks down the 
Markov property. A constant hazard rate, as in the exponential distribution or Weibull for 
,ß=1, is sufficient for the Markov property to hold and necessary to have an homogeneous 
Markov process. 
Homogeneous Hazard Rate (HHR) Estimator 
The entry (i, j) of the transition intensity matrix A is driven by a random duration T; 
which is subject to censoring. Censoring refers to the fact that durations are discontinued 
at both ends of the sample. As one does not know for how long outside the sample window 
14A detailed exposition of failure time analysis can be found in Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002). 
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each individual survived in the current rating, we have a case of right censoring. 15 Rating 
withdrawals also result in right censored durations. 16 
In the case of credit rating transitions, there are K-1 outcomes (K possible rat- 
ings including default). A likelihood function is formulated under the assumption of 
independence across durations. The maximisation approach to estimate A accounts for 
the contribution of each possible transition or, equivalently, duration (i. e. from i to j, 
j=1, 
... 
K, j i) in the overall transition probability for rating i. In this framework, the 
contribution of duration t1 that involved a transition from state i to state j is 
tl K 
. 
fij (t) 
= 
Aij (t) eXP(- fE Aij (t) du (5.14) 
° j=1, joi 
and for Nij migrations occurring at times t,,,, m=1, 
..., 
Nij, and Ni, censored durations 
(at rating i) occurring at t,,,, m=1, 
..., 
Nic, the likelihood function for the transition from 
state i is formulated as 
K Nij t,,, K Ni" tm K 
Li 
= 
]I II Aij (t) exp(- 
jE 
)(t) du) fjexp(-f Nij (t) du) 
o 
=1, ji m=1 
f° 
j=11j¢i m=1 j=11j4i 
The third product above is the contribution of the right censored observations to the 
likelihood. The log-likelihood function is 
K Nij K Nic tm K 
log Li 
= 
[Nij 
log(7ij (t)) 
-EfE aij (t) du -f aij (t) du 
j=1j9i m=1 ° j=1, jýi m=1 ° j=1, joi 
If the intensities are homogenous, At = A, maximisation of the log-likelihood gives a 
simple closed-form solution for the transition intensities 
Nij Ni. Ö log Li 
=N ýitj -ý tm -E tm =0ý Ai j= 
Nij 
Cýi' 
' 
N` t ýý m=1 m=1 
ým=1 ý+ 
(5.15) 
where N; j (T) is the number of transitions from i to j, (i j), within the period [0, T] 
such that Ni = Nij + Ni,. The above MLE can also be written as äij =7 
NY. 
ý 
)du 
where 
15Left censoring refers to the corresponcing situation at the beginning of the sample window. 
16A withdrawn rating (WR in Moody's jargon) indicates the interruption of credit quality assessment 
of a particular issuer due to non-credit related factors, for instance, maturing of outstanding debt. 
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Y(u) is the number of sovereigns rated i at time u and so fT Y(u)du gives the total time 
spent in state i by all the sovereigns in the sample. The transition probability matrix 
estimate over a At horizon is 
P= 
exp(ÄOt), At >0 (5.16) 
where exp(AAt) = Ek o "ý, t 
k- So under homogeneity, a simple mapping from transition 
intensities to transition probabilities exists. 
The homogeneous hazard rate (HHR) estimator based on a continuous transition in- 
tensity matrix, equation (5.16), is expected to be more efficient than the DM counterpart, 
(5.5), for several reasons. First, over a given time horizon of one year (At), if a country 
migrated from Aaa--ºAa-) A, then the transition to the intermediate state Aa con- 
tributes to the estimation of the transition probability from Aaa to Aa through (5.15). 
In the discrete framework, however, this information is ignored. Second, the continuous 
estimator accounts for the exact date when a sovereign receives a new rating and also 
for each rating duration. In the above example, the time spent in the intermediate state 
Aa is accounted for in the estimation of the transition intensity for rating Aa. Third, 
it readily accommodates right censoring by using information for the obligors up to the 
day of withdrawal and thus obligors ending the year in the WR status will not be dis- 
carded as in the DM estimator in (5.5). Fourth, it generally yields non-zero probabilities 
of rare transitions between states, even if they are not observed in the sample, as long 
as an indirect transition from one state to the other occurs. The DM estimates for these 
unobserved direct transitions would have been zero. For instance, suppose that no direct 
defaults from state Aa are observed, but we observe migrations from Aa to B and then to 
default. Then as long as the probability of migrating to B and the probability of default 
from B are both positive, the continuous estimate for the default probability from Aa is 
strictly positive. Finally, the estimates of the continuous transition intensity matrix can 
be easily transformed into transition probabilities over any time horizon. 
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Non-homogeneous Hazard Rate (NHHR) Estimator 
The nonparametric approach of Aalen and Johansen (1978) facilitates a generalization of 
the above continuous hazard rate estimator to allow for heterogeneity in the underlying 
Markov process. Let P(s, t) be the rating transition matrix over the horizon [s, t], as 
defined in (5.1). In the heterogeneous setting, intensities and transition probabilities are 
linked by means of the cumulative intensity function 
t 
Ai. 9 (t) =f Aij (u)du, Aii(t) =-Z Aij (t) 
09 iEi 
defined in Gill and Johansen (1990). The transition matrix is given by 
P(s, t) = II(I + dA) = 
mýlt 
lim 
_tl-t,,, 
ý(I 
+ A(tti) - A(t, n-1)) (5.17) [s, tl m 
where s< ti < ta < t. Assuming n transitions within the [s, t] horizon, P(s, t) can be 
consistently estimated by means of the Aalen-Johansen non-parametric product limit 
n P(s, t) = fJ[I +L A(T1)] (5.18) 
where Ti denotes a point in time over [s, t] where a transition occurred, n is the total 
number of transitions (i. e. for an annual horizon, the number of days in a year where at 
least one transition occurs) and 
r 
_ON1. 
T; ON12T{ AN19T; ANKT{_ 
I Y, (TO Y, (TO VI-(Ti F ... Y, (TO 
DÄ(Ti) 
= 
ON21 (T; ON2. Ti ON2a T: ON2x Ti 
Y2 (Ti) Y2 (Ti) Y2 (Ti) ... Y2 (A) 
ONK_1.1(T; ) ANx-122(Ti) 
_ANK-1. 
T; ONK-1. K(T: ) 
YK-1(Ti) YK-1(Ti) ... YK-1(T+) YK-1(T: ) 
00 0 
(5.19) 
where ONýj(Ti) is the number of transitions from state l to j at time T;. 17 The diagonal 
elements AN1. (Ti) are the number of transitions away from state l at time Ti so that the 
17NN; (t, t+ 1) counts the total number of transitions observed from 1 to j from the starting date t until 
t+1 and ANI j (Ti) is an increment of this process. 
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sum of each row is zero and the rows of I +DÄ(TT) sum to 1. The number of sovereigns in 
state l just before time Ti is denoted Y (T; ). The off-diagonal entries {0Ä(T; )}15, lj thus 
represent the fraction of sovereigns at state l just before time Ti that migrated to state j at 
time Ti. The Aalen-Johansen method can be seen as the DM estimator (5.5) extended to 
infinitely short-time intervals (i. e. time points Ti). Finally, the non-homogeneous hazard 
rate (NHHR) estimator of the transition matrix is 
P= woP(to, tl) + w1P(tl, t2) +... + wT-1P(T 
- 
1, T) (5.20) 
where P(to, t1), P(tl, t2) and so forth are particularizations of (5.18) for sequential, non- 
overlapping intervals and wi is the proportion of rated issuers at t1. 
5.3.4 Transition Horizon 
The discrete estimation of migration matrices is inextricably linked to the notion of tran- 
sition horizon. The latter can be simply defined as the regular time interval at which 
the credit ratings, and thus rating transitions, are observed. For instance, for a quarterly 
transition matrix the discrete estimator will capture transitions that occur between the 
beginning and the end of quarterly time periods. Since sovereign credit quality is contin- 
uously reviewed by rating agencies, DM estimators based on shorter transition horizons 
can reflect better the dynamics of the rating process. However, shorter horizons have the 
shortcoming that transitions between distant ratings are unlikely to be observed. Contin- 
uous estimation methods exploit the observed rating histories (without having to specify 
a fixed transition horizon) to provide transition intensities at any point in time. 
The appropriate transition horizon in a discrete framework is dictated by the appli- 
cation. For credit portfolio analysis, one year or longer is standard practise. Shorter 
horizons are useful for credit-risky bond and credit derivative pricing models where cash 
flows occurring at all dates need to be weighted accordingly by the corresponding survival 
probability. The discrete transition matrices published by rating agencies are based on a 
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1-5 year horizon. Longer horizons have the property that they smooth out noisy data. 
In our empirical analysis below the DM estimator is based on non-overlapping h-year 
horizons with hE {1,2,3}. To illustrate, for h=2, using the observed ratings (over 
23 years) we compute two-year transition matrices by pairing the years and recording 
transitions in each of the 11 biannual periods. This approach has to discard the first 
year of data, 1981. For the three-year matrix, we leave out the first two years 1981-1982 
and use information based on 7 triennial non-overlapping periods. In some studies they 
use overlapping horizons. For example, S&P's and Moody's estimate two-year transition 
matrices by counting the biannual transitions, Ni, (t, t+ 2), sequentially for every year 
in the sample (see Bangia et al., 2002). For a sample covering 22 years, this implies 
using twice as many observations as with non-overlapping periods (21 versus 11) but this 
approach has the shortcoming of introducing double counting. 
5.3.5 Measuring Overall Rating Mobility 
The primal focus in evaluating or comparing credit rating transition matrices should be 
the `mobility' as opposed to the `stability' characteristics. The latter refers to the diago- 
nal probability mass whereas mobility (or dynamics) refers to the off-diagonal probability 
mass. The reason is that one is more interested in the off-diagonal transition probabilities 
because mispredicting them implies greater economic costs. Thus an appropriate metric 
for transition matrix comparison should account for the diagonal dominance that is typ- 
ical in sovereign credit migration matrices. In the literature, this comparison is usually 
based on L1 (Israel et al., 2001) and L2 (Bangia et al., 2000) Euclidean distances and 
eigenvalue/eigenvector analysis. 18 To test the validity of the homogeneity assumption, 
Arvanitis et al. (1999) compare different horizon matrices using a ratio of two matrix 
norms that evaluates the overall distance between their eigenvectors. Schorrocks (1978) 
18For a survey of the metrics used for transition matrix comparison see Jafry and Schermann (2003). 
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and Geweke et al. (1986) proposed indices of mobility for Markov matrices based on 
eigenvalues and determinants. A pitfall of these metrics is that they typically cannot 
provide a clear signal regarding matrix comparison because they are inflated by the large 
concentration of probability mass along the diagonal (i. e. by the stability characteristics). 
To circumvent this problem Jafry and Schuermann's (2004) propose a mobility measure 
based on singular value decomposition, which we employ. This is outlined below. 
Subtracting the identity matrix (I) from the transition matrix at hand gives the dy- 
namic part of the system 
P=P-I 
or overall mobility matrix because I represents a fully stable (no migrations) system. The 
Jaf y-Schuermann mobility estimator is defined as 
x 
M(P) e; (P'P) } (5.21) 
, 
_1 
JJJ 
that is based on the singular value decomposition of the mobility matrix P and where 
ei(PP) denotes the ith eigenvalue of P'P. 19 Given the mobility matrices PA and PB 
where A and B are two estimators (for P), the differential measure 
A m(PA, PB) = m(PA) - m(PB) (5.22) 
has the nice property of largerly reflecting the concentration of the of diagonal probability 
mass. Put differently, in the case where PA and PB have the same diagonal, the typical 
differential metrics are very likely to be zero whereas Om(PA, PB) 36 0. If the off-diagonal 
probability mass is diluted across a number of ofd diagonal entries, then (5.21) is smaller 
than when it is concentrated in a few specific positions. 20 
19The use of the singular values of P (i. e. eigenvalues of P'P) rather than its eigenvalues to ensure 
positivity of the metric, which is an essential property for the latter to stand as a distance-metric. Note 
that for the typical dimensions of credit migration matrices closed-form expressions for the singular values 
axe intarctable. The latter is solved numerically using a Gauss code. 
20The metric does not distinguish, however, between mass concentrated closer or farther from the 
diagonal which would be a desirable property as distant transitions imply greater mobility and higher 
economic costs. 
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5.3.6 Bootstrapping the Rating Migration Process 
Constructing asymptotic confidence intervals for the estimated transition probabilities is 
difficult in a continuous framework. This is because there is no simple closed-form expres- 
sion for the asymptotic variance-covariance of the intensity matrix estimator. Besides, 
the sovereign rating samples available are relatively small (few transitions) and so asymp- 
totic estimators may not behave well in this context. Regarding the mobility differential 
estimator, equation (5.22), no asymptotic theory has been developed as yet. Given these 
shortcomings, we adopt Christensen et al. 's (2004) parametric bootstrap framework to 
compare alternative transition matrix estimators. 
The DM estimator is compared with the HHR estimator by means of the following 
experiment. The continuous intensity matrix, A, and one-day transition matrix, P= 
exp(3s5 A), are estimated from the observed rating histories. These estimates are used to 
construct artificial daily-rating data. For this purpose, the rating histories of the various 
obligors are conceptualized as independent realizations of a continuous, homogeneous 
Markov model. 21 We thus construct R bootstrap samples {BB}R 1 such that each B3 
contains the same number of sovereign histories, N, as the observed sample and each 
sovereign's lifetime h and initial rating Xo are as in the observed sample. We should 
stress that h varies across sovereigns (i. e. we have hi, i=1, 
..., 
N) for two reasons: a) the 
rating agencies have included many emerging market sovereigns only recently, b) a rating 
history may terminate promptly in the case, for instance, of rating withdrawal. These 
issues are further discussed below in Section 5.4. 
Each sovereign rating history is constructed as follows. Suppose Xo=Baa for the 
sovereign at hand and that the probability of transition from rating Baa to Aaa, Aa, 
A, Baa, Ba, B, C and D is J341, P42,143, P44, P45, P46, P47 and 7545i respectively, with 
= 
1) 
. 
We transform P into cumulative probability ranges for the initial (_14234i 8 
21 Cross-sectional homogeneity is essential because conditioning the transition matrix on the sovereign's 
characteristics would, in effect, imply smaller sample sizes and so less reliable inferences. 
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rating. The first range is (0, P411, Summing 1541 and 1542 gives the cumulative probability 
that the new rating is either Aaa or Aa and hence, the next probability range is (P41, 
P41 + P42]. The next range is (1541 + P42, P41 + P42 + p43] and so forth until eight ranges 
are computed, one for each possible transition. The next daily rating, X1, is obtained by 
randomly drawing from a uniform distribution, r-i. i. d. U[0,1], and then matching the 
draw with one of the above cumulative probability ranges. For instance, if rE (1541 +P42, 
P41 + P42 + P43] then X1 = A. Another uniform random draw gives X2 and so forth until 
the end of this sovereign's lifetime so that {X1, 
..., 
Xh} is obtained. This simulation is 
conducted independently for the remaining sovereigns to construct the bootstrap sample 
B, that contains N rating histories. After iterating this simulation R times we have the 
bootstrap data sets {B1}R 1. Then each Bj is transformed into N rating transition histo- 
ries and rating durations. On the basis of the latter, we estimate the one-year transition 
R 
matrix 
{P; }; 
_lusing 
the DM and HHR approaches, equations (5.5) and (5.16), respec- 
tively. For each matrix we calculate (5.21) and then the mobility differential estimator 
Amy. Thus we obtain an Rx1 vector of default probability estimates per rating (last 
column entries in P;, j=1, 
..., 
R) or equivalently, the bootstrap distribution of the one- 
year probability of default estimator (PD hereafter). Similarly, we also have the empirical 
distribution of the mobility differential (Appendix 5.1 presents the bootstrap in steps). 
The bootstrap distribution of the PD for each rating facilitates confidence intervals to 
compare the efficiency of the estimators and to test hypotheses about differences in the 
mean value. One can also assess the finite-sample bias by comparing the latter with the 
true (sample estimated) PDs used in the bootstrap DGP. The bootstrap PDs from each 
estimator are also compared by plotting their kernel density. Likewise, the bootstrap 
distribution of the mobility differential estimator (5.22) facilitates further comparisons 
across estimators. We use R= 1000 following Efron and Tibshirani (1993) who argue 
that this generally suffices to obtain reliable bootstrap confidence intervals. Nevertheless, 
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in order to assess whether 1000 simulations guarantee convergence of the bootstrap, we 
experimented by performing two sets of 500 simulations. The estimated PD distributions 
using the two smaller (500) samples were virtually identical and comparable to those from 
the larger sample. 
Similar bootstrap simulations are conducted to compare the homogeneous (HHR) and 
non-homogeneous (NHHR) hazard rate estimators. In order to introduce heterogeneity in 
the DGP for ratings, we estimate an intensity matrix per year on the basis of the observed 
rating transitions. Using the matrices Pt = exp(35At), t=1,2, 
..., 
T, a bootstrap daily- 
rating history is obtained for each sovereign as explained above. To make the comparison 
of the HHR and NHHR estimators more informative, equations (5.16) and (5.18), are 
deployed so as to evaluate the probability of transitions that occur over a 2-year horizon 
- 
in the former At 
=2 and in the latter tl - to, t2 - t1, etc. are 2-year horizons. We were 
reluctant to introduce heterogeneity in the simulations across shorter periods than one 
year for two reasons. First, the generator matrix estimator, At, over 6- or 4-month periods 
would be highly inaccurate because few sovereign transitions are generally observed in 
such short intervals. Second, the anecdotal stability of the sovereign ratings suggests that 
there is within-year homogeneity in the underlying Markov process. 
5.4 The Dataset 
The data are from the Moody's Default Risk Service database that contains complete 
rating transition histories for all obligors (corporate and sovereign) since 1914.22 Moody's 
provides ratings for each individual debt issue of about 33,463 issuers categorized by 
domicile and industry. The industry categorisation includes among others: banking, 
finance, industrial, insurance, public utility, real estate and sovereign. The assigned credit 
22S&P's and Moody's ratings are highly correlated. For instance, out of the 49 sovereigns rated by 
both Moody's and S&P's in September 1995,28 had equal rating whereas for those with different ratings, 
the gap was only one notch, with 7 exceptions that were 2 notches apart (Cantor and Packer, 1996). 
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rating represents Moody's assessment on the likelihood of each issuer to honour any type 
of future debt payment. Structural features of the debt issues such as maturity, coupon 
structure, collateralization and seniority are all taken into account in the assessment. 
We consider only sovereigns which had foreign-currency bonds outstanding and rated 
by Moody's some time during March 5,1981 through March 4,2004. Thus the rating 
histories of the 72 sovereigns in the sample have different lengths. 23 For the DM approach, 
based on year-on-year ratings, the sovereigns are observed on the 5th March. 
Our empirical analysis is based on the issuer's foreign-currency rating history rather 
than on the history of every single foreign-currency bond issue. Moody's occasionally as- 
signs different ratings to the bonds of the same issuer depending on their characteristics. 24 
In order to convert the sovereign bonds' ratings into a single rating for the sovereign at 
any point in time we observe its lowest rating on senior unsecured bonds which have not 
yet matured or been repaid. The latter is the most meaningful indicator of a sovereign's 
likelihood of defaulting on any of its bonds (Moody's, 2003). For each sovereign, the exact 
rating transition dates are recorded. 
A sovereign default is defined to occur whenever, according to Moody's records, a 
country defaults on any of its foreign-currency rated bonds. Moody's does not have a 
`default' rating category as such but it records default dates. While in default an issuer is 
still rated (e. g. as Caa) and the rating representing the severity of default. For each coun- 
try, we treat the date of the first default announcement as the single default date 
- 
these 
23 We exclude countries that have been assigned ratings for domestic currency bond issues as well as 
for types of foreign currency debt issues other than bonds (i. e. foreign currency bank deposits, country 
ceilings). Excluding also sub-sovereigns and municipals (local and regional) as well as bonds with con- 
vertible features, the 72 sovereigns have had around 3,000 registered debt issues with the aforementioned 
characteristics over the period. Including all rating changes for every issue we have a total of 6,056 
rating transitions experienced by 68 of the 72 sovereign issuers. The transitions per country range from 
just 1 for some small sovereigns (Bermuda, Estonia, Latvia, Mauritius, Morocco, Oman) up to 961 for 
Sweden. Sovereigns that have never experienced a transition on any of their foreign bond issues are Chile, 
Guatemala, Egypt and El Salvador, which were first rated in 1999,1997,2001 and 2002, respectively. 
24For instance, Russia's 'MinFin' US dollar bonds have been generally rated lower than its Eurodollar 
bonds. During the 1999 Russian crisis, defaults occurred on the former but not on the latter. 
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are 17/08/98 (Russia), 30/11/98 (Pakistan), 25/08/99 (Ecuador) 
, 
20/01/00 (Ukraine), 
7/09/00 (Peru), 13/06/01 (Moldova), 30/11/01 (Argentina) and 15/05/03 (Uruguay). 
The rating from which the transition to default took place and the ratings that were 
assigned as characterisation of the default status need to be disentangled. In order to 
identify the former we track the rating sequence up to the default date and throw away 
the rating transitions that occurred very close (within a month) to it. For instance, 
Ukraine was downgraded from Caa3 to Ca at day 
-15 in default event time so the pre- 
default rating is Caa3 as the downgrade clearly reflected the pending default which was 
only delayed. 
Appendix 5.2 shows the number of foreign-currency sovereign bond issuers rated by 
Moody's from 1981-2004 and provides a breakdown according to issuer's characteristics, 
geographical location, state of the economy and credit quality. Most industrialised coun- 
tries have ratings from the beginning of the sample period (they dominate the sample 
until the mid 1990s) whereas many emerging economies were first rated later within the 
sample window. More specifically, only 11 sovereigns were rated over 1981-1986 which 
comprised 9 industrial and 2 emerging economies whereas 17 industrial and 55 emerging 
markets were rated in 2003. Regarding non-investment grade ratings, none was observed 
before 1987, between 2 and 18 during 1987-1997 and around 25 during 1998-2004. 
As aforementioned, the initial date of the rating history varies across sovereigns. The 
same applies to the termination date or `right' censoring in the terminology of survival 
analysis. Termination can occur either at the end of the time window (i. e. March 4,2004) 
called implicit censoring or at an earlier point due to withdrawn rating or default called 
explicit censoring. A sovereign receives an withdrawn rating (WR) status if the underlying 
debt issues are no longer outstanding, i. e. bonds have matured, been repaid or called. 
Most often the latter reflects the issuer's temporary exit from the public bond market 
rather than having negative credit implications (Carty, 1997). However, sovereign WRs 
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are rather scarce because sovereigns, as opposed to corporates, rarely retire all their debt 
simultaneously 
- 
our sample contains only 5 countries that have, at any time, experienced 
a WR. 25 We follow the literature and consider WRs as non-informative, and so they are 
excluded from the rating history of the specific sovereign. The sovereign is treated as a 
new independent issuer when the rating is later resumed. Likewise, any rating assigned 
between the default date and the end of the default episode is discarded. The latter is 
defined as the date when the sovereign exceeds the B3 rating. The sovereign is treated as 
a new independent issuer when the default episode ends. 26 Half of the 8 default countries 
(Pakistan, Peru, Russia and Ukraine) recover from default and re-emerge in our sample 
as new issuers whereas the rest (Argentina, Ecuador, Moldova and Uruguay) remain in 
default at the end of the sample window. 
Finally, in order to focus on the broader ratings Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B, C (and 
default) used by Moody's prior to 1982, we label the numbered sub-categories according to 
the mother category, e. g. Baal, Baal, Baa3 are treated as Baa. The lowest sub-categories, 
Caal, Caa2, Caa3, Cal, Ca2, Ca3, Ca, contain either very few or no observations at all 
and so are all merged into aC category. There are two reasons for restricting our analysis 
to the eight coarse ratings. First, this reduces the number of parameters to be estimated 
and increases the sample size of transitions per rating. Second, the reliability of finer 
transition matrix estimates in credit risk applications is doubtful and thus the coarse 
rating system has emerged as the industry standard. 
The above considerations result in an effective 1981-2004 sample of 81 sovereigns of 
which 4 and 5 countries have re-emerged from default and WR, respectively, and therefore 
are treated as new independent issuers. Figure 5.1 displays the aggregate ratings distrib- 
ution over all issuers and years in the sample. Investment grade sovereigns represent 70% 
of the sample on average. Appendix 5.3 provides detailed information on the distribution 
25Debt withdrawals are common for corporates, for instance, in the case of mergers or liquidation. 
26This procedure is equivalent to treating the default state as absorbing. 
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of credit ratings in each year along with some summary statistics. In line with the above 
discussion the numbers exclude WRs from the date of withdrawal to the new rating date 
and leave out defaulted countries from immediately after the default date until recovery. 
As a whole, we have a total of 759 sovereign-year rating observations and 104 rating tran- 
sitions. 27 A discrete estimation framework (ignoring within year rating activity) captures 
only 80 of these 104 transitions which means throwing out effectively 23% of the observed 
TT1ibTatioriS. 28,29 
5.5 Properties of Migration Matrix Estimates 
In this section we compare the properties of rival transition matrix estimators. The sta- 
tistical framework for the comparison is a parametric bootstrap. We first compare the 
1-year probability matrices estimated from discrete and continuous type approaches. Sec- 
ond, we investigate the degree of discrepancy between the two estimators as the transition 
horizon increases from 1 to 3 years. Third, the added value of time-heterogeneous estima- 
tors when there is time variation in the underlying Markov process is also assessed. For 
the latter purpose, we introduce yearly heterogeneity and focus the comparison on 2-year 
transitions. The discussion focuses primarily on the relative bias and efficiency of the 
PD estimates and on the overall mobility or dynamics implied by the transition matrix 
estimates. Finally, the presence of duration dependence and rating momentum in rating 
transitions is investigated. 
5.5.1 Discrete versus Continuous Estimators 
We start by illustrating how the differences between the discrete and continuous estimators 
materialize in the Moody's dataset. In the DM approach, equation (5.5), entry ptij of the 
27The total number of annual observations is the sum of all yearly ratings per sovereign. 
28 The only available study on sovereign transition matrix estimation, Hu et al. (2002), uses only 26 
S&P annual rating transitions during 1981-1998 in a discrete-time framework. 
21The empirical analysis in this chapter is conducted using Gauss 3.4 and LIMDEP 8. 
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1-year transition matrix is estimated by adding the number of sovereigns rated i at the 
start of any year (t = 1,... T) and rated j at the start of year t+1 and dividing the sum 
by the total number of sovereigns that started any year in rating i. In the continuous 
approach the entry )j of the generator is provided by the HHR estimator, equation (5.15), 
which divides the number of transitions from i to j observed during the T-year sample 
window over the total time spent (in years) at rating i by all sovereigns. The 1-year 
transition probability matrix is then obtained as the matrix exponential of the generator, 
(horizon At 
= 
1) for a 6th order Taylor expansion. Table 5.1 reports the transition 
matrix estimates. Our DM estimate is very similar to that reported by Moody's (2003). 
Both transition matrices are diagonally dominant indicating rating stability. There is also 
heavy concentration around the diagonal, that is, most observed transitions are towards a 
neigbouring rating. Higher migration activity and more distant transitions are associated 
with migration from lower credit qualities (Ba, B and C categories). Another common 
characteristic is that for each row (initial rating i) the transition probabilities decrease 
as one moves farther from the diagonal. This is referred to as row monotonicity and is a 
general feature of credit rating migration matrices (J. P. Morgan, 1997, p. 73). A violation 
of monotonicity occurs for the B rating such that there is a higher probability of migrating 
to default than to C. A possible explanation could be the noisy nature of the data for the 
low B rating. The above effect is more prominent in the multinomial estimator which is 
unsurprising because it ignores the intra-year rating activity. 
The above discrete and continuous (homogeneous) estimators differ in three respects. 
First, the HHR probability estimates are positive for most transitions even if they have 
not been observed. For such cases, the DM estimates are zero. The HHR method spreads 
the off diagonal probability over almost all ratings whereas the DM concentrates the prob- 
ability mass around the diagonal. Second, the HHR transition matrix estimate exhibits 
greater migration volatility for low ratings, that is, relatively less diagonal probability 
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mass. One reason for this difference is that continuous estimators better capture the 
rating dynamics. Third, the PD of a C-rated sovereign suggested by the HHR method 
is relatively high. A possible rationale is that the DM method will only record a default 
from C when the sovereign starts the year at C and ends it in default. However, the 
duration of C is short, in most cases less than a year, as it is just a transitional rating 
toward default. The transition from C to default will not be captured by the DM, which 
will consider it as a default from a previous rating (e. g. from B). On the other hand, it 
will be recorded by the continuous estimator. The short durations in C peak the default 
intensity from C leading to a higher estimate from the continuous method. 
We now deploy the parametric bootstrap technique described in Section 5.3.6 to com- 
pare the finite sample properties of the DM and HHR estimators. For this purpose we 
use the homogeneous Markov model characterized by the generator matrix and the asso- 
ciated transition matrix estimates (Table 5.1). The latter are referred to as true default 
probabilities. To preserve space and without loss of generality we focus the discussion on 
the default probabilities. 30 Figure 5.2 plots the kernel (Gaussian) density of the bootstrap 
1-year PD estimates for the investment grade categories. The bold vertical line signifies 
the true PD and the two dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence interval. For the top 
ratings, Aaa, Aa, A, the kernel density for the DM estimates is not plotted because these 
are zero for all simulated paths. Table 5.2 shows, for each rating, summary statistics for 
the bootstrap PD estimates along with the true PD value. For the three highest ratings 
(Aaa, Aa, A) with true default probabilities as small as 1.89 x 10-6bp, 0.000158bp and 
0.0556bp, the DM estimates are zero for all simulated paths. The distribution of the HHR 
estimator is roughly exponential with upper 97.5% quantiles of 1.23 x 10-5bp, 0.0009bp 
and 0.238bp, respectively and means quite close to the `true' default rate (small bias). 
Transitions to default from high ratings are not observed in the sample or in the simulated 
paths. However, the continuous method is able to provide an estimate of how rare such 
30Simulation results for all transition probabilities are available from the authors upon request. 
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events are. 
Regarding the Baa rating, the DM estimator produces a zero PD for most paths and 
a PD in the range [60,125]bp for a few paths (Figure 5.2) which leads to a rather high 
upper quantile of 75.2bp. In sharp contrast, the upper quantile of the HHR estimator's 
distribution is 9.72bp which means a notable increase in accuracy compared to the former 
estimator. The higher DM quantile is because about 2.5% of the simulated paths contain 
at least one transition from Baa to default, 0.0223% x 112 = 0.025 where 112 is the 
number of observed Baa ratings at year-beginning (NBQ. Q. ) as shown in Appendix 5.3. 
If one default occurs, then the DM probability estimate in simulation j is 1/NBaa where 
E(NBaa) 
= 
112 and 1/112 is roughly 75.2. Our analysis can be used to assess the adequacy 
of the minimum probability at 3bp that has been established by the Basel Committee 
for unobserved (thus far) events. This threshold probability clearly falls in the HHR 
confidence interval for Baa-rated sovereigns while it is well beyond the 97.5% quantile 
of the HHR distribution for the Aaa, Aa and A ratings. Hence, the Basel II threshold 
appears too `tough' for these higher ratings. 
The counterpart results for the lower ratings (Ba, B, C) are set out in Figure 5.3. 
We observe that the DM probability estimator has a smooth distribution only for the B 
category. This is not surprising given that direct default migrations from B are expected 
to be the most frequent. The total number of observations over the period are 132 for Ba, 
85 for B and 6 for C so according to the true default probabilities the expected number 
of default migrations per simulation are 83.07bpx 132 = 0.010,487.2bp x 85 = 0.041 and 
2897bpx6 = 0.017, respectively. The DM estimator is similar to the HHR estimator in 
terms of accuracy for the B rating whereas the latter is more efficient (tighter confidence 
intervals) for the Ba and C categories. The trimodal distribution of the HHR estimator 
for the Ba category is attributed to the fact that there are two main transitions from Ba in 
the true generator matrix, one is an upgrade from Ba to Baa 
, 
with 6.76% probability, and 
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the other is a downgrade from Ba to C, with 8.55% probability. This creates a division of 
the simulations between those where the upgrade occurs and those where the downgarde 
occurs. When the up(down)grade occurs the PD de(in)creases significantly. In the case of 
no transition we obtain the middle peak, that is the PD directly from Ba which is 0.08% 
in the true transition matrix. 
In terms of bias, measured by the difference between the true PD and the mean of 
the bootstrap distribution, the HHR estimator shows less bias than the DM estimator 
for the higher ratings whereas the opposite holds for the lower ratings. Moreover, as 
noted earlier, the HHR estimator captures the frequent transitions with short duration 
of the low categories (on the way down to default) resulting in comparatively higher PD 
estimates. This is in line with the finding that for the B and C ratings the DM and HHR 
estimators exhibit negative and positive bias, respectively. 11 
We turn now to the issue of whether the difference between the DM and HHR default 
probabilities is statistically significant. For this purpose, we conduct two-sided bootstrap 
tests for HO: PDHHR 
- 
PDDM 
= 
0. Table 5.3 (panel A) reports the summary statistics 
for the probability differential measure, (PDHHR 
- 
PDDM), over replications. It turns 
out that all the 95% confidence intervals contain zero with the exception of the rating A 
for which the above null is rejected 
- 
for this mid rating, the DM default probability 
estimate is zero because of the zero observed default transitions from A in the sample 
whereas the more efficient HHR estimator gives a non-zero probability because it jointly 
exploits the information that there are transitions from A to Ba and Baa and from Ba to 
D. Therefore we infer that the HHR estimator can stand out as less biased than the DM 
estimator for some mid ratings. 
Finally we address the question of whether there are significant differences in the over- 
31 For the default probability from the Aaa, Aa and A ratings, the negative bias in the DM estimator 
is explained by the fact that it predicts 0 whenever no transitions are observed in the bootstrap sample, 
i. e. N;; (t, t+ 1) =0 for i= Aaa, Aa, A and j=D. 
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all ratings mobility (or migration risk) implied by the DM and HHR methods. Table 5.3 
(Panel B) provides the sample mobility differential, Om(PDM, PHHR), as well as summary 
statistics of the bootstrap distribution. First, the DM matrix implies higher overall mo- 
bility than the HHR matrix and the difference is statistically significant as suggested by 
the 95% confidence interval not containing zero. This suggests that the concentration of 
probability mass at off-diagonal positions in the DM transition matrix is higher than that 
in the HHR counterpart. Upon closer inspection (Table 5.1) it is apparent that the DM 
matrix is relatively sparse (large number of zero entries) and its transition probability 
mass is largely concentrated in those few ratings for which transitions have been observed 
in the sample (i. e. around the diagonal). Default probability mass is higher, in general, 
for the HHR. However, the HHR matrix spreads the PD mass over more off-diagonal 
positions or equivalently, a larger number of ratings. These results are consistent with 
the discussion in Section 5.3.5, namely, that the presence of a few large off-diagonal terms 
inflates the m metric considerably. 
5.5.2 Increasing the ]ansition Horizon 
The DM and HHR transition matrix estimators are expected to show more marked dif- 
ferences when the horizon is beyond one year because the latter will allow for more rating 
activity. Thus comparing the three estimators over longer horizons bigger differences are 
likely to bear out. The probability matrix estimates for the 2- and 3-year transition hori- 
zons are presented in Table 5.4. It turns out that the DM estimator captures default 
risk only for one or two ratings, Baa and B, in contrast with the HHR estimator. One 
can notice that the DM estimate of the PD for Baa is about twenty-fold above the HHR 
estimate 
- 
the 2-year default probabilities are 192bp and 9bp and the 3-year are 333bp, 
22bp for the DM and HHR cases, respectively. The smaller HHR default probability for 
Baa is more plausible because sovereigns spend relatively long times in the mid Baa state 
(versus other ratings) on their way up(down) the rating scale 
- 
the latter is reflected in 
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the denominator of equation (5.15) 
- 
which will thus pull down the default probability 
for Baa. The differences are striking at the lowest end of the rating spectrum 
- 
for rating 
C the DM default probability estimate is zero throughout whereas the HHR estimates 
are 38.18bp and 35.49bp for the 2- and 3-year horizons, respectively. The zero DM esti- 
mate is unrealistic since there are reasons to believe that there is a non-zero probability 
of migrating from C to default over a relatively large horizon of 2 or 3 years-given a 
large enough sample of sovereigns. This findings are just a reflection of a shortcoming of 
discrete versus continuous transition probability estimators, namely, the relatively short 
stay of sovereigns in the low rating C biases the former but not the latter because it 
accounts for duration through the intensity matrix. The upshot is that the DM method 
underestimates the default probability for the highly risky sovereigns. 32 
Regarding the overall mobility metric, m, it turns out that the DM estimator gives 
higher values than the HHR estimator for all horizons ranging from one to four years. 
Unsurprisingly, the differential 0m(PDM, PHHR) increases with the time horizon. 
5.5.3 The Time-homogeneity Assumption 
We now assess the validity of the homogeneity assumption for the sovereign rating process 
by comparing the performance of the HHR and the NHHR approaches. It seems plausi- 
ble that the longer the horizon, the more apparent the heterogeneity is and so we focus 
the comparison primarily on the 2- and 3-year horizons. Table 5.5 presents the 2- and 
3-year horizon probability matrices from the NHHR approach. At first glance, the dif- 
ference between the above two hazard rate estimators is not as striking as that between 
the two homogeneous, one discrete (DM) and the other continuous (HHR), estimators. 
The NHHR estimator yields non-zero transition probability estimates in positions that 
correspond to rare transitions (sample) but to a lesser extent than the HHR estimator. 
32The DT estimates PC, B =1 and pC, Ba =1 (for the 2- and 3-year horizons, respectively) stem from 
one transition 
- 
Romania migrates from C to B after 2 years and to Ba after 3 years. All other C-rated 
issuers have durations shorter than 2 years and so their transitions are not captured by the DM method. 
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Low credit ratings exhibit greater overall migration in the HHR matrix whereas the op- 
posite holds for the NHHR matrix. Furthermore, there are discrepancies between the two 
estimators in the default probability particularly so for the Baa and the lowest category 
C, with the NHHR estimator giving lower probabilities. 
It turns out that increasing the transition interval from 2 to 3 years exacerbates the 
differences between the HHR and NHHR matrix estimates. This is corroborated by the 
Om statistic which increases with the transition horizon. The overall mobility measure rn 
is larger for the HHR method and this may be because this approach is applied directly 
over the whole sample whereas in contrast the NHHR transition, estimate, in order to 
control for heterogeneity, is an average of the sequential estimates over each (2 or 3 year) 
interval. Thus the former estimator exploits more of the (indirect) transitions between 
distant ratings in the sample and thus has higher off-diagonal probability mass. 
We now statistically compare the two continuous estimators on the basis of the boot- 
strap replicates. To preserve space we focus on default probability estimates over a 2-year 
horizon that we think is sufficient for time variations in the rating process to become 
apparent. A different generator is used for each year (to introduce heterogeneity), as 
discussed in Section 5.3.6 and the true PD over the sample window is the issuer-based 
weighted average of all the 2-year transition matrices. The kernel density and summary 
statistics of the bootstrap default probabilities for investment grade issuers can be seen 
in Figure 5.4 and Table 5.6. For the Aaa and Aa ratings with zero true PD, the kernel 
density of the NHHR estimates is not plotted because these are zero for all simulated 
paths. The latter can be rationalized as follows. Direct transitions to default do not oc- 
cur from high ratings. The two continuous estimators facilitate default intensities for the 
latter cases by capturing indirect transitions. The difference between them stems from 
the homogeneous versus heterogeneous aspect. The HHR transition matrix, P, is based 
on continuous transition intensities obtained directly from the whole rating histories. In 
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contrast, the NHHR counterpart matrix is the average of matrices, P(t1, tj+1), estimated 
sequentially over non-overlapping 2-year histories. Hence, the NHHR estimator will natu- 
rally combine fewer indirect transitions between distant ratings than the HHR estimator. 
To illustrate, suppose that sovereign X migrates from Aa to Baa, sovereign Y from Baa to 
B and sovereign Z from B to default in a 6-year period. The HHR estimator will combine 
the information and give a default probability from Aa to default whereas the, NHHR 
that conditions on 2-year periods will not be able to combine all this information, unless 
it happens within the 2-year period. This explains why the NHHR approach generally 
produces zero default intensities for the top ratings. 
For the A and Baa ratings, with non-zero true PD, both estimators produce smooth 
distributions (Figure 5.4). In the case of the A rating, the NHHR estimator yields zero 
probabilities for most simulated paths, and very few paths with probabilities in the range 
(0,2]bp, giving a 97.5% confidence band of 0.47bp. The corresponding upper quantile 
for the HHR estimator is 1.93bp. The NHHR estimator is more efficient and less biased 
(Table 5.6). For the Baa category, the 97.5% quantile of the bootstrap distribution for 
the NHHR estimator is about sixteen-fold smaller that that for the HHR estimator. The 
NHHR estimator is again more efficient and less biased. 
Figure 5.5 plots the kernel density of the PD estimates for non-investment grade 
issuers. All of them are centered at the true default rate (c. f. true and mean PD in Table 
5.6), except that of rating C. However, the NHHR estimator produces tighter confidence 
intervals than the HHR estimator (more efficient) for all ratings, the only exception being 
Ba for which the two are comparable. For the C rating the difference is remarkable. The 
HHR produces a very wide 95% band of [0,8396bp] whereas the corresponding band for 
the NHHR is [411bp, 3522bp]. Moreover, the NHHR estimator has smaller bias for all 
ratings. 
Table 5.7 reports the summary statistics for the bootstrap distribution of the 2-year 
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PD differential (PDHHR 
_ 
pDNHHR) for all ratings. All the confidence intervals contain 
zero and thus, there is no evidence that the HHR and NHHR estimators yield significantly 
different PDs. However, in terms of overall mobility the two transition matrix estimates 
appear significantly different. More specifically, the mobility in the HHR matrix is 
significantly larger than that in the NHHR matrix which means more probability mass 
at off-diagonal positions. Put differently, disregarding heterogeneities might result in 
transition matrix estimates that suggest more frequent rating migration (possibly between 
farther apart ratings) than that actually implied by the underlying Markov process. 
5.5.4 Robustness Checks 
One may argue that the above comparison results may be determined by the sample pe- 
riod used to estimate the parameters of the data generating process for the simulations. 
We check the robustness of our findings by carrying out the same experiment using only 
the last six years in the sample (March, 1998- March, 2004). This period is characterised 
by the introduction of lower credit-quality (emerging market) sovereigns and the occur- 
rence of all eight defaults. The post-1998 era is thus representative of substantially more 
frequent rating transitions. 33 As expected, the transition probability estimates for non- 
investment grade issuers rise dramatically relative to those for the overall sample period. 
However, the comparison results do not change qualitatively. 
All three estimators under study assume that the group of individuals examined is 
homogeneous, i. e. pj (t) = p; 2 (t) for all sovereigns s=1,2, 
..., 
N. But the validity of this 
assumption can be questioned for at least two reasons. 34 First, for some highly rated 
sovereigns the initial state perpetuates. For example, Austria has maintained the initial 
Aaa rating since 1977, France since 1992. Second, regional considerations or the level of 
33Results for the restricted period are available from the authors upon request. 
34The assumption of cross-section independence is also questionable because rating transitions could be 
correlated due to regional contagion, debt links, capital flows and IMF fund flows. S&P's (2004) argue, 
however, that their rating transitions over the recent past are country-specific. 
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developement of a country may increase the propensity of up(down)grade. For instance, 
Italy and Israel both had an A rating in 1995 but Italy is more likely to be upgraded than 
Israel. To control for the first, one can utilize a `mover-stayer' type model that implies 
two distinct continuous Markov processes, one for movers and another for stayers. But 
maximisation of this model's likelihood function is rather complicated. 35 To gauge the 
robustness of our results in this regard, we measure the percentage of countries rated over 
a long period (beyond 15 years) and whose credit status has remained constant over the 
entire time window. Only 5 sovereigns meet these requirements in the sample 
- 
Austria 
(Aaa), France (Aaa), UK (Aaa), Australia (Aa) and Belgium (Aa). The transition matrix 
in this simple time-homogeneous, mover-stayer model is Q=S+ (I 
- 
S)P, where At is 
the transition horizon, S- diag(sl, s2i 
..., 
88) and si, i=1, 
..., 
8, denotes the proportion of 
stayers among those countries whose initial rating was i and P(At) is the HHR transition 
matrix. In our sample, Q(At) and P(At) only differ in the first (Aaa) and second (Aa) 
rows. The results suggest that the diagonal probabilities rise slightly whereas the off- 
diagonal probabilities in the first and second rows, decrease by a factor of sl and s2, 
respectively, for all three estimators. Hence, the findings regarding the relative properties 
of the estimators are qualitatively similar. 36 
5.6 Detecting Non-Markovian Behaviour 
The DM, HHR and NHHR estimators build on the premise of a Markov migration process. 
To the best of our knowledge, the plausibility of the latter has not been assessed in the 
context of sovereign debt. In this section, we attempt to fill this gap in two ways. First, 
35It requires the use of the Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm of Dempster et al. (1977). A 
mover-stayer model is applied to corporate bonds by Frydman and Kadam (2002). They find that for 
newly issued low-quality bonds (C rating), default probabilities are substantially smaller than what is 
implied by the usual Markov model and those issuers are more likely to stay in their current low rating. 
36Detailed bootstrap results over the 1998-2004 period and the mover/stayer probabilities from each 
of the three estimators under study are available upon request. 
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we test whether the transition matrix estimate conforms to the homogeneous Markov 
structure by means of spectral analysis. Second, we investigate the presence of momentum 
and duration effects by means of panel logit models. 
5.6.1 Testing for Markov Structure of the Transition Matrix 
Let the 1x8 state vector xt contain the probability of each credit rating for any sovereign 
at time t. Assuming homogeneous Markov evolution according to transition matrix P 
and an initial state vector xo (e. g., xo =[00100000] indicates that the 
sovereign starts at rating Aa) then the state vector n periods ahead is given by 
x. =XoPn 
which can be rewritten as 
(5.23) 
x,, = xoEQ"E-1 (5.24) 
by using the eigenvalue decomposition P= EQE-1 where Q is the diagonal matrix of 
eigenvalues and E is the eigenvector matrix. 
Since each row of P sums to one, it follows that there exists a trivial unity eigenvalue 
which is the largest in magnitude (qi = 1). This has implications for the rating process. 
Specifically the process is neutrally stable, namely, when the time elapsed tends to infinity 
it reaches the steady state 
xý = lyý(xoP"') = xoEQ°°E-1 (5.25) 
and as time goes to infinity, all eigenvalues but ql go to zero. Hence, the steady state 
vector x,, is a multiple of the eigenvector associated to Q1.37 The rate at which the 
process decays to the steady state is dictated by the second largest eigenvalue (q2) called 
the transient decay term 
- 
the smaller q2 is the faster the process reaches the steady 
37The results regarding the unity eigenvalue and the corresponding eigenvector of Markov transition 
matrices can be proven using the Perron-Frobenius theorem for matrices. 
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state. It can also be shown that the eigenvector associated to q2 provides the asymptotic 
distribution of survivors (sovereigns not ending in default) and thus it provides insights 
on the rating towards which the survivors will converge asymptotically. 38 
It follows from equations (5.23)-(5.25) that, for a process to be homogeneous Markov, 
the eigenvalues of P associated with increasing horizons should decay exponentially and 
that the eigenvectors should remain constant. In other words, if q2t is second largest 
eigenvalue of the migration matrix for transition horizon t, then ln(q2t) _ 
-Ct, C>0. 
For a Markov rating process, this log-linear relationship has to hold for all subsequent 
eigenvalues. The second to fifth largest eigenvalues of P for varying transition horizons 
from 1-4 years are plotted in Figure 5.6. The estimation of the transition matrix is based 
on the HHR method. The graph strongly supports the log-linear relationship above and 
consequently the Markov properties of the rating process. 
Figure 5.7 shows that the 2nd largest eigenvector of P is very similar across hori- 
zons which provides additional evidence for Markovian behaviour. Moreover, the rating 
distribution exhibits a peak at Aaa. This suggests that the survivors in the long-term 
tend to settle at the highest rating. We carried out robustness checks for this analysis 
by constraining the sample to the last 6 years (1998-2004) and the results did not change 
qualitatively. 
5.6.2 Testing the Duration Effects Hypothesis 
To test the effect of duration on credit rating transitions we estimate panel logit models 
using monthly sovereign credit ratings over 23 years (March, 1981-March, 2004). 39 The 
38The steady state solution is equal to the absorbing row of P, that is, for any transition matrix 
exhibiting at least one non-zero probability of default the state vector will settle at the default state. Put 
differently, given enough time and a constant (homogeneous) migration matrix all sovereigns will end up 
in default. Since the rate of decay to the steady state of the sovereign migration process is very slow (long 
durations) the time homogeneity assumption is unlikely to hold over such long time periods. Hence, the 
economy and consequently the migration process often changes long before the default state is reached. 
39The duration effect is different from the `ageing' effect examined by Altman and Kao (1992) for 
corporates. The latter refers to the relation between the time since issuance of individual bonds and the 
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duration measure, dtit, is obtained for each sovereign at the end of each month as the time 
elapsed since the last transition to the current state. To illustrate, consider a sovereign 
that experienced a rating transition to Ba in June 2002, then to B in September 2003 
and has not moved since then. The duration in, say, June 2003 is 12 months and in 
March 2004 it is 6 months. We assume that the rating histories start at the beginning of 
our sample window in March 1981 (left-censored durations) which is not too restrictive 
because very few issuers had been rated before 1981. The effect of duration on the rating 
transition probability is assessed separately for upgrades (UP) and downgrades (DW). To 
do so, we define the endogenous variables 
- 
UPit 1 if sovereign i was upgraded in month t 
- 0 otherwise 
1 if sovereign i was downgraded in month t DWit= 
0 otherwise 
and estimate the following logit regression for each 
Y it =a+ IQdit +'t'zt + cit, cit ^' iid(0, vi), i=1, ..., N, t=1, ..., T (5.26) 
where yt is a continuous latent variable such that UPit =1 for yt>0 and UPit =0 
otherwise (likewise for DWit) and zt is a7x1 year dummy vector over 1998-2004 that 
controls for the fact that many emerging economies entered the sample after 1997. If 
durations are more stable over time for industrial countries, then the logit error variance 
should be smaller for this group. To control for this groupwise heteroskedasticity, the error 
variance is allowed to differ between industrial and non-industrial countries according to 
Q; = [exp(i + ertt)] where exp(O) = and rct =1 if i is industrial, and are -3 '0 
time-invariant parameters. 
Appendix 5.4 summarises the observed rating durations. Two features emerge. First, 
average duration increases with rating quality, the only exception being the absorbing 
upgrade (downgrade) probability. 
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default rating. This can be explained in terms of the low transition probabilities for 
high credit-quality sovereigns 
- 
using survival theory, it can be shown that the expected 
duration in state i is negatively related to the probability of transition away from i. 
Second, the standard deviation of duration is also larger for the high credit-quality ratings 
but this is just a reflection of their relatively large durations. 
We now address the question of whether duration influences the upgrade/downgrade 
probability. Table 5.8 reports the logit estimation (ML) results. 40 The duration coefficient 
is negative for both upgrades (%3 = -1.88) and downgrades (ß = -1.66) which suggests 
that transition probabilities are negatively influenced by duration 
- 
the more time a 
sovereign spends in the current rating the less likely it is to be migrated. These findings are 
consistent with those in Lando and Skodeberg (2002) for corporates and can be explained 
in terms of the common practice by rating agencies of upgrading/downgrading gradually 
notch by notch. The latter results in short durations and high migration risk for the low 
end of the rating scale and vice versa. Finally, note that the estimated error variance is 
higher for industrial countries (ý > 0) albeit not significantly. The positive parameter 
is an artefact of the high durations that inflate the variance of higher ratings. The 
standardised durations are comparable across ratings, tebreby justifying the insignificant 
result (see Appendix 5.4). 
5.6.3 Testing the Rating Momentum Hypothesis 
In order to test for momentum effects in sovereign rating migrations we define 
U, 
". = 
1 if sovereign i was upgraded to the current rating over [t 
- 
1, t- 23] 
0 otherwise U t r ise 
"Our primary focus is on testing effects that are `internal' to the rating process and would automatically 
violate the Markov assumption. Nevertheless, equation (5.26) was reestimated by substituting a business 
cycle dummy for d; t. We find that the downgrade probability is significantly higher in recessions, however, 
the result is marginal. 
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DM, 
= 
If 1 if sovereign i was downgraded to the current rating over [t 
- 
1, t- 23] 
0 otherwise U t r ise 
which are referred to as the upward and downward momentum indicators, respectively 
(and t denotes months). 41 First, we estimate the upgrade logit regression 
ý Y it =a -}- IQZ1it .i.. 'Y zt + citv Eit ^ ' iid(0, Qi ), i=1, 
..., 
N, t=1, 
..., 
T (5.27) 
where UPit =1 for yt>0 (as defined in the previous section) and vit - UMit. A similar 
logit is estimated to test for downgrade momentum. The exogenous vector zt and variance 
vti are as defined in the previous section. 
The estimation results are presented in Table 5.9. The downgrade logit estimates 
provide strong support for the momentum hypothesis with a highly significant coefficient 
at 0=1.20. This suggests that a downgrade in the previous two years significantly increases 
the current downgrade probability. These findings are in line with the extant evidence for 
corporate debt (Lando and Skodeberg, 2002; Nickell et al. 2000). Moreover, the residual 
variance is significantly lower for industrialized countries (ý = -0.17) which is in line with 
the more stable downgrade momentum history for these economies. In sharp contrast, 
the upgrade logit provides no evidence of momentum. 
5.7 Conclusion 
Sovereign credit ratings and the associated migration probabilities play a major role in 
modern credit risk management, valuation and international capital allocation. Differ- 
ent models and estimators for rating migration matrices have been proposed. However, 
the extant methodologies have been mainly applied to corporate credit risk. Very little 
is known on the finite-sample properties of these estimators in the context of sovereign 
41 Let Rit denote the rating for country i at period t. To construct them we initially set UM; t =0 and 
compare the R;, t-1 with R,, t_ j for j=2, 
..., 
23 sequentially. For instance, if Rj, t_j < R:, t_l for j=2 
then an upgrade occurred at t 
-1 and UM; t =1 and the comparison stops, otherwise j=3 and so forth. 
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ratings. There is substantial evidence that sovereign and corporate ratings behave dif- 
ferently. For instance, the former are notably more stable than the latter and so it is 
not clear that continuous and possibly time-heterogeneous estimators will perform better 
than the conventional DM estimators in the sovereign context. 
This chapter contributes to the literature by comparing the finite-sample properties 
of three different credit migration estimators - the DM approach considered as the 
industry standard and two continuous, hazard rate approaches that differ in how they treat 
time-heterogeneity. The sample for the analysis is an unbalanced panel of ratings for 72 
sovereigns over the 1981-2004 period. The comparison is conducted through a parametric 
bootstrap method that facilitates empirical confidence intervals and bias measures. The 
three estimators have in common that they build on the Markov property for the rating 
evolution which implies that the future rating is independent of the rating history. In 
a panel logit framework, tests are conducted for the presence of two non-Markov effects 
in the sovereign rating process known as rating momentum and rating duration. Such 
effects induce time-heterogeneity in the rating process and thus, a hazard rate estimator 
that allows for the latter merits particular attention. 
Significant differences are found between discrete and continuous type estimators, on 
the one hand, and between homogeneous and heterogeneous estimators, on the other. The 
continuous estimators yield more accurate default probabilities than the standard discrete 
approach virtually for all ratings and are significantly less baised for mid ratings. The 
transition probability matrices also differ significantly in the overall mobility or dynamics 
that they imply. The discrete estimator provides matrices with a larger concentration of 
probability mass around the main diagonal. As the transition horizon increases, time ho- 
mogeneities become apparent and the difference between the two hazard rate estimators 
is more marked. The heterogenous estimator emerges as more efficient and less biased 
for most ratings. The default probabilities from the homogeneous estimator are generally 
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upward biased and larger overall migration mobility is implied. However, the discrep- 
ancies between homogeneous and heterogeneous estimators are less marked than those 
between discrete and continuous estimators. It turns out that the lower bound of 3bp re- 
cently established by the Basel Committee as the minimum transition probability for rare 
events is relatively conservative for the high credit-quality ratings. Another important 
implication, in the light of the New Basel Accord, is that the choice of either a discrete 
or a continuous framework for the estimation of sovereign default probabilities may result 
in substantially different levels of capital requirements. 
There is evidence of non-Markov effects in the sovereign ratings which implies a specific 
type of heterogeneity in the rating process. Logit regression estimates suggest negative 
duration dependence for both downgrade and upgrade transition probabilities. Rating 
momentum effects are significant for downgrades (but not for upgrades) which is con- 
sistent with the rating agencies' practice of reducing a sovereign's credit-quality grade 
sequentially, notch by notch, rather than abruptly. These findings have important impli- 
cations for risk management. For instance, in terms of pricing credit sensitive instruments 
it turns out that the rating momentum of a sovereign and its duration in the current rat- 
ing may entail information about the future value of its debt obligations. In the case of 
multisovereign portfolios, upgrade and downgrade duration dependence for different as- 
sets is likely to cancel out on average so the effect might be less pronounced. This might 
not be the case for the momentum dependence because such effect is mostly present in 
downgrade migrations. 
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TABLE 5.1 
One-year Homogeneous Rating Transition Probability Estimates 
Aaa Aa A Baa 
i) DM estimator: transition probabilities 
Aaa 0.94444444 0.05555556 0.00000000 0.00000000 
Aa 0.06395349 0.92441860 0.01162791 0.00000000 
A 0.00000000 0.04123711 0.88659794 0.06185567 
Baa 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.10000000 0.85454545 
Ba 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.07575758 
B 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 
c 0.00000000 0. 0000000 0. 0000000 . 0000000 
D0000 
Ba BCD 
0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 
0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 
0.01030928 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 
0.02727273 0.01818182 0.00000000 0.03333333 
0.83333333 0.06818182 0.01515152 0.00757576 
0.07142857 0.84523810 0.02380952 0.05952381 
0.00000000 0.33333333 0.50000000 0.16666667 
0001 
ii. 1) HHR estimator: transition intensities 
Aaa 
-0.06031064 0.06031064 0.00000000 0.00000000 
Aa 0.06345418 
-0.07499131 0.01153712 0.00000000 
A 0.00000000 0.03898427 
-0.11695282 0.07796855 
Baa 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.10085659 
-0.15968960 
Ba 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.08026789 
B 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 
C 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 
D0000 
ii. 2) HHR estimator: transition probabilities 
Aaa 0.94326537 0.05640615 0.00032019 0.00000816 
Aa 0.05934618 0.92974209 0.01050315 0.00040064 
A 0.00113833 0.03549046 0.89328254 0.06804843 
Baa 0.00003750 0.00175118 0.08802438 0.85780798 
Ba 0.00000074 0.00004600 0.00347151 0.06763890 
B 0.00000001 0.00000092 0.00009220 0.00270316 
C 0.00000000 0.00000005 0.00000665 0.00025650 
D0000 
0.00000000 .00000000 .00000000 .00000000 
0.00000000 .00000000 .00000000 .00000000 
0.00000000 .00000000 .00000000 .00000000 
0.05883301 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 
-0.18972411 0.10215914 0.00000000 0.00729708 
0.08042178 
-0.19531004 0.06893296 0.04595530 
0.00000000 0.30290456 
-0.75726141 0.45435685 
0000 
0.00000012 0.00000000 0.00000000 1.89X10-10 
0.00000771 0.00000020 0.00000000 0.00000002 
0.00196704 0.00006660 0.00000103 0.00000556 
0.04957648 0.00252941 0.00005040 0.00022258 
0.83258448 0.08550168 0.00244961 0.00830707 
0.06680802 0.83799106 0.04368674 0.04871789 
0.00935562 0.22501918 0.47564963 0.28971236 
0001 
The bootstrap DGP parameters (transition probabilities in bold) are estimated from the observed 
1981-2004 ratings. DM stands for discrete multinomial and HHR for homogenous hazard rate. 
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TABLE 5.2 
Summary Statistics for Bootstrap 1-year Default Probability Estimates 
Panel A: DM estimator 
Rating True PD Mean(PD) StDev(PD) 95% Conf. Int. Bias 
Aaa 1.9 x 10- o--- 0 
Aa 1.6x10-$ 0 
A 5.6x10-6 0 
Baa 0.0002226 0.0002696 
Ba 0.008307 0.008905 
B 0.04872 0.04661 
C 0.2897 0.2761 
o [0,0] 
-1.89 x 10- 
0 [0,0] 
-1.58 x 10-8 
0 [0,0] 
-5.56 x 10-6 
0.001502 [0,0.00752] 0.000047 
0.008086 [0,0.02801] 0.000598 
0.02596 [0,0.1067] 
-0.00211 
0.2591 [0,1] 
-0.0136 
Panel B: HHR estimator 
Rating True PD Mean(PD) StDev(PD) 95% Conf. Int. 
Aaa 1.9x10-10 2.3 x 10'11 
Aa 1.6x10-8 1.8 x 10_8 
A 5.6x10-6 6.6 x 10'6 
Baa 0.0002226 0.0002701 
Ba 0.008307 0.01003 
B 0.04872 0.05861 
C 0.2897 0.3220 
Bias 
3.5 x 10-1U [0,1.2 x 10'111 3.5 x 10-1' 
2.7 x 10-8 [0,9 x 10-8] 2.6 x 10-9 
6.8 x 10-6 [1.8 x 10-7,2.4 x 10-5] 9.9 x 10-7 
0.0002625 [1.1 x 10-5,0.0009718] 0.0000475 
0.007823 [0.0007534,0.02963] 0.00173 
0.04568 [0.01333,0.1204] 0.00989 
0.1882 [0,0.7488] 0.0323 
See footnote to Table 5.1. True PD are the 1-year default probability parameters in the 
bootstrap DGP for the ratings. The bias is calculated as Mean(PD) - True(PD). 
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TABLE 5.3 
Bootstrap Tests for Differences between Discrete and Continuous Estimator 
Panel A: 1-year default probability differential 
Rating Meant(PD) StDevO(PD) 95% Conf. Int. 
Aa 
A 
Baa 
Ba 
B 
2.3 x 10-10 
1.8 x 10-8 
6.6 x 10-6 
4.8 x 10-7 
0.001129 
0.01200 
0.04557 
Null 
A(PD) 
=0 
3.5 x 10-11 [0,1.2 x 10-y] Not reject 
2.7 x 10-8 [0,9 x 10-8] Not reject 
6.8 x 10-6 [1.8 x 10-72.4 x 10-5] Reject 
0.001486 [-0.006857,0.000946] Not reject 
0.004858 [-0.01078,0.010241 Not reject 
0.03948 [-0.01468,0.043641 Not reject 
0.2171 [-0.3796,0.5269] Not reject 
Panel B: Matrix mobility differential 
rrt Oih Mean(Am) StDev(Ai) 95% Conf. Int. Om =0 
0.1921(HHR) 
-0.003257 -0.09424 0.04160 -0.1801, -0.034851 Reject 
0.1954(DM) 
See note in Table 5.1. The default probability differential, 0(PD), and the mobility differential, 
Am, are computed as the HHR minus the DM estimator. 
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TABLE 5.4 
Longer Horizon Homogeneous Transition Probability Matrices 
Panel A: 2-year time-homogeneous transition matrices 
Aaa Aa A Baa Ba BCD 
i) DM estimator: transition probabilities 
Aaa 0.89393939 0.10606061 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 
Aa 0.13253012 0.84337349 0.02409639 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 
A 0.00000000 0.09302326 0.83720930 0.04651163 0.02325581 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 
Baa 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.19230769 0.73076923 0.03846154 0.01923077 0.00000000 0.01923077 
Ba 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.01587302 0.12698413 0.73015873 0.11111111 0.01587302 0.00000000 
B 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.02564103 0.12820513 0.71794872 0.02564103 0.10256410 
C 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 1 0.00000000 0.00000000 
D00000001 
ii) HHR estimator: transition probabilities 
Aaa 0.89309742 0.10566051 0.00118122 0.00005910 0.00000169 0.00000006 0.000000002 0.00000001 
Aa 0.11116780 0.86814133 0.01920177 0.00143194 0.00005410 0.00000274 0.00000005 0.00000025 
A 0.00419941 0.06488333 0.80432402 0.11930575 0.00677385 0.00045614 0.00001340 0.00004410 
Baa 0.00027174 0.00625894 0.15432853 0.74518679 0.08414610 0.00858763 0.00029323 0.00092705 
Ba 0.00001060 0.00032267 0.01195477 0.11480340 0.70235638 0.14498126 0.00706058 0.01851035 
B 0.00000032 0.00001280 0.00062900 0.00913344 0.11247287 0.72636960 0.05735495 0.09402703 
C 0.00000004 0.00000125 0.00008910 0.00162146 0.02943731 0.34594667 0.24106727 0.38183694 
D00000001 
Panel B: 3-year time-homogeneous transition matrices 
i) DM estimator: transition probabilities 
Aaa 0.825 0.175 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0,00000000 0.00000000 
Aa 0.2 0.76363636 0.03636364 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 
A 0.00000000 0.15384615 0.73076923 0.07692308 0.03846154 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 
Baa 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.23333333 0.63333333 0.06666667 0.033333 0.00000000 0.03333333 
Ba 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.05 0.15000000 0.6 0.175 0.025 0.00000000 
B 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.05263158 0.10526316 0.78947368 0.05263158 0.00000000 
C 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 1 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 
D00000001 
ii) HHR estimator: transition probabilities 
Aaa 0.84869989 0.14865507 0.00245627 0.00018061 0.00000769 0.0000004 0.00000002 0.00000004 
Aa 0.15640335 0.81410236 0.02643214 0.00288804 0.00016023 0.00001240 0.00000020 0.00000130 
A 0.00873241 0.08931496 0.72970394 0.15754915 0.01317806 0.00131647 0.00006220 0.00014276 
Baa 0.00083059 0.01262352 0.20379847 0.65546943 0.10786059 0.01656732 0.00065266 0.00219742 
Ba 0.00004820 0.00095553 0.02325718 0.14715790 0.60046186 0.18628034 0.01267560 0.02916336 
B 0.00000196 0.00005770 0.00180806 0.01754222 0.14351949 0.64937460 0.05295081 0.13474512 
C 0.00000049 0.00000641 0.00040229 0.00419626 0.05450719 0.39994490 0.18600557 0.35493687 
D00000001 
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(. cont) 
Panel C: Matrix mobility metric for varying horizon 
'ftansition horizon 
fn(HHR) 7h(DM) Dm (years) 
1 0.1921 0.1954 
-0.0033 
2 0.3155 0.3916 
-0.0761 
3 0.3802 0.4661 
-0.0859 
4 0.4007 0.5197 
-0.1190 
DM stands for discrete multinomial and HHR for homogenous hazard rate. 
The mobility differential, L 11, is computed as the HHR minus the DM estimator. 
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TABLE 5.5 
Longer Horizon Heterogeneous Transition Probability Matrices 
Panel A: NHHR transition probabilities 
Aaa Aa A Baa Ba BCD 
Two-year horizon 
Aaa 0.92016251 0.07983749 0.00000000 
Aa 0.17143835 0.80310470 0.02545695 
A 0.00336537 0.06106579 0.78600696 
Baa 0.00000000 0.00187119 0.15640571 
Ba 0.00000000 0.00006791 0.01368107 
B 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00015967 
C 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00000000 
D000 
Three-year horizon 
. Aaa 0.89704219 0.10295781 0.00000000 
Aa 0.24791551 0.71512515 0.03695934 
A 0.00477332 0.08545516 0.75038362 
Baa 0.00000000 0.00271339 0.22693730 
Ba 0.00000000 0.00028635 0.02743720 
B 0.00000000 0.00005206 0.00412252 
C 0.00000000 0.00000000 0.00017013 
D000 
Transition horizon 
m(HHR) (Years) 
1 0.1921 
2 0.3155 
3 0.3802 
4 0.4007 
0.00000000 . 0000000 . 0000000 . 0000000 0. 0000000 
0.00000000 . 0000000 . 0000000 . 0000000 0. 0000000 
0.13813270 0.01075966 0.00066952 0.00000000 0.00000000 
0.71752941 0.11918620 0.00488992 0.00005879 0.00005879 
0.10337922 0.72815887 0.13087669 0.00475398 0.01908226 
0.00525031 0.11132463 0.77381518 0.02885281 0.08059740 
0.00000000 0.00000000 0.16111111 0.67063492 0.16825397 
00001 
0.00000000 . 0000000 . 0000000 . 0000000 0. 0000000 
0.00000000 . 0000000 . 0000000 . 0000000 0. 0000000 
0.14407716 0.01308519 0.00162502 0.00002053 0.00058000 
0.58257029 0.17611914 0.00949798 0.00016421 0.00199768 
0.12277370 0.62134554 0.19443597 0.00740273 0.02631851 
0.01114124 0.13311615 0.70687773 0.03902732 0.10566297 
0.00221167 0.04689865 0.19957862 0.50550336 0.24563758 
00000 
Panel B: Matrix mobility 
m, (NHHR) Orrin, 
0.1303 0.0618 
0.2399 0.0755 
0.3146 0.0786 
0.4210 
-0.0204 
HHR stands for homogenous hazard rate (see probability estimates in Table 5.4) and NHHR stands 
for non-homogeneous hazard rate estimator. The mobility differential, A7 i, is computed as the HHR 
minus the NHHR estimator. 
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TABLE 5.6 
Summary Statistics for Bootstrap 2-year Default Probability Estimates 
Panel A: HHR estimator 
Rating True PD Mean(PD) StDev(PD) 95% Conf. Int. Bias 
Aaa 0 7.7x10- 1.1x10- 0,4x10-] 7.7x10- 
Aa 0 3.3 x 10-7 4.4 x 10-7 [0,1.6 x 10-6] 3.3 x 10-7 
A 4.8 x 10-6 5.6 x 10-5 5.3 x 10'5 [3.1 x 10-6,0.0001931] 5.1 x 10-5 
Baa 1.2 x 10-4 0.0011894 0.0009514 [0.0001018,0.003780] 0.001069 
Ba 0.02519 0.0235 0.01371 [0.003997,0.05473] 
-0.00169 
B 0.09319 0.1221 0.04872 [0.04018,0.2360] 0.02895 
C 0.2232 0.4684 0.2123 [0,0.8396] 0.2452 
Rating Uue PD 
Aaa 0 
Aa 0 
A 4.8 x 10-6 
Baa 1.2 x 10-4 
Ba 0.02519 
B 0.09319 
C 0.2232 
Mean(PD) 
00 
00 
3.4x10-6 1.5x10'5 
0.0001053 0.0002146 
0.02406 0.01417 
0.08875 0.03324 
0.18249 0.07407 
Panel B: NHHR estimator 
StDev(PD) 95% Conf. Int. 
0,0 
[0,0] 
[0,4.7 x 10-5] 
[0,0.0007048] 
[0.002985,0.05641] 
P. 02757,0.1603] 
[0.04106,0.3522] 
Bias 
0 
0 
-1.3 x 10-6 
-0.00001486 
-0.001134 
-0.0044 
-0.0407 
The bootstrap DGP parameters (true transition probabilities) are estimated from the observed 
1981-2004 ratings. The bias is calculated as Mean(PD)-True(PD). HHR stands for 
homogeneous hazard rate and NHHR for non-homogeneous hazard rate estimator. 
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TABLE 5.7 
Bootstrap Tests for Differences between Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Estimator 
Panel A: 2-year default probability differential 
Rating MeanA(PD) StDevL(PD) 
Aaa 7.7 x 10- 
Aa 3.3 x 10-7 
A 5.2 x 10-g 
Baa 0.001084 
Ba 
-0.0005521 
B 0.03339 
C 0.2859 
95% Conf. Int. 
1.1 x 10- [0,4 x 10- ] 
4.4 x 10-7 [0,1.6 x 10-6] 
5.5 x 10-5 [-1.1 x 10-5,0.0001924] 
0.0009477 [-3.8 x 10-5,0.0035621 
0.00898 [-0.01936,0.01734] 
0.03171 [-0.03262,0.10174] 
0.1963 [-0.1717,0.6609] 
Matrix mobility metric differentials 
Null 
A(PD) 
=0 
Not reject 
Not reject 
Not reject 
Not reject 
Not reject 
Not reject 
Not reject 
m Om Mean(Am) StDev(Om 95% Conf. Int. Am =0 
0.3155(HHR) 0.07555 0.08597 0.0364 [0.0134,0.1540] Reject 
0.2399(NHHR) 
See note in Table 5.6. The differential statistics, 0(PD) and LIZ, are computed as the HHR 
minus the NHHR value. 
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TABLE 5.8 
Logit Test Results for Non-Markov Effects 
Panel A: Duration effect 
Upgrade Downgrade 
Coefficient estimate t ratio estimate t ratio 
ß 
71998 
71999 
72000 
72001 
72002 
72003 
72004 
a 
-1.88 -5.33 -1.65 -5.74 
1.99 2.71 
-0.31 -0.37 
0.48 0.39 1.68 3.12 
1.36 1.69 1.49 2.62 
3.81 4.88 0.37 0.43 
2.39 2.89 1.94 2.70 
3.78 5.67 
-0.08 -0.12 
-0.44 -0.67 -0.90 -1.66 
-1.57 -1.50 -0.41 -1.15 
0.27 1.04 0.11 0.44 
Panel B: Momentum effect 
Upgrade Downgrade 
Coefficient estimate t ratio estimate t ratio 
ß 
71998 
71999 
72000 
72001 
72002 
72003 
72004 
a 
-1.24 -1.02 1.20 2.94 
1.65 2.75 
-0.37 -0.46 
0.60 0.71 1.21 2.67 
0.84 1.19 0.71 1.47 
1.83 3.23 
-0.79 -0.99 
0.84 1.16 0.35 0.63 
2.61 5.47 
-0.28 -0.45 
0.90 1.08 
-0.08 -0.12 
-6.37 -14.46 -5.18 -14.06 
-0.027 -0.35 -0.17 -2.10 
The logit estimates are based on monthly ratings March, 1981-March 2004. 
The logits in Panel A and B model the probability of upgrade/downgrade 
as a function of duration and rating drift (ß), respectively. y, are dummies, 
c is an intercept and £ is a parameter in the disturbance variance equation 
to capture groupwise heteroskedasticity (industrial/non-industrial sovereigns). 
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Figure 5.1: Aggregate Ratings Distribution, 1981-2003 (Moody's) 
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Figure 5.3: Discrete versus Continuous Bootstrap Default Probability Estimates (low credit-quality ratings) 
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Figure 5.4: Fbrrngeneous versus Heterogeneous Bootstrap Default Probability Estirrates 
(high credit-quality ratings) 
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Figure 5.5: Homogeneous versus Heterogeneous Bootstrap Default Probability Estimates 
(low credit-quality ratings) 
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Figure 5.6: Eigenvalues and Transition Horizon 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
6.1 Concluding Remarks 
It is important to recognize the complexity of international debt crises in the sense that 
they are determined by the interaction of economic fundamentals and a range of unob- 
served factors 
- 
political, social, cultural and legal attributes could equally determine the 
timely fulfillment of debt obligations. The development of better methods to anticipate 
sovereign default and, more broadly, to estimate rating migration probabilities falls under 
the umbrella of sovereign risk analysis. The main stakeholders are the policymakers of 
emerging and developing markets, the financial institutions and the bank regulators. 
We start by investigating the importance of accounting for heterogeneity in panel 
sovereign default models. The literature has developed a critical attitude towards the 
restrictive country-homogeneity assumption in panel sovereign default models. However, 
direct evidence on the importance of relaxing the latter, particularly for forecasting pur- 
poses, has not yet been provided. Chapter 2 seeks to complement the literature in this 
respect. Several panel logit specifications are considered ranging from a simple pooled 
model to a time-varying random coefficients model. 
Statistical hypotheses tests and model selection criteria strongly suggest that hetero- 
geneous models better describe the data for our large sample of emerging markets and 
LDCs. The different models are, however, similar regarding the plausibility of the coeffi- 
cient signs. In order to develop an Early Warning System (EWS) for sovereign default it 
seems natural to compare these models on the basis of their forecast performance. To this 
end, we conduct a comprehensive forecast evaluation exercise which fills a gap in the panel 
sovereign default literature. Our out-of-sample, recursive forecast framework comprises 
statistical and economic loss functions as well as formal tests of predictive performance 
both across models and relative to naive forecasts. As expected, model ranking depends 
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on the decision-maker's loss function. The analysis reveals that logits that exclusively 
control for either time or regional heterogeneity in a simple manner forecast relatively 
well. Fully heterogeneous models produce poorer forecasts. Our results in Chapter 2 
provide further evidence, which is new in the context of sovereign default, that the model 
that best describes the data is not necessarily good in terms of forecasting. 
Little attention has been paid to residual autocorrelation in panel logit (or probit) 
models of sovereign default. This stems both from the overlapping problem inherent in 
EWSs and from the serial dependence in the macroeconomic and financial ratios typically 
used as regressors. The lack of attention can perhaps be attributed to the fact that the 
usual econometric packages do not produce an autocorrelation-robust estimator for panel 
logit and probit modeling. Neglecting residual autocorrelation will invalidate inferences 
on the determinants of default because the usual standard errors are biased. 
In Chapter 3 we demonstrate the magnitude of the serial correlation problem in 
the context of several panel logit models of sovereign default. Building on the cor- 
rection proposed by Estrella and Rodriguez (1998) for panel probits, we implement an 
autocorrelation-robust estimator for panel logits along the lines of the Newey-West ap- 
proach. The results suggest that the usual ML standard errors are substantially underes- 
timated. Inferences based on them are overturned, for several regressors, when the robust 
standard errors are used. Our findings in this regard have broad implications since the 
same criticism applies to much of the recent literature on EWSs for currency/banking 
crises which has largely utilized panel binary-choice models. 
Although most of the extant EWSs are based on panel binary-choice models for macro- 
economic and financial indicators, credit ratings have also been considered. To the ex- 
tent that they capture unobservable sociopolitical factors as well as market expectations, 
there may be gains from combining them with forecasts from macro/financial logits. Non- 
parametric classification techniques allow researchers to avoid the problem of having to 
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specify a functional form and thus, may better capture complex relationships. Chapter 
4 investigates several issues in the development of an optimal EWS for sovereign de- 
fault using three classifiers 
-a logit regression and K-means clustering, both based on 
macrovariables, and a logit regression based on bankers' credit ratings. 
We demonstrate the potential importance of optimally calibrating these classifiers 
according to the decision-maker's preferences. In particular, it is shown that the optimal 
warning horizon, cut-off probability, assignment rule and number of clusters vary with 
the loss function. These parameters have mostly been chosen in an ad hoc manner in the 
literature. We corroborate the different strengths of the classifiers in terms of Type I and 
Type II errors and further demonstrate that there are out-of-sample forecast gains from 
combining them. Finally, evidence is provided on the importance of accounting for the 
decision-maker's loss function in choosing the forecast combining scheme also. We believe 
that important practical recommendations emerge from Chapter 4 which should also be 
relevant for the development of EWSs for currency and banking crises. 
Having analysed the above issues regarding the prediction of sovereign default events, 
we next turn to the estimation of rating transition probability matrices. The small his- 
tories of sovereign ratings (and transitions) available pose problems for the reliability of 
sovereign transition matrix estimates. In this context, it is important to investigate the 
small-sample properties of rival estimators. Moreover, most of the estimators available 
build on the notion that the current transition probability does not depend on the rat- 
ings history (Markov property). Thus, it is relevant to test for non-Markov effects such 
as momentum and duration dependence. There is no evidence on these issues in the 
context of sovereign rating migrations and this thesis attempts to fill this gap. For this 
purpose, in Chapter 5 we compare the bias, efficiency and implied overall mobility of 
continuous versus discrete estimators, on the one hand, and of time-homogeneous versus 
time-heterogeneous estimators on the other. The comparison is based on a bootstrap 
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method that facilitates their empirical distribution. 
Two interesting findings emerge. First, the accuracy of transition probability esti- 
mators is enhanced when we move from a discrete to a continuous-time framework that 
utilizes rating duration information. This result is important given that the discrete 
(multinomial) approach is the standard method used by leading rating agencies. The aver- 
age migration dynamics implied by discrete and continuous estimators is also significantly 
different as measured by a matrix mobility metric based on the spectral decomposition. 
Second, continuous *estimators that account for time-heterogeneity are generally more ef- 
ficient and less biased. Finally, we document duration dependence for both sovereign 
downgrades and upgrades which implies that transition intensity significantly increases 
with duration. Rating momentum effects are prominent only for downgrades. This is 
consistent with the common practice by agencies of reducing a sovereign's credit-quality 
grade gradually. Overall our results show that several stylised facts of corporate credit 
ratings also apply to sovereigns. 
6.2 Further Research 
Political risk indexes have been recently constructed (PRS-Political Risk Services) that 
incorporate the degree of corruption, ethnic tensions, democracy, military involvement in 
politics as well as the socioeconomic and investment profile of countries. Lack of publicly 
available data has precluded the use of such factors in our analysis. Examination of the 
latter as a complementary tool for sovereign risk assessment might be of interest. 
Our results have suggested that controlling for regional heterogeneity is important in 
the context of sovereign default prediction. A natural follow-up would be to investigate 
the existence of unsystematic region-specific risk factors over and above the underlying 
common factors driving world debt repayment performance. For example, given that Latin 
America has experience a larger degree of liberalization compared to Asia factors reflecting 
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global trade links and foreign direct investment may play a more important role in future 
debt repayment. The regional differences may thus materialize in terms of picking up 
different default determinants and would likely increase the predictive performance of 
sovereign default events by region. Moreover, given the pervasive evidence regarding 
the magnitude of the serial correlation problem inherent in financial crisis EWSs, we 
could further support the proposed correction by means of Monte Carlo simulations. By 
simulating the macro variables as autoregressive processes and the debt crisis variable 
using logistic error terms, we can show whether the correction provides accurate standard 
errors. The latter can be facilitated by comparing the variance of the parameter estimates 
across simulations with the usual and autocorrelation corrected standard errors. 
In addition, the period between 1994 to date deserves particular attention given the 
general turbulence in the sovereign bond market. The latter has been characterized by 
large defaults on foreign currency bonds. By contrast, most of the default episodes in the 
pre-1994 era are attributed to defaults on bank syndicated loans and trade credit obliga- 
tions. Focusing the analysis exclusively on emerging markets with access to the sovereign 
bond market could provide useful insights. However, given the scarcity of bond default 
events in this context, a broader definition of `sovereign distress' is needed that reflects 
increased credit risk but not necessarily default. In parallel with the distressed debt litera- 
ture in corporate finance one can define the occurrence of a `sovereign distress' event when 
the spreads of the most liquid bonds exceed a threshold value of, say 1000 basis points. 
The availability of actively traded bonds for these sovereigns enables the comparison of 
different classification techniques on the basis of economic significance, that is, one could 
simulate simple trading strategies and return distributions of emerging market sovereign 
bond portfolios. For example, recursively estimating binary or multinomial logit models 
using rolling windows of data, out-of-sample forecasts for the dynamics of the risk-neutral 
implied default probabilities can be generated. The ability of trading strategies based on 
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out-of-sample default probability forecasts to beat the `buy & hold' strategy in terms of 
emerging market bond portfolio returns could be assessed. A naive trading strategy could 
be constructed as follows: increase the position upon a clear upgrading signal, close the 
position upon a clear downgrading signal and keep the position unchanged upon no clear 
signal, given a minimum investment required to re-open a position and borrowing and 
lending at the risk-free rate. 
Finally, the current comparative analysis of estimators for sovereign rating migration 
matrices could be extended by addressing whether the differences uncovered translate 
into economic significance. For this purpose, once could test whether the estimators lead 
to different VaR capital requirements for sovereign credit portfolios. More precisely, a 
sovereign bond portfolio that mimics the distribution of the Moody's sovereign rating 
universe on a specific date can be constructed. Industrial credit portfolio models can be 
used to generate the value distribution of the portfolio of bonds, where besides recovery 
rates and credit spreads, the crucial input parameter will be the credit rating migration 
matrix from the relevant estimator. The question would be: what is the ceteris-paribus 
portfolio value distribution one year ahead using different transition matrices? The sim- 
ulated portfolio value distribution will provide the risk levels and the 99% standard VaR 
economic risk capital requirements. The discrepancy surrounding the different methods 
to calibrate the matrices may thus be assessed in term of economic relevance. If the dif- 
ferences between estimators are economically significant, their implied VaR capital levels 
will exhibit sizeable differences. 
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Appendix 2.2: Historical Sovereign Defaults per Country 1984-2002 
Country 
Entries to Average Defaults Default Episodes 
Default Length 
(Odic=1) (dit=1) 
Algeria 1 
Argentina 4 
Bangladesh 0 
Belize I 
Benin 3 
Bolivia 4 
Botswana 0 
Brazil 3 
Bulgaria 2 
Burkina Faso 3 
Burundi 0 
Cameroon 3 
Cape Verde 3 
Centr Africa R5 
Chad 2 
Chile 0 
China 0 
Colombia I 
Congo DR 2 
Congo R3 
Costa Rica 3 
Cote D'Ivoire 3 
Czech Rep 0 
Dominican R5 
Ecuador 3 
Egypt 3 
El Salvador 2 
Eq Guinea 4 
Fiji 0 
Gabon 4 
Gambia 1 
Ghana 1 
Grenada 1 
Guatemala 3 
Guinea 4 
Guyana 3 
Haiti 2 
Honduras 5 
Hungary 0 
India 0 
Indonesia 1 
5.0 5 1994-1998 
2.3 9 1984,1986,1988-1992,1994-1995 
0.0 0- 
1.0 1 1984 
2.3 7 1984-1988,1991,1993 
2.3 9 1984-1985,1987,1991-1993,1995-1997 
0.0 0- 
1.7 5 1987,1989-1991,1993 
2.5 5 1990-1993,1997 
2.7 8 1986-1987,1992-1994,2000-2002 
0.0 0 
4.3 13 1986-1988,1990-1996,1998-2000 
1.7 5 1989-1990,1993,1999-2000 
1.6 8 1989-1990,1992-1993,1995,1998,2000-2001 
3.0 6 1985-1987,1996-1998 
0.0 0- 
0.0 0- 
1.0 1 1988 
4.5 9 1988-1995,1998 
5.3 16 1985,1987-1993,1995-2002 
2.0 6 1986-1989,1991,1993 
3.7 11 1988-1993,1995,1998-2001 
0.0 0- 
2.2 11 1984-1985,1987-1990,1992-1993,1995-1996,1998 
3.7 11 1987-1994,1999,2001-2002 
4.3 13 1984-1986,1988,1992-2000 
2.0 4 1984,1989-1991 
2.8 11 1984,1986-1992,1994-1995,1998 
0.0 0- 
2.8 11 1986,1989-1993,1995-1998,2000 
2.0 2 1984-1985 
2.0 2 2001-2002 
8.0 8 1984-1991 
1.7 5 1986-1987,1990-1991,1994 
2.8 11 1985,1988,1990-1994,1996-1999 
3.3 10 1984-1989,1994-1996,1999 
2.0 4 1992-1994,1996 
2.4 12 1984-1986,1989,1992-1994,1996-1997,1999-2001 
0.0 0- 
0.0 0- 
4.0 4 1998-2001 
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(cont. ) 
Iran 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Korea 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Malawi 
Maldives 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Mozanbique 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Romania 
Russia 
Rwanda 
Samoa 
Sao Tome and Principe 
Senegal 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
Solomon Islands 
Sri Lanka 
St. Kitts and Nevis 
St. Lucia 
Swaziland 
Syria 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Togo 
Trinidad and Tobago 
1 3.0 3 1984-1986 
2 3.5 7 1986,1989-1993,1995 
2 6.0 12 1989-1992,1994-2001 
2 2.0 4 1992-1993,2000-2001 
0 0.0 0- 
1 3.0 3 1988-1990 
o 0.0 0 
1 1.0 1 
0 0.0 0 
1989 
3 3.3 10 1984,1989-1992,1994-1998 
34 12 1984,1989-1995,1997-2000 
0 0.0 0- 
1 4.0 4 1989-1992 
3 2.0 6 1985,1987,1989-1992 
3 5.0 15 1984-1986,1988-1998,2000 
0 0.0 0- 
2 6.5 13 1985-1994,1997-1999 
4 2.3 9 1989-1990,1992-1993,1995,1997-2000 
3 4.0 12 1988,1990-1999,2001 
0 0.0 0- 
1 4.0 4 1998-2001 
2 4.0 8 1987-1991,1993-1995 
0 0.0 0- 
2 2.0 4 1986-1987,1989-1990 
3 3.7 11 1984-1990,1993-1995,1998 
1 5.0 5 1989-1993 
3 2.7 8 1984,1986-1991,1997 
0 0.0 0- 
2 5.5 11 1990,1992-2001 
2 2.5 5 1994-1995,1999-2001 
0 0.0 0- 
3 4.3 13 1985-1993,1997-1999,2001 
2 3.5 7 1989-1994,1997 
2 1.0 2 1991,2001 
4 3.0 12 1985,1987-1991,1993,1996-2000 
1 9.0 9 1993-2001 
1 1.0 1 1996 
1 1.0 1 1992 
0 0.0 0- 
0 0.0 0 
2 6.5 13 1986,1990-2001 
4 3.3 13 1984-1985,1987,1989-1996,1998-1999 
0 0.0 0 
-- 
4 2.8 11 1987,1989-1994,1996,1998-2000 
1 5.0 5 1988-1992 
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(cont. ) 
Tunisia 0 0.0 0- 
Turkey 0 0.0 0- 
Uganda 3 2.7 8 1988-1992,1998,2000-2001 
Uruguay 0 0.0 0- 
Vanuatu 0 0.0 0- 
Venezuela 1 2.0 2 1984-1985 
Vietnam 2 5.5 11 1988-1996,1998-1999 
Yemen 3 3.7 11 1987-1992,1995,1998-2001 
Zambia 5 2.4 12 1985,1987-1990,1992-1993,1996-1998,2000-2001 
Zimbabwe 1 3.0 3 2000-2002 
Total 175 539 
1984-1995 127 383 
1996-2002 48 156 
Rate 10% 30% 
1984-1995 11% 33% 
1996-2002 7% 23% 
The models have the form yit=f(xi, t-1) so the first relevant year for yit in the analysis is 1984. 
The reported statistics are for the default series {dit}t00g84 on which the EWS indicator 
{2000 is based, e. g. yi 1 if di 1 at t=2000,2001 or 2002. A country-period (i t) case Yit}t=1984 
, 
2000= 
, 
t= + 
is a `default entry' if di, t-1=0 and dit=1. The reported default entries in 1984 are cases where 
di, 1983=0. The analysis is based on N=96 countries. There are 1152(=96X12) and 672(=96X7) 
country-period cases over 1984-1995 and 1996-2002, respectively. 
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Appendix 2.3: The Cross-Validation (Jacknife) Method 
In order to preserve degrees of freedom, a jacknife procedure is conducted to reduce the original 
set of explanatory variables to an optimal smaller set with large predictive power. This jacknife 
approach is conducted in-sample, i. e. over the 1984-1995 period denoted [1, T*]. It is based 
on the Type I error measured over the entire sample [1, T*] and over a reduced subset that 
excludes consecutive defaults. The former measure (denoted TI) gives the percentage of missed 
defaults (yTo+1 
= 
0, yT,, +1 = 1) whereas the latter gives the percentage of mispredicted positive 
directional changes (PDC) or entries to default (yTo+l = 0, yTo+i = 1, yTo = 0). 
The pooled logit model estimates over [1, To] with To < T* and A=0.5 are used to generate 
1-step-ahead event forecasts yi, T0+l for i=1,.. ' N (minimum feasible To = 4). This modeling 
and forecasting exercise is repeated iteratively, adding one further observation at a time, until 
T* is reached. We compute the following cross-validation (CV) metric for different regressor 
sets (S) 
1 T' 
CV 
_TIS = TT 7, 
TIt 
ýý t=To+1 
and likewise for CV 
_PDCS. 
In the first iteration, the baseline regressor set So contains all 
regressors and S1 is a model that differs from So in that it excludes xj. Each iteration has 2 
steps. First, collect in X the xj E So that satisfy 
CV 
_PDCSJ 
< CV 
_PDCso 
so that PDC is not increased by excluding any of them. Second, collect in X the Xk EX such 
that 
CV 
_TIsk 
< CV 
_TIs,, 
so that their exclusion does not increase TI. The regressor set Sr that satisfies 
Sr 
= arg min(CV 
_TIsk - 
CV 
_TIso 
) 
kEX 
in the first iteration is the reduced regressor set that gives the minimal TI without increasing 
PDC relative to that for So. Therefore, x, is dropped from So and the new baseline regressor 
set for the second iteration is Sr and so forth. The last iteration occurs when X is the null set. 
We thus end up with a regressor set that gives the smallest possible Type I error over [1, T*] 
under the condition that no variable can be removed without increasing the Type I error over 
the PDC sample. 
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Appendix 2.4: Definition of Selected Variables 
External credit exposure 
External debt/GDP: The total external debt measured as a share of GDP. Total external debt 
is debt owed to nonresidents repayable in foreign currency, goods, or services. Total external 
debt is the sum of public, publicly guaranteed, and private nonguaranteed long-term debt, use 
of IMF credit, and short-term debt. 
Official debt/Total debt: Public and publicly guaranteed debt comprises long-term external 
obligations of public debtors, including the national government, autonomous public bodies, and 
external obligations of private debtors that are guaranteed for repayment by a public entity. 
Short-term debt/Total debt: Short-term debt includes all debt having an original maturity 
of one year or less and interest in arrears on long-term debt. 
Debt service ratio: Total debt service relative to exports. Total debt service is the sum of 
principal and interest repayments paid in foreign currency on long-term debt, interest paid on 
short-term debt and repayments to the IMF. 
IMF credit/Exports: The repurchase obligations to the IMF for all uses of IMF resources as 
a share of export earnings. These obligations comprise purchases outstanding under the credit 
tranches, including enlarged access resources, and all special facilities (extended fund, and oil 
facilities), trust fund loans, and operations under the structural adjustment facilities. 
External economic activity 
Variability of export growth: The standard deviation of annual growth rate of exports of 
goods and services over the past 5 years. Annual growth rate of exports of goods and services is 
based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 1995 U. S. dollars. Exports 
of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other market services provided to the 
rest of the world (e. g. merchandise, insurance, transport, travel, communication, construction, 
financial, business and government services). 
Trade balance /GDP: Trade balance relative to GDP. Trade balance is defined as the differ- 
ence between exports and imports. 
Domestic conditions 
Credit to private sector/GDP: Credit to private sector includes the domestic financial 
resources, provided to the private sector, such as loans, purchases of non-equity securities, trade 
credits and other accounts receivable that establish a claim for repayment. 
GDP growth: The annual growth rate of the gross domestic product. It is based on constant 
local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 1995 U. S. dollars. 
GNP per capita: GNP per capita is the gross national product divided by midyear population. 
GNP is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes not included in 
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the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income from abroad. Data are in constant 
1995 U. S. dollars. 
Variability of GNP per capita growth: The standard deviation of GNP per capita annual 
growth rate over the past 4 years. Annual growth rate of GNP per capita is based on constant 
local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 1995 U. S. dollars. 
Real exchange rate misalignment: Deviation of real exchange rate from the long-run trend. 
The variable was constructed using the official exchange rate (local currency per US$) , deter- 
mined by national authorities, adjusted for relative changes in the price levels. It is calculated 
as an annual average based on monthly averages. Our measure of the long-run trend is the 
demeaned real exchange rate index. 
Global Links 
Trade/GDP: The trade integration ratio is the sum of exports and imports of goods and 
services measured as a share of GDP converted to international $ using PPP rates. 
Global Factors 
US monetary policy uncertainty: The measure is the conditional standard deviation derived 
from an AR(1)-GARCH(2,1) model fitted to the spread between the yield on the U. S Federal 
Funds Target Rate and the yield on the 3 month US Tresaury Bill. 
US macroeconomic uncertainty: The measure of macroeconomic uncertainty is the condi- 
tional variance derived from an AR(1)-GARCH (1,1) model fitted to the detrended (logarithmic 
first differences) U. S Real GDP. 
US risk aversion: The measure for risk aversion is the Sharpe ratio of the spread between the 
Merrill Lynch corporate high yield 175 index and the yield on the 10-year U. S Treasury Bonds. 
Appendix 2.5: Expected Impact of Selected Variables 
External credit exposure 
External debt/GDP (+): An increase in the size of the debt burden, compared to the 
country's output (or any other type of resources such as export earnings) will increase the 
likelihood that the debt burden becomes unsustainable and thus, the probability of default 
(Edwards, 1984; McFadden et al., 1985; Callier, 1985; Hajivassiliou, 1994; Aylward and Thorne, 
1998; Detragiaghe and Spilimbergo, 2001) 
Official debt/Total debt (+): Detragiaghe and Spilimbergo (2001) argue that the burden 
of servicing a given amount of debt is likely to depend on the nature of the debt obligations. 
Thus, one should control for debt characteristics such as the share of debt owed to multilateral 
creditors, commercial creditors, and the share of debt at concessional terms. They find a positive 
and significant effect of the official debt burden, while variables that indicate the share of debt 
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owed to commercial banks or that at concessional terms prove insignificant. The latter result 
reflects that countries experiencing balance of payments problems are more likely borrowers from 
multilateral institutions. 
Short-term debt/Total debt (+): The ratio is a proxy for short-term external liquidity and 
affects the level of foreign funds that a country requires to raise in a given year. Detragiaghe 
and Spilimbergo (2001) find a positive and significant effect, that is, the less liquid a country 
the more likely it is to default on its external debt obligations. 
Debt service ratio (+): The ratio links the fixed foreign exchange outflow obligation of 
debt service to what is generally the major foreign exchange inflow. As noted in Feder et at. 
(1981) a shortfall of exports will force the government to draw down foreign exchange reserves 
or cut down imports in order to accommodate debt-service payments and thus, an increase in 
the ratio would increase the risk of defaulting by the government. However, Frank and Cline 
(1971) point out that the ratio may be non-informative as a proxy for the country's ability to 
service foreign currency debt. The debt service ratio is just an indicator of the proportion of 
foreign exchange earnings which can be used for imports. If export earnings are high relative to 
import demand, a high debt service ratio can be maintained without increasing the probability 
of default. Furthermore, a country with a good credit standing may be able to finance a high 
debt service ratio, at least for a certain amount of time, through a high level of borrowing. A 
significant and positive effect is reported in Frank and Cline (1971), Feder et al. (1981), Edwards 
(1984), Berg and Sachs (1988), Brewer and Rivoli (1997), while a negative coefficient is reported 
in Elmore and McKenzie (1992). 
IMF credit/Exports (+/-): Aylward and Thorne (1998) report a positive impact on default 
risk to external creditors. This can be interpreted by considering the IMF's preferred creditor 
status, which implies that other creditors are repaid only after IMF obligations are met. The 
positive effect of this ratio is also in line with that countries experiencing balance of payments 
problems are more likely borrowers from multilateral institutions (Detragiaghe and Spilimbergo, 
2001). On the other hand, certain countries benefit from last minute IMF rescue packages and 
prevent default (Manasse et al., 2003), which postulates a negative parameter. 
External economic activity 
Variability of export growth (+/-): Export earnings is the main source of countries' foreign 
exchange. According to the views advocated within the ability-to pay framework the more the 
fluctuations in the flows of foreign funds faced by a country the higher the probability for a large 
current account deficit, and thus of default. On the other hand, Eaton and Gersowitz (1981) 
assume that a country uses foreign funds to smooth consumption. Under this assumption, the 
more the uncertainty in a country's export earnings, the more a country relies on foreign fund 
flow from international creditors to stabilise consumption. Thus, the greater is the incentive the 
country has to meet debt service obligations to avoid potential penalties imposed by creditors. 
In this perspective, the expected parameter is negative. In essence, the theoretical literature 
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provides explanations for both positive and negative effects and there is little established em- 
pirical evidence on the effect of export shocks. Lee (1991) is the only empirical study that looks 
at volatility of exports and finds a negative impact. 
Trade balance /GDP (-): It is a proxy for the external balance of payments or current account 
deficit relative to the country's output. Edwards (1984) argues in favour of a negative effect 
of this variable which indicates that a higher balance of payment deficit will result in a higher 
probability of default because the same investment is being financed with a higher proportion of 
foreign savings. Moreover, for countries with large trade balance deficits, any shock disrupting 
a country's access to international capital markets will compound the problem of servicing 
maturing debt with that of finding a substitute for the real resource transfer the country relied 
upon. Haque et al. (1996), among others, argue that an improving current account position 
reduces the dependence on foreign savings, slows down the increase in the foreign debt burden 
or even reduces the foreign debt burden and, thus, reduces default risk. Cline (1984), Edwards 
(1984), Callier (1985), Hajivassiliou (1994) and Peter (2002) report negative coefficients. 
Domestic conditions 
Credit to private sector/GDP (+/-): For the impact of the ratio of (domestic) credit 
to private sector to GDP two contradicting theoretical expectations can be considered. The 
first scenario expects the ratio to be positively correlated to a country's default risk since the 
higher the indebtedness of the private sector compared to the output of the economy, the higher 
the likelihood of mass private bankruptcies, 'in times of financial distress. A banking crisis may 
induce a country to bail out large financial institutions, and therefore plunge into debt repayment 
difficulties (Peter, 2002). From a different perspective, a larger private sector may be reflect 
better dsitribution of assets and in this case the expected parameter is negative (Staikouras, 
2005) 
. 
Bekaert et al. (2000) argue that the credit to private sector ratio is a proxy for 
banking development which is linked with increased growth. Real investment and infrastructure 
developments that lead to economic growth are carried out by the private sector. 
GDP growth (-): Haque et al. (1996), Balkan (1992), Feder and Uy (1985) and McFadden et al. 
(1985) report a significant negative effect of GDP growth on default risk. Feder and Uy (1985) 
suggest that higher growth would improve the initial creditworthiness of a country through 
increased investment, however, as this higher growth entails heavier borrowing for investment it 
may be possible to reduce creditworthiness in subsequent periods. 
GNP per capita (-): The ratio is indicative of a government's management flexibility (Feder 
et al., 1981). It serves as a proxy of the extent to which the government can muster additional 
resources to overcome a balance of payment liquidity crisis without defaulting. The higher the 
per capita income the easier it would be for the government to dampen the demand for goods and 
services and divert the resources to produce the additional foreign exchange needed to service 
debt obligations (management flexibility). Feder et al. (1981), Feder and Uy (1985), Berg and 
Sachs (1988), McFadden et al. (1985), Hajivassiliou (1987), Aylward and Thorne (1998) report 
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significant negative effects. 
Variability of GNP per capita growth (+/-): The expectations for the effect of the volatil- 
ity of GNP per capita growth are overwhelmed by ongoing controversy between the willingness 
and capacity to pay theories. The arguments of the two sides are similar to the ones discussed 
for export volatility shocks. According to the Eaton-Gersowitz willingness to pay approach and 
the consumption-smoothing motive, the expected effect is negative (Lee, 1991). If the capacity 
to pay considerations prevail the parameter will bear a positive sign since the more the shocks on 
a country's income the higher the probability that the country might experience output ranges 
that diminish the resource availability for debt repayment (Peter, 2002). In essence, whether the 
income volatility is positively or negatively correlated to sovereign default risk depends on the 
conceptualised trade-off between a country's willingness to pay and capacity-to 
-pay benefits, 
and on which of the two will prevail. 
Real exchange rate misalignment (+/-): Three of the studies that tested a real ex- 
change rate indicator agree on a significant positive effect on default probability (Solberg, 1988; 
Obedokun, 1995; Peter, 2002). Other studies (Haque et al., 1996; Hajivassiliou, 1989; De- 
tragiaghe and Spilimbergo, 2001) report a positive but insignificant effect. Apreciation of the 
currency is likely to lead to currency crises, while depreciation will imply large external debt 
burden in terms of domestic currency (Peter, 2002). Detragiaghe and Spilimbergo (2001) refer 
to the negative effect that an overvalued exchange rate may have on exports. Likewise, Haque 
et al. (1996) note that the real exchange rate variable measures the trade competitiveness of 
the economy, thus a high real exchange rate is expected to increase default risk. On the other 
hand, Manasee et al. (2003) find that the exchange rate shows a large depreciation against the 
US dollar in the year of entry into a debt crisis, and argue that depreciation increases external 
debt in domestic currency units which can make debt repayments more difficult. 
Global Links 
'Dade/GDP (-): It indicates the degree of trade openness of an economy. It has been found 
significant and negative in Detragiaghe and Spilimbergo (2001) and Callier (1985). Trade in- 
tegration increases growth through export revenues (Bekaert et al., 2000). Furthermore, un a 
willingness-to pay framework more trade openness may render a country more vulnerable to 
creditor sanctions if it defaults (Bulow and Rogoff, 1989). 
Global Factors 
The empirical literature on international capital flows gives support to the impact of external 
factors on country creditworthiness and on the fluctuations of capital flows to emerging markets. 
Business cycle fluctuations in industrialized countries (namely higher interest rates and lower 
availability of capital) and changes in risk aversion induce shifts in the demand of emerging 
market assets, which in turn influence capital flows (FitzGerald and Krolzig, 2003). In the 
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context of debt servicing capacity this translates into lower levels of foreign exchange reserves. 
Higher interest rates mean higher debt-service for the newly acquired debt of emerging market. 
US monetary policy uncertainty (+): Fluctuations in the spread are aimed at capturing 
heightened uncertainty about the expected stance of U. S monetary policy. Arora and Cerisola 
(2000) find that US monetary policy uncertainty increases sovereign spreads, since unpredictabil- 
ity of US monetary policy destabilize capital flows and capital market conditions in emerging 
markets. Some authors have argued that episodes of market turbulence reflect irrational investor 
behaviour and contagion (Valdes, 1997; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000), while other have tried 
to explain these episodes primarily as liquidity events. Other studies (Edwards and Susmel, 
2000) have stressed the importance of the transmission mechanism of such liquidity effects on 
capital flows and prices of emerging market assets. Sudden and unexpected rises in the US 
interest rates or other shocks precipitate financial turmoil across assets and countries. 
US macroeconomic uncertainty (+): Abrupt business cycle fluctuations in industrialized 
countries change market sentiment (through spillover of financial turmoil or contagion of shocks 
from one country to another) and lower the demand of emerging market assets, which in turn 
reduce capital flows. 
US risk aversion (+): Risk aversion varies over time and negatively affects capital flows to 
emerging markets as lower appetite for risk implies a reduction in the demand and the exposure 
to emerging market risky assets(FitzGerald and Krolzig, 2003). Changes in market sentiment 
have been evidenced to drive fluctuations in emerging market spreads (Cantor and Packer; 1996; 
Eichengreen and Mody, 1998; Kamin and von Kleist, 1999). 
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Appendix 4.1: Clustering by K-means Algorithm 
K-means clustering belongs to the non-hierarchical clustering class of methods. In our con- 
text, a case is an observation vector xit = [xit, li xit, 2, 
... > xit, s], where s is the dimension of the 
macrovariable set; i=1,2,..., N and t=1,2,..., T denote country and period, respectively. The 
number of sample cases is M= NT. 
K-means clustering consists of comparing the distances of each observation vector from the 
mean vectors of each of K proposed clusters in the sample of M observations. The observation 
xit is assigned to the cluster with nearest mean vector. The distances are recomputed and 
reassignments are made as necessary. This process continues until all observations are in clusters 
with minimum distances to their mean vectors. The algorithm in steps is as follows: 
1. Take the first K cases in the sample as the initial cluster centroids (c? = x11, c2 = x21, 
..., 
c0 
XK1)" 
2. Assign case xit to the cluster whose centroid is closer 
c0 j= argrnin D(xit, c9) 
9=1,2,..., K 
i=1,2,..., N, t=1,2, 
..., 
T where D(xit, c4) denotes the Euclidean distance between the itth 
case and qth cluster centroid, given by 
/ D(Xit, Cq) = ýlxit,! 
-Cq, t)2 
1=1 
Thus the outcome of Step 2 is a set of K clusters of observation vectors. Let ml, m2, 
..., 
mK 
denote the number of observation vectors in each cluster such that j: y 1 mq = M. 
3. The centroid of the new qth cluster is given by its mean observation vector 
Cq 
-[ mq 
ýit ýit, lý 
... ý , 
m4 ýit ýit, s II, 
which facilitates a measure of the change in the cluster centroids, OSq = D(cq, c°q), q=1,2,..., K. 
4. If LSq <e for all q=1,2,..., K the algorithm terminates. Otherwise it goes to Step 2. We 
set e=0.01. The output of the procedure is the set of K clusters obtained at iteration j such 
that ASq = D(clýq+1, c9) <e for all q=1,2,..., K. 
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Appendix 4.2: Historical Sovereign Defaults per Year, 1984-2000 
Year 
Default entries Countries 
(&dit=1) 
1984 15 (7) Argentina, Benin, Bolivia, Dominican R, Egypt, El Salvador, Grenada 
Honduras, Iran, Mali, Mozanbique, Peru, Poland, Tanzania, Venezuela 
1985 6 (3) Congo R, Guinea, Morocco, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Zambia 
1986 9 (7) Argentina, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Costa Rica, Gabon, Guatemala, 
Jamaica, Paraguay, Syria 
1987 11 (9) Bolivia, Brazil, Congo, Dominican R, Ecuador, Morocco, Panama, 
Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo, Zambia 
1988 12 (7) Argentina, Colombia, Congo DR, Cote D'Ivoire, Egypt, Guinea, 
Lebanon, Mozanbique, Nigeria, Trinidad-Tobago, Uganda, Vietnam 
1989 15 (10) Brazil, El Salvador, Gabon, Honduras, Jamaica, Jordan, Malawi, Mali, 
Mexico, Morocco, Paraguay, Philippines, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo 
1990 7 (4) Bulgaria, Cameroon, Guatemala, Guinea, Nigeria, Russia, Syria 
1991 4 (3) Benin, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Seychelles 
1992 8 (5) Burkina Faso, Dominican R, Egypt, Haiti, Honduras, Kenya, Russia, 
Zambia 
1993 6 (5) Benin, Brazil, Costa Rica, Panama, Peru, Sierra Leone 
1994 5 (5) Algeria, Argentina, Guatemala, Jordan, Mali 
1995 6 (6) Bolivia, Congo R, Cote D'Ivoire, Dominican R, Gabon, Jamaica, 
1996 7 (7) Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Togo, Zambia 
1997 4 (4) Bulgaria, Nicaragua, Poland, Senegal 
1998 11 (11) Cameroon, Congo DR, Cote D'Ivoire, Dominican R, Indonesia, 
Pakistan, Peru, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Vietnam 
1999 2 (2) Ecuador, Honduras 
2000 7 (7) Burkina Faso, Gabon, Kenya, Mozanbique, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Total Rate 
1984-2000 135 (102) 10% (10%) 
1984-1995 104 (71) 11% (11%) 
1996-2000 31 (31) 8% (8%) 
Data on debt levels, arrears and reschedulings for N=75 countries over T=17 years (1984-2000) 
is used to define NT=75X17=1275 cases for the default indicator dit. Numbers in parentheses 
pertain to the effective country-period cases (NT=1017) used in the analysis; NT is dictated by 
the missing cases for X (=macrovariables or credit ratings). The following countries did not ex- 
perience default: Bangladesh, Bostwana, Chile, China, Czech R, Ghana, Hungary, India, Korea, 
Mauritus, Nepal, Oman, Papua Guinea, Romania, Swaziland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay. 
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Appendix 4.3: Logit Estimates 1984-1995 
Classifier 
Variable LOGIT LOGIT-II 
External debt/ GDP (+) 6.959 (7.19) 
- 
Official debt/ Total debt (+) 2.473 (2.03) 
- 
Short term debt/ Total debt (+) 
-0.068 (-0.06) - 
Debt service/ Exports (-{-) 
-1.940 (-3.13) - 
IMF credit/ Exports (+/-) 
-1.206 (-1.78) - 
Volatility export growth (+/-) 1.415 (2.18) 
- 
Trade balance/ GDP (-) 
. 
1.198 (-1.34) 
- 
Credit private sector/ DGP (+/-) 
-1.799 (-3.31) - 
GDP growth (-) 
-0.813 (-1.39) - 
Per capita GNP (-) 1.914 (3.31) 
- 
Volat. pc GNP growth (+/-) 1.681 (3.08) 
- 
RER misalignment (+/-) 0.437 (0.76) 
- 
Total trade/ GDP (-) 
. 
2.751 (-3.99) 
- 
II credit ratings (-) 
- -0.082 (-9.53) 
Intercept 
-2.641 (-1.60) 1.406 (6.66) 
The model is yit =f (xi, t-1), where yit =dit. Expected theoretical 
sign in parenthesis besides each variable; italics indicate correct sign. 
Volatility defined as std. deviation over [t-3, t]. ßEß misalignement 
is the real exchange rate deviation from trend; trend proxied by the 
sample mean up to W. In parenthesis the t-statistics are reported. 
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Appendix 5.1: Bootstrapping the Ratings Migration Process 
The bootstrap simulation method in steps is as follows: 
1. Estimate the generator matrix A from the observed sample of sovereign ratings (N sov- 
ereigns) 
2. Calculate the probability transition matrix as P(it) = exp(Ait). Choose the transition 
horizon At for the analysis. Transform the transition matrix into cumulative probability 
ranges for each rating. 
3. The initial rating Xoi and and lifetime hi for each sovereign (i = 1, 
..., 
N) are those in 
the observed sample. Obtain the next period state, Xli, by generating a random draw 
r-i. i. d. U[0,1] and matching it with the cumulative probability ranges corresponding to 
Xoi. For instance, if rE (pli + p12, p11 + P12 +P131, then the rating associated with the 
3rd column of P represents Xji. 
4. Repeat step 3 with starting state Xli to simulate X2i and so forth. The artificial rating 
history for sovereign i is {Xoi, Xli,..., Xh, } 
5. Repeat steps 3 and 4 for all sovereigns i=1, 
..., 
N. The output is the bootstrap dataset 
Bj that contains the N rating histories. 
6. Transform B3 into sequences of rating transition and durations. Use the latter to compute 
the transition probability matrix P(At) for the horizon of interest using the DTM and 
HHR estimation methods. Retain the default probability vector Pb1 and compute the 
mobility differential Orn, 1. 
7. Repeat steps 3 to 6a large number, R, of times. The parameters of interest are the R 
} 
and R mobility differential scalars {Ar"nj} default probability vectors PR {b3 i=1 
from 
the DTM and HHR estimation methods. 
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B. List of Moody's-rated foreign currency sovereign bond issuers 
Year New Ratings Countries 
1981-1986 11 Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Sweden, 
United Kingdom, Venezuela 
1987 5 Argentina, Brazil, Italy, Malaysia, Portugal 
1988 3 Belgium, Ireland, Spain 
1989 2 China, France 
1990 2 Iceland, Thailand 
1991 1 Mexico 
1992 0 None 
1993 2 Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey 
1994 5 Colombia, Indonesia, Japan, Philippines, Uruguay 
1995 5 Barbados, Bermuda, Greece, Pakistan, South Africa 
1996 4 Israel, Jordan, Mauritius, Poland 
1997 9 Bulgaria, Croatia, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Lithuania, 
Moldova, Oman, Russia, Slovenia 
1998 8 Bahamas, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Jamaica, Romania, Ukraine 
1999 12 Belize, Bolivia, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, 
El Salvador, Egypt, Estonia, Hungary, Korea, Latvia, 
Peru, Slovakia 
2000 3 Chile, Morocco, Qatar 
2001 0 None 
2002 0 None 
2003 0 None 
Total 72 
Ratings are observed on 5th March every year. 
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Appendix 5.3: Moody's Ratings Distribution 
A. Number of rated sovereigns. Groups by rating and year 
Rating 
Year Aaa Aa A Baa Ba BC Default Total IG NIG 
1981 8300000 0- 11 11 0 
1982 83000000 11 11 0 
1983 63000000990 
1984 63000000990 
1985 54000000990 
1986 62000000880 
1987 82112000 14 12 2 
1988 76111200 18 15 3 
1989 86211200 20 17 3 
1990 77411200 22 19 3 
1991 59412100 22 19 3 
1992 4 10 412200 23 19 4 
1993 4 10 413200 24 19 5 
1994 59617200 30 21 9 
1995 4 11 639200 35 24 11 
1996 4 11 768300 39 28 11 
1997 4 13 68 12 600 49 31 18 
1998 5 13 68 17 800 57 32 25 
1999 6 12 9 13 14 10 32 69 40 29 
2000 7 11 7 17 14 11 12 70 42 28 
2001 7 11 8 18 12 11 11 69 44 25 
2002 998 18 14 11 02 71 44 27 
2003 13 5 14 13 13 10 11 70 45 25 
Total 146 173 97 112 132 85 68 759 528 231 
% 19 23 13 15 17 11 11 100 70 30 
Ratings are observed on 5th March. Sovereigns with withdrawn ratings 
are eliminated from the year of withdrawal to the year of new rating. 
Default sovereigns are discarded from the year following default to the 
year of recovery. IG and NIG stand for Investment Grade and 
Non-Investment Grade issuers, respectively. 
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B. Percentage of rated sovereigns. Groups by rating and year 
Fisting 
Year Aaa Aa A Baa Ba BC Default Total IG NIG 
1981 73 27 000000 100 100 0 
1982 73 27 000000 100 100 0 
1983 67 33 000000 100 100 0 
1984 67 33 000000 100 100 0 
1985 56 44 000000 100 100 0 
1986 75 25 000000 100 100 0 
1987 57 14 77 14 000 100 86 14 
1988 39 33 666 11 00 100 83 17 
1989 40 30 10 55 10 00 100 85 15 
1990 32 32 18 55900 100 86 14 
1991 23 41 18 59500 100 86 14 
1992 17 43 17 49900 100 83 17 
1993 17 42 17 4 13 800 100 79 21 
1994 17 30 20 3 23 700 100 70 30 
1995 11 31 17 9 26 600 100 69 31 
1996 10 28 18 15 21 800 100 92 28 
1997 8 27 12 16 24 12 00 100 63 37 
1998 9 23 11 14 30 14 00 100 56 44 
1999 9 17 13 19 20 14 43 100 58 42 
2000 10 16 10 24 20 16 13 100 60 40 
2001 10 16 12 26 17 16 11 100 64 36 
2002 13 13 11 25 20 15 03 100 62 38 
2003 19 7 20 19 19 14 11 100 64 36 
See note in Table A. 
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Appendix 5.4: Summary Statistics for Sovereign Rating Durations 
Rating Mean StDev Max Min StDev/Mean 
Aaa 78.94 78.65 280.03 12.10 0.996 
Aa 50.22 49.09 194.07 1.63 0.978 
A 33.74 32.30 124.57 2.23 0.957 
Baa 32.17 21.70 87.13 0.80 0.674 
Ba 31.46 26.66 103.10 0.63 0.847 
B 18.58 19.62 84.97 0.13 1.06 
C 11.48 11.74 34.37 1.27 1.02 
D 28.70 17.44 55.13 0.40 0.61 
Duration is the number of months spent in each rating. 
Data are from March 1981 to March 2004. 
211 
